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9Introduction
As the title suggests, the two central themes of this book are urban mobility and poverty. Mobility refers as much to 
the act of moving from one place to another using 
some mode of transport, as to the social and cul-
tural meaning of this movement. Urban poverty, a 
growing phenomenon in many countries around 
the world, is seen here not as an isolated object of 
study but rather in its relationship with mobility. 
A city dweller’s ability to move on a daily 
or occasional basis hinges on factors such as the 
ease of physical access to a mode of transport, 
the frequency of the mode and the economic cost 
of travelling, represented, for example, in public 
transport fares or in the opportunity cost of travel 
time using di%erent modes. Indeed, in the absence 
of money to cover a fare, as is o&en the case in 
the poorest households, an individual’s capacity 
for movement will likely result from a household 
strategy, giving priority to one or two members of 
the family to travel. In an urban context in which 
access to income earning opportunities, education 
and leisure tends to be mediated by the capacity 
to move, such a decision might deprive other 
household members of these essential elements for 
personal and social development.  
As the world’s population continues 
to urbanise, cities represent an ever-higher 
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proportion of the national and global economy 
and human activities leave a growing footprint in 
the atmosphere through climate change. In this 
context it becomes ever more urgent and necessary 
to "nd forms of equitable urban management and 
planning which maximise society’s individual 
and collective development potential and, at 
the same time, lead to a more sustainable use 
of natural resources. It is a well-known fact that 
more than half of the world’s population lives in 
urban areas. In Latin America and the Caribbean 
this proportion is even higher and varies roughly 
in accordance with national income, surpassing 
80% in some countries. In the majority of African, 
Middle Eastern and Asian countries urbanisation 
is of the order of a third of the national population, 
but the next decades are likely to see a substantial 
increase, in some cases an accelerated increase, in 
the proportion of the population living temporarily 
or permanently in urban areas. 
Globalisation, which has been 
experienced by nearly all countries across the 
world, has been accompanied by a phenomenon 
of increasing income concentration within ever-
smaller segments of the national and global 
population. In many cities this is re$ected in the 
spatial concentration of wealthier groups in areas 
isolated from the rest of the urban population, in 
gated communities or other forms of physical and 
social isolation o&en in municipalities adjacent 
to traditional urban centres.  Latin America has 
been a pioneer amongst the so called ‘developing 
countries’ in allowing the proliferation of these 
urban ‘ghettoes’, but the trend in many other 
Figure 1: Medellín’s Metrocable K Line, launched in 2004
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countries which are undergoing a process of 
accelerated urbanisation is very similar. At the 
same time, the poorest populations continue to 
live in areas which are physically and socially 
marginal, areas where land prices and rents are 
more accessible, in neighbourhoods o&en far from    
the city centre, on steep terrains, or locations at 
risk of landslides and $ooding, even settling on 
sanitary land"lls. 
 Within this panorama of generalised and 
uncontrolled urban expansion, social, spatial and ad-
ministrative fragmentation, and high levels of physical 
and indeed social and economic isolation, it is inspir-
ing to examine in detail the experience of success sto-
ries. !at is, cities that have been able to contain, or at 
least, re-direct what appeared to be irredeemable phe-
nomena, with explicit criteria for equity and sustain-
ability whilst resorting to creativity and solidarity.  
Figure 2: London’s Emirates Air Line, launched in June 2012
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A&er having been associated for a long 
time in the global media with violence linked 
to the drug trade, in recent years Medellín, 
Colombia’s second city, has become an inspiring 
example of urban change led by the municipal 
government. In the context of a particularly 
di#cult topography, a dense and spatially 
segregated urban fabric, and high levels of income 
concentration, over the "rst decade of this century 
the local government actively searched for ways 
in which to redress these social and spatial 
imbalances. !is is represented emblematically by 
the Metrocables, aerial cable-car lines connecting 
high-density hilly neighbourhoods with the rest of 
the city (Figure 1). !e aerial cable-cars (usually 
known in Spanish and Portuguese as teleféricos) 
do not in themselves constitute a technological 
innovation; they are a tried and tested technology 
on ski pistes around the world. With the exception 
of the Aerial Tramway of Roosevelt Island in New 
York, in urban areas they have been mainly used 
to transport tourists, such as can be seen in the 
recent example of London’s Emirates Air Line 
(Figure 2). Medellín is the "rst city in the world to 
use this technology as a means of mass transport 
exclusively aimed at low-income populations. 
!e "rst Metrocable line, inaugurated in 2004, 
connects the so called ‘north-western communes’, 
neighbourhoods marked over the years by the 
stigma of poverty, violence and almost total 
control of illegal militias and drug tra#ckers, with 
the city’s overground Metro system. 
!e novel use of an aerial cable-car 
in these conditions in itself would merit closer 
scrutiny, with the aim of measuring, for example, 
its e%ectiveness as a mass transit system and its 
limited environmental impact. But the underlying 
motivation of this book stems from the fact that 
this technology is not used in Medellín in an 
isolated manner as a solution to the transport 
problems of neighbourhood residents, but is 
instead part of a much wider set of interventions. 
!ese seek to integrate the neighbourhoods with 
the rest of the city while improving opportunities 
for those that live or work there through a range 
of projects: upgrading of housing and public 
spaces, social infrastructure with eye-catching 
architectural design in schools and libraries, 
economic and social support programmes. But 
at their core lies a political approach to local 
government involvement that seeks to deliver 
physical and infrastructure change through more 
active forms of community participation than the 
top-down forms usually present in widespread 
patron-client practices.
!e vigorous defence of the "rst 
Metrocable line by commune residents in Medellín 
re$ects not only the central importance that 
cable-cars have acquired as a mode of transport, 
but also a sense that they have helped revalue 
these neighbourhoods in the eyes of residents 
and visitors alike, including a growing number 
of foreign tourists. !ese interventions are part 
of a new generation of urban upgrading projects 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the cases 
documented here, urban transport and, more 
concretely, mobility, have a central role in upgrading 
that is at the same time both real and symbolic. 
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!is book is the product of a two-year 
research project examining the social and urban 
impacts of the Metrocables and the upgrading 
projects associated with them. !e research also 
sought to examine the possible impacts of a similar 
system in Soacha, a municipality adjacent to 
Bogotá, Colombia’s capital.
!e research team brought together 
"ve institutions. !e project was coordinated by 
University College London’s (UCL) Development 
Planning Unit, and researchers from the following 
universities participated: Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia (Medellín campus), Universidad 
de los Andes (Bogotá), Department of Civil, 
Environmental and Geomatic Engineering at UCL 
(London) and Universidad del Rosario (Bogotá). !e 
research was jointly funded (Research Grant RES-
167-25-0562) by the United Kingdom’s Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the 
Department for International Development (DFID).
!is book can be downloaded for free 
in English and Spanish from the project’s website 
(www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/metrocables) where 
other project outputs can also be found. 
!e book has four sections. !e "rst 
section provides theoretical explorations of mobility 
and transport in the context of an urbanised 
society. !e second section outlines with some 
level of detail the case study of Medellín, including 
the institutional background of the interventions, 
the communities’ socio-economic pro"les, the 
travel patterns and the opinions of users and non-
users of the Metrocables, and the system’s political 
resonance. !e third section re$ects upon the 
feasibility of building an aerial cable-car system in 
the municipality of Soacha, a project announced 
by the President of Colombia in a speech given to 
local residents. Soacha embodies a marked contrast 
to Medellín, as it lacks the "nancial, institutional 
and political conditions that made the changes 
documented in the second section possible. !e 
fourth section groups various experiences in 
other cities, from descriptions of the systems in 
Caracas and Rio de Janeiro, inspired by Medellín, 
to proposals for aerial cable-cars in La Paz and Cali. 
!e "nal section concludes with re$ections on the 
lessons arising from contrasting the context and 
experiences in Medellín and Soacha.
!is book and the other project outputs 
would not have been possible without the crucial 
support of numerous people and institutions. 
I especially want to thank all the members of 
the research team from the "ve institutions for 
their hard and rigorous work in collecting and 
analysing primary and secondary information, 
and for their wholehearted participation in 
national workshops in Medellín (September 
2010) and Bogotá (March 2011), and also in the 
international workshop in Medellín (December 
2011). !eir valuable contributions can be 
seen in the chapters of this book, in articles in 
specialised journals and in two reports available 
(in Spanish) on the project’s website. I am 
particularly indebted to Peter Brand, Françoise 
Coupé, Juan Pablo Bocarejo, Jorge Acevedo and 
Iván Sarmiento for enthusiastically agreeing to 
my proposal of exploring these two fascinating 
case studies. 
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I owe my considerable thanks also to 
the participants and organisers of the workshops 
for their support, their time and their insights 
into the two cases studies. In particular, Soledad 
Betancur and José Fernando Angel not only gave 
us their valuable time in two of the workshops, 
but they also shared their extensive experience of 
more than a decade as professionals at the centre 
of change and critical re$ection in Medellín. !e 
smooth operation of the international workshop 
in Medellín was due, in large part, to the hard 
work of Alejandra Jaramillo, Beatriz Marín and 
Carolina García to whom I am very grateful.
!e research would not have reached a 
successful end without the support and time of 
those who gave us access to crucial information, 
be this o#cial documentation or personal 
opinions, or both. In particular, I would like to 
thank former Medellín mayors Sergio Fajardo 
and Luis Pérez; in the Metro Company, Ramiro 
Márquez Ramírez (CEO), Tomás Elejalde and 
Engineers Luis R. Pérez and !eodor Kurk 
Echeverri; and Federico Restrepo (until 2011) 
CEO of Medellín’s Public Utilities Company 
(EPM) and former Director of Municipal 
Planning under Sergio Fajardo’s administration.
I am enormously grateful to Diana 
Daste, Caren Levy, Nick Tyler, Gynna Millán, 
Yukiko Fujimoto, Sarah Walton, Mark Hopwood 
and Naveed Khan at UCL, as well to Lyndy Gri#n 
at ESRC. I also want to thank María Carolina 
Lecompte, Daniel Oviedo, Sebastián Velásquez and 
César Arango at Universidad de los Andes; Ivette 
González, Laura Díaz, Sebastián Villamizar and 
Natalia Duarte at Universidad del Rosario; Tom 
Aston, who translated the book into English, and 
Andrés Monsalve, who designed the book and 
saw it through to the "nal stages of the production 
process. Other friends and colleagues gave us their 
valuable support and their time in a variety of 
ways: Cecilia Vargas, Martha Correa, Isaac Dyner, 
Isis Nuñez, Alejandro (Cacho) Echeverri R. and 
Julian Honer.
Finally, on behalf of the research team, 
I want to express my sincere thanks to all the 
inhabitants of Communes 1, 2, 7 and 13 in Medellín 
and Commune 4 in Soacha for giving us their time, 
sharing their daily experiences through interviews 
and focus groups, and welcoming us with warmth 
and generosity. Luis Alberto Camargo, a leader in 
Soacha’s Commune 4, gave us more time than a 
researcher can dare to dream in their "eldwork. 
!e sta% in Casa de los Derechos (Human Rights 
House) in Soacha’s Commune 4 kindly received us 
and lent us their premises for the "rst set of focus 
groups and interviews. To all of them I would like to 
dedicate this personal and collective e%ort.
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Society, Mobility, and the City 
Mobility has become a de"ning characteristic of the contemporary world. !e movement of ever 
greater quantities of goods, people, money and 
information, at ever lower cost, and at higher 
speed, has exponentially increased over the 
last three decades. Revolutionary advances in 
transport infrastructure and information and 
telecommunication technologies have been an 
integral part of this and have driven globalisation 
in all its dimensions: economic, political, social 
and cultural. 
For cities, the capacity to integrate into 
this perpetual movement, intensi"ed at a global 
scale, has become a fundamental condition for 
their participation in the economic circuits of 
organised networks. !is obliges cities to carry out 
substantial investments in transport infrastructure 
and virtual connectivity. At the same time, the 
problem of congestion intensi"es, and with it new 
responses are being tried out, such as restrictions 
on the use of private vehicles, the search for clean 
technologies, the promotion of public transport 
and the use of non-mechanised means of transport 
(bicycling, walking). Mobility is also transforming 
urban living, leading to a rethinking of the way 
in which individuals and groups interact and 
participate in social activities. However this is 
a very heterogeneous phenomenon, and for 
large segments of the population, especially in 
developing countries, life continues to unfold 
primarily in local geographical spaces, in relative 
isolation from and without easy access to the 
opportunities and demands of the globalised city.
As the following section will show, 
Medellín’s Metrocables have a special interest due 
to the way in which they combine the following 
two dimensions: innovation in the use of transport 
technology, and its application in the poorest and 
most marginalised sectors of the city.  !is chapter 
synthesises some approaches on the sociology of 
mobility, with the aim of conceptually structuring 
the signi"cance and possible consequence of an 
increase in mobility for such a social group. !ese 
ideas and their usefulness evolved and matured 
throughout the research that led to this book.  
Peter Brand 
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Transport, Accessibility 
and Mobility 
For some authors, mobility and its consequences 
constitute phenomena of such magnitude as to 
demand a new paradigm for the social sciences 
(Urry, 2007). In place of the traditional sociological 
concern centred on social structures, Urry and others 
argue that movement and $ows should be placed 
at the forefront, as the organising elements of social 
life. As such, mobility is a far from minor issue; it is 
understood, rather, as a characteristic, a condition 
and a requirement of contemporary societies.  
!e growing "eld of mobility studies 
emphasises plurality in the means and types of 
movement. By including both physical movement 
and virtual $ows, there is a tendency to refer to 
‘mobilities’ in plural, in their relation to both 
social and spatial organisation. Here there is an 
important di%erence between more technical 
transport studies and those that take a sociological 
approach around the notion of ‘mobilities’. A 
central concept in transport studies is that of 
accessibility, understood as a measure of “the 
place’s connectedness to means of transport and 
the place’s attractiveness in terms of opportunities 
that can be realised there”, referring to the objective 
conditions for moving something or someone, 
based on the principle of utility maximisation 
(Ohnmacht et al., 2009: 16). From this perspective, 
speed and cost are the primary concerns, but 
recently other variables have acquired importance, 
such as energy consumption, the environment 
and social equity (Bocarejo and Oviedo, 2010). 
In contrast, the concept of mobility is directed 
more towards the logics and practices of the actor: 
how an actor builds his/her relationship with 
space, with less emphasis placed on the objective 
opportunities o%ered by a territory itself (Flamm 
and Kaufmann, 2006: 169).
However, the analysis of accessibility is 
not limited to infrastructure supply. It also includes 
attraction factors such as land use and activity 
clusters, as well as obstacles to user access. Of 
these latter, cost in relation to income is probably 
given most attention, but the physical limitations 
and cognitive disadvantages of di%erent users, 
gender discrimination, and so on, have become 
increasingly important. In this way, a concern for 
poverty and social inequality opens the way for 
the analysis of signi"cance of di%erent transport 
options for the poorest and most vulnerable social 
groups. !is builds an important bridge between 
accessibility and mobility. 
Mobility, 
Inequality and Poverty Although poverty reduction was not an explicit 
ÀǯϐMetrocable line (see Coupé, Brand and Dávila’s chapter in the following section), as time passed great 
ϐthat could result for the poor and marginalised sectors of the population who lived in areas where the Metrocables were built. Such 
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expectations rested on the belief that greater accessibility through a new mobility option would bring with it, in and of itself, enhanced opportunities and better living conditions.
While there is abundant evidence to 
demonstrate that, in general, a lack of mobility 
constitutes an integral part of a condition of social 
disadvantage, the opposite is not necessarily true. 
!at is to say, marginal increases in options for 
mobility do not inevitably and inexorably lead to 
social improvement.  
In general, greater mobility implies 
greater opportunities, but this presupposes the 
availability of the economic, physical and cognitive 
resources necessary to take advantage of those 
opportunities. At one extreme, mobility, once a 
luxury, has become a generalised necessity and a 
heavy burden (Bauman, 2000); to be in movement, 
real or virtual, is to be permanently connected, 
and this has become a stressful and demanding 
condition of contemporary life. At the other 
extreme are social groups anchored to a local 
territory due to their absolute lack of resources 
for mobility. As Bauman points out, an increase 
in mobility does not homogenise societies, rather 
it strati"es and polarises them: it liberates some 
individuals to act at distance without any kind of 
territorial attachment, while imprisoning others in 
a particular place. 
For poor communities who are relatively 
disconnected from the modern formal economy, 
collective life continues to revolve around a 
local personalised space. !e local territory or 
neighbourhood (barrio) continues to be a central 
point of reference and source of livelihood and 
identity. In other words, in the areas of in$uence 
of the Medellín Metrocables, one can still expect 
to "nd relatively strong local spatial communities, 
where the lack of mobility constitutes, from this 
perspective, a heightened disadvantage. In this 
sense, Ohnmacht et al. (2009) propose two ways of 
addressing the relationship between mobility and 
inequality: 
In its relationship with classical forms of 
inequality: how di%erent levels of mobility 
are related to the uneven distribution of 
wealth, income, education and status. 
New forms of inequality related to di%erent 
mobilities: in addition to the ‘vertical’ 
inequalities within society, mobilities 
produce new ‘horizontal’ inequalities 
though their e%ects within a more 
complex and diverse social organisation; 
for example, in relation to age, gender, 
ethnicity and lifestyle.   
!e "rst relationship has received more 
attention in conventional transport studies. As 
Ohnmacht et al. (2009) have pointed out, the 
relationship between accessibility and social 
exclusion has been a secondary but important 
issue within transport engineering and policy. 
It is well known that high-income people travel 
more and travel faster than people with low 
incomes, and that the lack of access to transport 
can drastically reduce the life opportunities of the 
poorest in urban society. For the poorest social 
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groups that live in the urban periphery, lack of 
mobility means that geographical marginalisation 
exacerbates social exclusion (Ureta, 2008), as can 
be seen in the case of Soacha municipality; a more 
detailed discussion can be found in later chapters 
of this book. 
New ‘horizontal’ inequalities, which 
derive from a lack of access to transport 
infrastructure and services, a%ect not only 
the poor but also the young, the elderly, the 
disabled and the least educated. For their part, 
new communication technologies, such as the 
internet and mobile telephones, demand economic 
resources but also require an additional dose of 
technical skills and cultural capital, and lacking 
these further accentuates social divisions. 
‘Motility’ Building on the above, there arises a paradox 
whereby despite the hyper-mobility of 
contemporary societies, social structures 
tend to remain relatively stable. In fact social 
di%erentiation has intensi"ed and inequality has 
become more pronounced. !e term ´motility’ 
has been used to help explain this phenomenon. 
Motility is understood as “the capacity of entities 
(e.g. goods, information or persons) to be mobile 
in social and geographical space, or as the way 
in which such entities access and appropriate 
the capacity for socio-spatial mobility according 
to their own circumstances” (Kaufmann et al., 
2004: 750). In contrast with ‘mobility’, the notion 
of ‘motility’ incorporates the “structural and 
cultural dimensions of movement and action in 
that the actual or potential capacity for spatio-
social mobility may be realized di%erently or 
have di%erent consequences across varying socio-
cultural contexts” (Kaufmann et al., ibid.).
!e important thing is the recognition 
that mobility is not static and uniform in character, 
meaning and consequences; rather, mobility 
becomes a new good or form of ‘capital.’ Following 
Kaufman et al. (2004), three inter-dependent 
elements may be identi"ed: 
Access, or the possibility to take advantage 
of the diverse transport and communication 
options that a particular territory o%ers, and 
the conditions of access to those options 
(cost, logistics and other restrictions). 
Competencies, or the knowledge and skills 
necessary to access and make use of those 
transport and communication options. 
Appropriation, or how agents (individuals, 
groups, networks and institutions) interpret 
and act on those options, which in turn is 
shaped by the needs and aspirations of those 
agents and their strategies, values and habits. 
Implications for a 
Research Project on 
Medellín’s Metrocables
A sociological investigation of the type outlined 
above was beyond the scope of this research project. 
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Nonetheless, there are important lessons that 
should be considered. On the basis of Kaufmann et 
al.’s outline, it is clear that social groups in the areas 
of in$uence of the Metrocables project are relatively 
homogenous from the point of view of orthodox 
statistical criteria, and undoubtedly su%er mobility 
restrictions, not just in terms of their limited 
economic capacity to access ‘mobilities,’ but also 
in terms of the knowledge and skills required. 
With regard to the supply of transport services, 
the Metrocables were built in areas where walking 
is still the main mode of transport and where the 
bus continues to be the most common motorised 
mode, although there is increasing access to 
motorcycles as a private mode of transport.  
However, the most important aspect 
is the third element proposed by Kaufmann et 
al.:  the needs, motivations and aspirations of 
individuals and groups. We must avoid falling 
into the trap of presuming that greater mobility 
has the same meaning for each social group, with 
the same consequences for social trajectories. 
Increased mobility can integrate individuals 
and social groups, or conversely, it can fragment 
identities and diversify social trajectories.  For the 
purposes of the Metrocables study, the usefulness 
of the concept of motility may be speci"ed in the 
following way: 
It should not be assumed that aerial 
cable-car systems will lead directly and inexorably 
to a greater integration of poor neighbourhoods 
with the rest of the city and to poverty reduction.
!e conditions of informality in these 
sectors should be taken into account with regard to 
Bangalore
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income-earning activities, access to public services, 
the relationship to administrative authority, and 
the local structures of power and prestige. 
It is vitally important to take into account 
the set of barriers and obstacles to a greater urban 
integration though improved mobility: the daily 
routines of the population in all its diversity, social 
horizons and individual expectations.  
Moreover, in a more general sense, it is important to: 
Recognise how the public sphere can 
contribute to greater mobility in a context in 
which private options remain seriously restricted. 
!e possibilities for social integration through 
increased mobility are a direct consequence of 
state intervention. 
Di%erentiate between the logic of a city’s 
management (in its eagerness to ‘modernise’ 
poor neighbourhoods and integrate them into 
the formal city) and the logic of the inhabitants 
of these neighbourhoods in the context of their 
everyday urgency to survive and improve (and 
even resist). !e inhabitants in the areas of 
in$uence of the Metrocables project have their own 
lifestyles and aspirations which in$uence the way 
in which they make use, or not, of the Metrocables.   
Di%erentiate and then re-articulate the 
technical-engineering rationality of planning 
strategies, on the one hand, and the logics and 
interests of governance on the other; the desire 
to normalise aspirations and behaviours of the 
population can work in favour of or against the 
daily realities of life in the neighbourhood. 
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One of the hallmarks of contemporary towns and cities globally is the extraordinary diversity of their 
populations and the complex activities associated 
with the lives they lead. Alongside and intersecting 
with this diversity is great inequality.  However, 
while the degree and scale of this diversity and 
inequality may be di%erent, towns and cities 
have always re$ected these relations of di%erence 
and injustice – conditions and processes that, 
more o&en than not, planning has been unable 
to address (Levy, 2009).  Planning practices were 
and continue to be imbued with conscious or 
unconscious assumptions and biases about how 
women and men, girls and boys in households and 
communities live in the city.
Over the last 25 years, transport 
planning, despite on-going concerns with gender 
mainstreaming in other policy and planning, 
has been particularly resistant to the recognition 
of di%erence and inequality in urban areas.  In 
contemporary neo liberal approaches to the city, 
transport has been recognised as critical to the 
development of the ‘competitive city’, but o&en 
at the expense of a socially just city.  Yet, urban 
transport is one of the most critical entry points 
for both the e#ciency of and the equal access to 
opportunities in the city of the 21st century. !is 
Caren Levy  
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paper will focus on three common challenges faced 
by transport infrastructure and services in fast 
growing cities:
1. How can the provision of transport in fast 
growing cities respond to, as well as strate-
gically lead, urban development so that it 
bene"ts all citizens and responds to their 
diverse interests and needs? 
2. How can the provision of transport which 
involves mobility in di%erent kinds of pub-
lic space, contribute to the equal appropri-
ation of the city by its diverse population 
in a way that enhances the collective space 
and aspiration in the city?
3. How can the provision of urban transport 
contribute to the progressive governance of 
cities, incorporating an inclusive vision of 
the right to participate in decisions a%ect-
ing urban dwellers?
!e subsequent sections will brie$y 
address each question in turn, within the 
framework of a socially just city that addresses 
gender justice, wherever possible using examples 
of the research project of which this book is an 
output. Following Young (1991), the socially just 
city comprises a material and an institutional 
dimension, which are in continual interaction.  !e 
"rst refers to the distribution of material bene"ts 
and burdens in the city, and in transport terms 
relates to the accessibility and mobility of all urban 
citizens, addressing the "rst and second questions 
above. !e second addresses the institutional 
procedures and practices of governance in the city, 
and relates to participation in decision making in 
transport policy and planning, thus addressing the 
third question.     
!e following sections will explore gender 
justice in the material and institutional dimensions 
of social justice, as de"ned above.  Although 
the focus is on gender relations, it should be 
understood that gender intersects with other social 
relations of class, ethnicity, religion, race, sexuality, 
mental and physical ability, and age, and hence 
an exploration of gender in all its diversity will 
weave into the discussions of urban poverty and 
inequality in the subsequent sections of the paper.  
Transport Planning
in the Context 
of Diversity: Gender 
Relations in Accessibility
Transport accessibility to urban opportunities 
relates not only to time/distance, but also to cost, 
safety and comfort.  Transport accessibility also 
has an integrative dimension in people’s lives, 
enabling them to balance – or orchestrate activities 
on a daily basis (see next chapter by Jirón).  While 
recognising the context speci"city of travel 
patterns in any urban setting, research over the 
last 25 years on gender relations in transport in 
di%erent cities demonstrates the importance of 
the social position of urban citizens in transport 
access, exhibiting some common tendencies (see 
for example, Anand and Tiwari, 2006; GTZ, 2007; 
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Levy, 1992 and 2013; Salon and Gulyani, 2010).  
In broad terms, based on their di%erent social 
position, the purposes, modes and experiences 
of women’s travel tend to di%er from that of 
men, as do their temporal and spatial patterns of 
movement in cities.   
Over the last 50 years an increasing 
number of women have moved into the formal 
workforce, so that in most contemporary urban 
situations, travel to work accounts for the highest 
proportion of both women and men’s trips.  
However, men tend to do proportionally many 
more work trips than do women. Women tend to 
do more trips than men related to reproductive 
activities in the household, for example, shopping, 
taking children to school, and taking family 
members to health facilities.  Trip patterns also 
re$ect the di%erent way in which women and men 
organise their daily activities. !us in most urban 
contexts, women do more multi-purpose trips 
(or ‘trip chaining’) than men, combining di%erent 
activities in a travel outing. Research also shows 
that travel for these di%erent purposes exhibit 
di%erent temporal patterns. In most contexts, 
men do more peak travelling than women while 
women do more o%-peak travelling than men. !e 
latter is important to recognise as women are o&en 
travelling to meet family needs when transport 
services are less frequent.
A critical in$uence in these travel 
patterns is the gender division of labour and the 
way in which women and men take on and balance 
productive, reproductive and other roles and 
responsibilities in households and communities 
in a di%erent and unequally valued manner.  
!e need for women to balance productive and 
reproductive activities accounts for the higher 
proportion of women in part-time work, and 
overall the shorter distances travelled by many 
women compared to men. !ese patterns are 
also strongly mediated by class and other social 
relations. !e informal sector is an important 
source of income for most poor people; for 
example, between 2001-2005 in Medellín it 
comprised 55% of the working population (see the 
chapter by Coupé). Furthermore, in most of these 
contexts, poor women account for the highest 
proportion of workers in the informal sector, 
which is di%erently distributed spatially from the 
formal sector in the city, and thus a factor in the 
di%erent travel patterns of working women and 
men of di%erent classes.
!is intersectionality comes out strongly 
in the di%erent modes of transport used by 
women and men. Where there is a family car, 
men will tend to have priority use of it. While a 
sense of patriarchal entitlement to this household 
resource is a strong factor here, women in most 
countries of the Global South are less likely to 
have a driving licence than men. However, in 
poor households, where a car is una%ordable, 
women and men tend to walk more. In Medellín, 
this trade-o% between cost and time is clearly 
demonstrated in the number of people walking 
instead of paying for public transport (see the 
chapter by Sarmiento et al.).  In most urban 
contexts, women tend to walk most, re$ecting 
their unequal access to resources.  
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!e research in Soacha shows that the 
transport patterns of women and men, girls and 
boys can be greatly a%ected in situations of urban 
con$ict and violence. In an area which has grown 
due to migration as a result of Colombia’s internal 
con$ict and in which much of the anatomy of 
that con$ict – along with state neglect – has 
been reproduced, the journeys made by Soacha 
residents, particularly women, are shaped and 
drastically con"ned, like their lives, by fear (see the 
chapter by Bocarejo and Álvarez Rivadulla).
!e research "ndings generated over the 
last 25 years talk to the importance of recognising 
gender and other social relations in the way 
transport forecasting and planning is done. 
However, they need to be understood in a wider 
context, beyond a behavioural understanding of 
di%erence in travel patterns. Firstly these travel 
patterns do not re$ect the actual travel interests and 
needs of women and men. For example, they do not 
show trips that were suppressed, postponed or re-
routed (Vasconcellos, 2001). !is is because current 
transport planning and provision in most cities has 
been done on the basis of a number of questionable 
assumptions about gender and class relations. In 
gender terms these relate to stereotypes about 
household structure, the gender division of labour 
and the distribution of resources in the household. 
!ese intersect with a focus on motorized 
transport, in particular the private car, and the 
(male) journey to work (Levy, 1992 and 2013). 
Because these assumptions do not re$ect the reality 
of people’s lives, transport planning contributes 
to the reproduction and perpetuation of urban 
inequality. !is exclusion is further exacerbated by 
the increased privatisation of transport provision 
in countries where the state has historically played 
a comparatively big role in transport provision.  
Furthermore, the articulation of transport 
infrastructure and services in public space acts as 
yet another critical factor in the reproduction of 
urban inequality and social exclusion. 
Transport Planning 
and Public Space: Gender 
Relations in Mobility
Transport accounts for a high proportion of the 
public space in any urban context. While this 
public space is critical to urban connectivity and 
the provision of access to essential urban activities, 
it is more than that. Streets, transport hubs like 
railway and bus stations, and public transport 
modes are all shared urban spaces, part of the 
conviviality of the city in which urban citizens 
live, enjoy and celebrate urbanity. !is is more 
about mobility than access in transport, that is, 
the freedom and right of all citizens to move in 
public space with safety and security – and without 
censure and social control (Levy, 2013). As with 
other public space, the public realm of transport is 
contested space, imbued with power and meaning 
in all societies, rooted in the intersecting relations 
of class, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, 
mental and physical ability, and age. 
!e signi"cance of gender relations is 
at the heart of the distinction between public 
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and private space, a false dichotomy between 
reproduction and consumption associated with 
women in the private sphere, and production 
and politics associated with men in the public 
sphere. Other social relations like ethnicity and 
religion, depending on the context, reinforce this 
basic division of labour in di%erent ways. !us, in 
most societies women’s mobility in public space 
is subject to a range of mechanisms of control, 
combined with decisions about travel – where, 
when and how – negotiated in the private sphere 
of the household and extended family networks 
(see also the chapter by Jirón). !is common 
gendered reality is the reason for the importance 
of safety, fear and violence in gender and transport 
research across countries. !e research in Soacha 
is illustrative of how women’s mobility can be 
in$uenced by factors both outside and inside the 
home. As Bocarejo and Álvarez Rivadulla show 
in their discussion of the perceptions of Cazucá’s inhabitants, women are con"ned to their home, 
“afraid to leave, in fear that their houses will 
be broken into and their daughters raped” but 
also because they are prevented from working 
outside the home by their partners (see chapter by 
Bocarejo and Álvarez Rivadulla).  
!ere are at least two implications for 
transport planning. Within the transport system 
itself, interventions need to be sought which 
promote the planning and design of transport 
hubs, routes and modes as defensible, comfortable 
and welcoming spaces. !e research in Medellín 
demonstrates how gendered perceptions of 
modal safety a%ect the modal choice of bus over 
Metrocable by women (see chapter by Sarmiento 
et al.). Practices to challenge violence in Medellín 
also show that this is more than a physical 
undertaking. !e creation of Cultura Metro, a 
set of behavioural norms enforced in Medellín’s 
mass-transport system (see chapters by Brand and 
Dávila, and Agudelo et al.), is a powerful ideology 
in which the balance between social control, 
respect for, and freedom of individuals is delicate 
and needs constant monitoring. Although Cultura 
Metro is not explicitly gender aware, women 
recognise that they would be worse o% without it, 
at the same time as complaining about its negative 
impacts – and still report sexual harassment in the 
Metrocable queues and on the crowded Metro (see 
the chapter by Coupé). 
!e second implication is the integration 
of transport planning with other urban planning 
interventions and especially physical upgrading 
of low-income areas. For example, the interface 
between transport routes and hubs and the 
neighbouring area or citywide facilities, is critical 
both for access to transport and for mobility in 
urban areas. !e co-operation between the Metro 
Company and the municipality in Medellín, 
particularly in the development of K Line, provides 
an excellent example of the link between the 
planning and construction of the Metrocable 
alongside the integrated urban projects (Proyectos 
Urbanos Integrales or PUIs) to upgrade the public 
space around and between Metrocable stations (see 
chapters by Brand and Dávila; by Coupé, Brand 
and Dávila; and by Coupé and Cardona). Similarly, 
the location of public libraries in relation to the 
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Metrocable and Metro stations in Medellín is an 
example of the meshing of transport hubs with 
citywide facilities. !e residents of Soacha clearly 
also perceive – and hope – that the creation of the 
Cazucable could attract a similar package of urban 
investment, recognition and visibility (see chapter 
by Bocarejo and Álvarez Rivadulla). While a 
gender perspective is not explicitly mainstreamed 
in the interventions in Medellín, the way spaces 
have been upgraded and developed make them 
safer and more secure for women and men, girls 
and boys.  
In assembling the components of this kind 
of integration between transport and other local 
and citywide planning, the involvement of urban 
citizens has an essential contribution to make. 
Transport Planning 
and Governance:
Gender Relations 
in Decision-Making
Despite decentralisation and the increasing 
recognition of the signi"cance of local government, 
coupled with the extension of democracy in local 
governance in contemporary cities, the practice 
of urban transport planning internationally is 
not known for its active incorporation of citizen 
participation. Yet, transport has powerful and 
o&en intrusive implications for daily individual 
and collective lives, which do not go unrecognised 
by urban citizens themselves, who o&en mobilise 
collectively against the negative impacts of transport 
decisions. !ese include protest against high fares, 
questions of safety (the rape and sexual harassment 
of women in public space and public transport), and 
the eviction of slum dwellers through the expansion 
and development of transport routes (for example 
in Mumbai where women have played actives roles 
alongside men in social movements).
Because of the deep-rooted gender 
ideology relating to public and private space, 
women are underrepresented in formal political 
structures in most countries. Ensuring the 
equal participation of women in city-wide and 
neighbourhood political processes requires a 
conscious e%ort to reach out to women and some 
men who, because of their social identities, are 
excluded from political decision making processes.
!e notion of ‘social urbanism’ 
developed in Medellín presents an interesting 
challenge to the usual technical focus of 
transport planning. Participatory planning 
in local development plans and participatory 
budgets (a%ecting between 5%-10% of municipal 
investment resources) were viewed as central to 
neighbourhood upgrading through the PUIs – 
and ultimately to the process of reclaiming these 
marginalised areas of the city (see the chapter by 
Coupé, Brand and Dávila). While participation 
was not consciously gendered and did not seek 
equal representation from women and men, some 
women did participate and appear to have learned 
and bene"tted from the opportunities a%orded by 
these processes and even felt empowered (see the 
chapter by Coupé).  
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Reframing 
‘Travel Choice’ in the 
Right to the City
Urban citizens are making daily trade o%s about 
their use of transport to access essential activities in 
the city. !ese trade-o%s are deeply gendered, and 
reinforced by other social relations. !ey are not 
optimal free ‘choices’, as transport planning assumes. 
Rather, travel decisions are made in the context of:
1. Transport systems that do not recognise the diverse 
needs and complex daily experiences of urban citizens. 
2. Gendered expectations in the private sphere of the 
household and the extended family.
3. And contested notion of public space that is fashioned 
by societal norms that result in controlling freedom of 
movement on the basis of social identities (Levy, 2013).
!e ‘Medellín model’ and the notion of ‘social urban-
ism’ developed in the city are a metaphor for an inte-
grated approach to transport and urban development, 
and for the power of the strategic potential of this in-
tegrated approach to address urban inequality. While 
class is clearly central to this inclusive perspective, 
embracing a wider notion of di%erence and inequality 
may o%er one avenue for strengthening this challeng-
ing notion and its wider application.
Taking this a step further, as I have 
argued elsewhere (Levy, 2013), locating a gendered 
view of transport within a Right to the City 
framework may more powerfully promote its 
recognition as central to the right to appropriation 
and the right to participation (Lefebvre, 1996) by 
diverse urban citizens. !is is not just a normative 
endeavour, but also a challenge to gender-blind 
transport planning which is an obstacle to its 
e%ectiveness in addressing diversity and inequality 
in contemporary urban areas.
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Incorporating a focus of daily mobility is one of the newest forms of approaching urban transport planning today. A mobility 
approach has contributed substantially to advance 
discussion regarding current phenomena in the 
social sciences and has also raised questions and 
produced new points of view in terms of thinking 
about a given territory. One aspect to which daily 
mobility speci"cally refers is the possibility of 
linking the daily experience of travel with new 
forms of improving transport and urban planning. 
!is work aims to shed light on these issues, using 
information from a study called “Daily urban 
mobility and urban social exclusion in Santiago de 
Chile” regarding the experience of travellers’ daily 
mobility in Santiago, the capital and main urban 
centre in Chile1.
Mobility has been extensively studied 
from a transport perspective; essentially from the 
disciplines of engineering, economics, geography 
and transport planning, business administration 
and regional studies (Johnston, 1981; Small, 2001). 
!ese are generally interested in understanding the 
travel patterns by means of origin and destination 
of daily journeys. In contrast, the “mobility turn” 
1  Funded by FONDECYT, Chile, N° 1090198. !e author 
was Principal Investigator of the research project. For 
more information, see: www.santiagosemueve.com 
The Importance 
of the Experience 
of Mobility in Transport 
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in the social sciences has revealed that the majority 
of transport research departs from an idea of space 
and the use that people make of space as "xed and 
restricted to certain areas. However, living in the 
city is directly related to people’s daily experiences 
and the space of the city through a complex 
process of interaction between travellers, activities, 
spaces, places and mobility factors. 
Mobility is central in understanding 
contemporary life in terms of how it changes and 
how it can develop over the next few decades 
(Urry, 2003a) and it refers to all the forms in 
which people relate socially to the change of place 
(Bourdin, 2003), which involves more than the 
sum of trips carried out.  Urry (2003b) points 
out that movement has not been adequately 
researched, except for work by engineers and 
transport economist who tend to examine simple 
journey categories. However, to understand 
these connections means to concentrate more in 
the experiences that these ‘mobilities’ generate 
than only in the types and forms of transport, as 
mobility is above anything else a means by which 
to carry out activities of a social nature and not the 
aim of those activities in and of itself. 
At the same time, while transport 
research fails to adequately consider the social 
processes involved in di%erent journeys and 
how these a%ect peoples’ lives, a large part of 
the research in the social sciences involved in 
travel/journeys have been ‘a-mobile’. It ignores 
the movements that people make to get to work, 
to school, to meet up with family members, 
and access leisure facilities.  Hence, they leave 
to one side an examination of how social life 
presupposes both real and imaginary movements 
from place to place, person to person, and event 
to event (Urry, 2003a). A comprehensive focus of 
mobility practices requires that we comprehend 
the contemporary reality of movement (Lussault, 
2003) and the impact that these make in terms of 
the construction of urban places, that is to say, the 
appropriation and meaning of urban space. 
A deeper comprehension of the 
multiple and hybrid experiences of mobility 
appears necessary given that mobility is an 
increasingly dominant and constitutive element 
of contemporary life and urban space.  On closer 
inspection of people’s experiences, ideas regarding 
"xity, permanence that is present in the most part 
of urban analysis, one may begin to interrogate 
mobile experiences that emerge as $uid and multi-
scalar processes in their situated complexity. !is 
way of analysing mobility practices is part of the 
“mobility turn” which is allowing considerable 
theoretical, methodological and practical advances 
in the social sciences and in understanding 
contemporary societies. 
On the other hand, one of the daily 
experiences that cause the greatest impact 
in the quality of urban life is daily mobility. 
Contemporary urban life is increasingly impacted 
by mobility, whether this be physical or virtual, 
in bus or car, on foot or bicycle. In the same way, 
immobility, or restricted mobility, can be clearly 
re$ected in inequalities that are lived in our cities, 
due to the diverse dynamics that a%ect urban 
centres today. 
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Nowadays, mobility experiences re$ect 
di%erent access to education, employment, health, 
and recreation, amongst others. Moreover, they 
are based on distinct social conditions in$uencing 
one’s possibility of encounters or dis-encounters 
during one’s experience. !at is to say, daily 
mobility is relevant to the quality of one’s urban 
life, on one hand related to access to di%erent 
spaces in the city, but on the other, it is also 
important with regard to how, when and with 
whom mobility is achieved or not. 
It is worth highlighting that the 
experience of mobility has implications in people’s 
lives, and these are not homogeneous; urban 
experiences are di%erent for men and women, 
boys and girls. !is means that the practice of 
inhabiting the city is di%erent for all concerned 
and indeed has diverse implications, such as in 
the possible policy recommendations to overcome 
inequalities. Within this practice, there are 
di%erent forms of experiencing the city, amongst 
other factors, these include gender di%erences, 
which intersect with generational and life-cycle 
di%erences, those of ethnicity, income, (dis)ability. 
From an analysis of journey experiences, 
one may discover di%erent ‘mobilities,’ that is to 
say, travel experiences are very di%erent depending 
on who lives them: a child, a teenager, a mother 
with small children, an adult with luggage, a 
pregnant woman, and an older person.   
On the other hand, “daily” refers to 
what people live on a daily basis: it is connected 
to places where women and men, girls and boys 
live, work, consume, enjoy, and relate with others, 
building identities, facing or defying routine, 
habits and norms of established conduct. In the 
framework of these experiences, on the bus, 
walking, moving, standing, meeting people, 
sharing moments; these are the things that 
constitute the essence of being urban.  
Understanding people’s daily activities 
in time and space is important for three reasons. 
First, because current urban interventions do not 
incorporate the way in which people experience 
the city as urban and transport planning inform 
mainly through abstract data about the city, added 
to the fact that there is very limited recognition 
of how daily life feeds into policies and vice 
versa. !ere is a danger of ‘instrumentalising’ 
the ‘daily’ and cataloguing it in such a way that 
planning mechanises daily life, and in trying to 
modify behaviour as a form of social engineering. 
Second, it may be understood as a closer means 
of understanding what is really happening, how 
lives are a%ected by events, rather than abstract 
numbers and theories which are o&en dissociated 
from what people do. 
Finally, the use of appropriate 
methodologies in$uences how one can understand 
daily life, in this case, as will be shown in this 
chapter, an ethnographic focus is the most suitable 
methodology for the research to better understand 
this daily reality. 
It is important to analyse the practices 
and experiences of mobility of a person within a 
complex system of relations with other people or 
objects that form part of their decisions, practices, 
and experiences regarding daily movements. !e 
33
Society, Mobility, and the City 
concept of inter-dependence is appropriate for 
describing, discussing and comprehending the 
conditions and consequences of the forms of daily 
mobility among the inhabitants of Santiago de 
Chile as they relate to social exclusion (Jirón and 
Cortés, 2011).
!e study of daily mobility, from this 
perspective, constitutes a means through which 
to approach people’s daily lives in terms of how 
they are organised or “orchestrated,” given that the 
majority of people pass the great majority of their 
days orchestrating, like an orchestra conductor, 
in continuous movements in relation to others 
(Jarvis, 2005). !ere are then multiple relations 
of a diverse nature which make up daily life and 
yet allow a relatively rational organisation based 
on people’s needs and resources. Explicit and 
implicit negotiations are key to these relations, 
alongside emotional and practical links that are 
found amongst family members, communities or 
through hiring services. !ese links can be seen 
when one approaches the practices and experience 
of mobility from the point of view of the people 
involved, as movement appears as a need to carry 
out daily activities, but also as an instance in which 
people negotiate and try to resolve varied aspects 
of daily life which on many occasions stress the 
closest social relations.  From an inter-dependency 
perspective, mobility appears as a network 
that articulates diverse routines, resources, 
needs, interests, expectations, productive and 
reproductive roles of a varied number of people 
who relate to one another through emotional and/
or practical links in the organisation of their daily 
lives, which currently are not conceived without 
the existence of others in that network.  !e roles 
and position that each person has within this are 
not static and vary in accordance with stages in the 
life cycle, economic conditions and gender roles, 
amongst other variables such as ethnicity and 
physical conditions. !e number of connections 
is also not "xed (Cortés, 2012). To show how this 
happens, we will present the travel experience of 
the members of a middle-income family who lives 
in the north of the city of Santiago and together 
use diverse modes of transport to inhabit space. 
Gloria is married to Fernando and 
they live in a closed condominium in the 
Huechuraba Commune in the northern sector 
of Santiago. Fernando is a graphic designer and 
works in a construction "rm in the ‘Sanhattan’ 
neighbourhood, the capital’s new business centre.  
Gloria is in charge of all domestic tasks. !ey have 
three children: Sebastián, who is 19, is about to 
enter university and is attending pre-university in 
a centre in the city; Javier who is a teenager and 
in tenth grade in a boys school in Providencia 
Commune and Paulina, who is 10, is in "&h grade 
in an all-girls’ school in Independencia Commune.
Until three years ago Gloria did not drive; 
all that she did depended on public transport, 
she went to the fair, to carry out paperwork or to 
search for a school for her daughter or visiting 
family in buses or shared taxis2. In general, 
this meant long tiring trips, but she also had to 
organise her time well and spent more time at 
2 Taxis with "xed destination but $exible routes.
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home or in her mother’s house. Later, she learned 
to drive and the family bought an automatic car 
to make driving easier. At the beginning, she was 
scared and ashamed, she was intimidated when 
she drove with her husband, but little by little she 
got the hang of it, and began to take longer routes, 
and soon she was taking to the motorways without 
fear. Driving has been an important challenge for 
her; it has given her independence and allowed her 
to feel that she has conquered a great fear. At the 
same time, to be the holder of a driving license has 
granted her the title of the family’s o#cial driver, 
a dynamic family, with diverse daily activities, for 
those that move, she has become a slave to the car.
Although she has always been the family’s 
core, this new ability made her indispensable, not 
simply for her nuclear family but also for her extended 
family. Gloria lives for the activities of others. 
As they have only one car, she drops her 
husband in the morning and, to avoid the rush 
hour, they must leave before 7 am.  Gloria wakes 
up early to prepare breakfast for everyone and 
their respective lunch packs. In this trip they take 
full advantage by bringing the two younger chil-
dren who leave half asleep, eating their breakfast or 
listening to music with headphones. In this stretch, 
Fernando drives, initially on the Vespucio Norte 
motorway towards Providencia, they pass through 
the San Cristóbal tunnel and they enter Isidora 
Goyenechea where Fernando gets out and she then 
shi&s to the driving seat. !e trip is comfortable: 
despite the rain, the car heating means they do not 
feel the cold of the street. 
Fernando leaves work at around 6 pm 
and takes the bus home with a friend and neigh-
bour. !is trip is more complex, the buses are 
full, and people leave almost asleep a&er a long 
day’s work; they talk, sharing work gossip. !ey 
o&en have to change and wait for the next bus to 
come in the rain, and later walk two long blocks 
to get home. !e journey is better together. Every 
Wednesday Fernando plays football with one of his 
sons. !is is the day when Gloria rests and does 
not go out. A&er leaving Fernando each morning, 
Gloria continues her journey to Providencia, and 
later on to Bellavista to drop o% her son Javier.
Javier is in his mid-teens; he speaks as if he was 
older, but he is still young and his mother takes 
care of him. Every day he is dropped o% at school 
a&er his father. In the a&ernoon he is grown up 
enough to use the metro, and travels with his 
friends to the metro station where his mother 
picks him up on her way to pick up her daughter 
Paulina. Sometimes he travels by bus and she picks 
him up at the nearest stop. !ey also have parties 
and visit friends and when they are very far from 
their neighbourhood she picks him up from their 
friends’ homes. 
Sebastián le& school last year, and despite 
having good grades, he needs a very good score 
for acceptance in the Engineering degree at 
Universidad de Chile. He attends a foundation 
course close to the República neighbourhood 
and although his classes only start later, he takes 
advantage of the trip with his mother so he can be 
dropped at the city centre, close to a metro station.
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Although Sebastián generally takes the 
metro or bus, he o&en calls his mother to pick him 
up, and if not to the centre, at least to the Américo 
Vespucio Norte Metro Station. Juan also plays mu-
sic and just bought a guitar.
Paulina is 10 years old and still goes to 
school, she has a gym class and also music; she 
stays at school until 5 pm almost every day to do 
extra-curricular activities a&er which Gloria picks 
her up. She doesn’t like her to walk alone and as 
the school is close to Gloria’s mother’s home, she 
o&en lets her stay with her in the a&ernoons and 
picks her up to take her home later. 
Gloria and Fernando have always lived 
close to both parents in the El Salto neighbour-
hood, and they help with the chores of both fami-
lies. Gloria’s mother has a place in the neighbour-
hood fair on Fridays, and Gloria generally keeps 
her company. Her two sisters live close to her 
mother’s house; one has a bakery and the other 
lives next to her mother. Gloria knows the neigh-
bourhood well. A few months ago, her mother was 
diagnosed with breast cancer and Gloria accompa-
nied her to the doctor each time she needed it. She 
is very concerned by the situation, but she says that 
the best way to be close is to take her to have tests 
done, and it is the car that allows her to do this. 
A large part of their family activities are 
concentrated in the El Salto sector. Family mem-
bers and friends have lived there for as long as 
Gloria can remember. With her being so close to 
her family and to Fernando’s family, she o%ers help 
whenever they need something. A few days ago, 
her great uncle needed to go to the doctor and she 
took him. If her sister needs her help to buy some-
thing, she also goes. And so it is that at least once 
a week, she transports one or other of her family 
members or friends to some part of Santiago, to 
doctors, supermarkets, for shopping, administra-
tive tasks, and so on. 
But, at the same time, she is the family 
home-maker, and thus on top of transporting her 
kin to their respective activities, she also has to go 
shopping and manage the family budget. She spends 
a large part of the day transporting people, and the 
few hours that she has le& she dedicates to tidying up 
the house, cooking, cleaning, washing, ironing and 
doing her own chores. At the end of the day, she has 
chained herself to the car, and the freedom of know-
ing how to drive, has turned into a form of slavery. 
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Mobility experiences can shed light on more spe-
ci"c processes of how people organise their daily 
journeys, the complexities that they face and how 
they either do or do not interact with the city and 
modes of transport in this process. In this way, 
generally, transport and urban planners know little 
about how travellers coordinate their daily tasks, 
and how they overcome the obstacles that the city 
can impose on them.   
One can see from this case study that mo-
bility decisions are not individual, but are strongly 
linked to decisions of other members of the house-
hold, family members and friends. What decision 
they take can seem at times to be irrational when 
seen from the point of view of an e#cient system, 
but fully rational if one understands the logic of 
the home. !is implies that peoples’ ‘mobilities’ 
are inter-dependent, that is to say, each decision is 
related to the responsibilities, tasks and desires that 
are orchestrated daily.  
!is also implies that inter-dependence 
happens not only between small children and their 
parents; there is inter-dependence between diverse 
social groups. In Gloria’s case, the decision to buy 
the car, its use, and their daily schedule are all 
closely related to what both she and her husband 
can do. On the other hand, she and her children 
are inter-dependent and, although they are no 
longer so young, there is still a special care for 
them, mainly for her younger daughter, as she is 
more apprehensive for her condition as a woman. 
Indeed, she and her mother also have an inter-
dependent relationship due to her mother’s age 
and failing health requiring that Gloria’s mobility 
decisions are closely linked to what happens to her 
mother. !is inter-dependence ensures that her 
daily planning is inter-connected with the deci-
sions of others.  
Moreover, it would seem that, although 
an important part of her journeys are carried out 
using a car, the journeys of others around her are 
not uni-modal. !at is to say, mobility decisions 
are diverse and have multiple combinations, de-
pending on speci"c circumstances, the ease of ac-
cess to public transport, the possibility of traveling 
with others, and the ease of "nding the best routes 
for their own ends.
It is important to highlight that practitio-
ners of both transport and urban planning need 
to come to terms with the reality of contemporary 
urban phenomena. !is implies not only rethink-
ing citizen participation but, overall, the way in 
which a city is created, the way in which transport 
is modelled, the variables included in models, how 
these are combined with other sources of infor-
mation, how space is designed for movement and 
non-movement and how, through an appreciation 
of the multiple and complex journeys that people 
really carry out, understand the way in which the 
city is used.  
Conclusions
37
Society, Mobility, and the City 
Bourdin, A. 2003. “Workshop 4: Hypermodern 
individuals?”. International Colloquium !e Sense of 
Movement. Modernity and Mobilities in Contemporary 
Urban Societies. Organised by Institut pour la Ville en 
Mouvement. Paris: Centre Culturel International de 
Cerisy-la-Salle.
Cortés, S. 2012. “Interdependencia y movilidad 
interdependiente”. Final Report, FONDECYT Project 
N° 1090198 Movilidad Cotidiana y Exclusión Social 
Urbana en Santiago De Chile. Unpublished document.
Jarvis, H. 2005. “Moving to London time. Household 
co-ordination and the infrastructure of everyday life”. 
Time and Society, Vol. 14, No. 1: 133-154.
Jiron, P. and Cortés, S. 2011. “Mobile relations, mobile 
shadows. Understanding contemporary urban daily 
living through shadowing techniques”. Presented in the 
International Workshop !e Everyday Life of Multi-Local 
Families. Concepts, Methods and the Example of Post-
Separation Families. 20-21 October, Munich, Germany.
Johnston, R. J. 1981. !e Dictionary of Human 
Geography. Oxford: Blackwell Reference.
Lussault, M. 2003. “Workshop 3: Mobilities elsewhere. 
Comparative approaches”. International Colloquium 
!e Sense of Movement. Modernity and Mobilities in 
Contemporary Urban Societies. Organised by Institut 
pour la Ville en Mouvement. Paris: Centre Culturel 
International de Cerisy-la-Salle.
Small, K. A. 2001. Urban Transport Economics, London: 
Routledge.
Urry, J. 2003a. “Social networks, travel and talk”. British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54, No. 2: 155-175.
Urry, J. 2003b. “Workshop 1: Beyond societies”. 
International Colloquium !e Sense of Movement. 
Modernity and Mobilities in Contemporary Urban 
Societies. Organised by Institut pour la Ville en 
Mouvement, Paris: Centre Culturel International de 
Cerisy-la-Salle.
References 
38
Transport, Technology, 
and Urban Development: 
Reference Points 
for a Timeline
In order to o%er some criteria to allow us to connect the generic notions of transport, technology and urban development, this 
chapter proposes some pointers to examine the 
historical development of cities as it relates to 
transport and technology. 
!e appearance of human settlements in 
the shape of linear villages arises from the gradual 
accretion of dwellings along traditional human 
and animal paths or new roads connecting gradu-
ally di%erentiated spaces, with some order, direc-
tion and purpose, in communities whose connec-
tions with the outside world are constantly chang-
ing. Settlements were established over rivers and 
other natural routes in resource-rich and fertile 
areas, and many societies were able to grow due 
to economic and cultural exchanges that helped 
accelerate their evolution. Regularity and order 
o%er foundations for improvement, as Confucius 
suggested in the 5th Century B.C., and proof of 
this were the uni"cation of the size of wheels, 
writing and accepted norms of behaviour. With 
the security of dynastic power, trading centres 
drove economic growth on the basis of trading 
systems over long distances. Rome had substan-
tial economic resources to form and control an 
empire thanks to its road system; in the European 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance communica-
tions were slowly taken up and future modes of 
transport such as carriages without horses and 
$ying machines were dreamed up to conquer the 
world through exploration.   
Hernando Vargas Caicedo 
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Societies such as the Phoenicians and lat-
er cities, leagues of cities or nations such as Venice, 
the Hanseatic League and the Netherlands focused 
on navigation and commerce. Already in imperial 
Rome there was road congestion that pushed cart 
tra#c well into the night. Caravan cities turned 
into markets, with hostel and caravanserai infra-
structure. Canals helped shape "elds and cities, 
forming new landscapes and specialised technical 
labour. Groups of human ‘beasts of burden’ such 
as the Mexican tamemes transported goods over 
long distances; this all preceded the road networks 
on wheels that the mining industry would bring in 
colonial times. 
Later, the narrow walled city gave rise to 
alternatives such as that of Leonardo da Vinci for 
the separation of roads and new ideal cities with 
wider streets and squares. On the eve of the Indus-
trial Revolution, the European city had extended 
slowly and small industries began to appear in the 
countryside. Communication networks radiating 
out from France’s largest settlements were pro-
posed and built as public goods in a centralised 
manner in the 17th Century. Ports, boats, docks, 
lighthouses and small shops were reinvented. In 
England, investors expanded the canal network, 
preceding both the road network and private in-
vestment in railways and the beginnings of the 
steam era. 
!e urban scene bore testament to new 
mobility needs. From litters and carriages for the 
privileged, such as hand-drawn carts, there began 
to appear omnibuses pulled by horses in the Paris 
of the 1820s, and this foreshadowed the appearance 
of rail and trams. !ere was fascination with these 
machines, their sound and smoke, and they were 
celebrated as signals of progress and a new age. 
For them, the Saint-Simonian utopia proposed the 
construction of universal communication systems by 
strong leaders committed to the material and energy 
economy. !is era so the appearance of collective 
urban transport services while steam trains appeared 
on the urban periphery, with stations that connected 
regions and markets allow trade to prosper. Trains 
crossed continents, traversed mountains, making 
great strides, before the steam engine and the internal 
combustion engine jockeyed for position, until the 
arrival of electricity. 
!e old urban centres faced growing 
populations and reformists such as Cerdà in 
Barcelona proposed suburbs without congestion, 
with city intersections, new steam ship itineraries 
and tarmacked roads that o%ered regional routes 
for cars and omnibuses. By the beginning of the 
19th Century, trains covered Manhattan, in Paris 
there were protests regarding private concessions 
and in London the "rst underground rail system 
was built. In Paris, Haussmann embarked on 
widening roads in the old city, interconnecting 
peripheral train stations. Modernisation began 
to require bonds and private investment, and 
this became the fulcrum of public debate. Cities 
on plains, such as Chicago or Buenos Aires 
sprawled along train lines where new working 
class neighbourhoods appeared. In response 
to radial urban growth, there came claims to 
build ring roads to reduce congestion in the city 
centres. Entire ‘railway towns’ were founded and 
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a process of colonisation of areas away from the 
heavily populated coasts was made possible at "rst 
thanks to basic road access to connect networks of 
towns. Railways were central in connecting export 
economies with seaports. !e railroad systems 
transformed large spaces and helped to impel 
growth. !e linear city was a continuous economic 
space where population would grow alongside 
roads, as in the Soviet Union’s new industrial 
cities of the 1930s. In these new societies, mobility 
management was made simpler by central 
planning and control of the ownership of land by 
the state.
In metropolitan areas, physical barriers 
to expansion were vanquished with draw-bridges, 
viaducts and sub-aquatic tunnels to ensure access 
and movement. Li&s allowed more intense land 
use in higher buildings and escalators sped 
up movement in public spaces. Cities such as 
Lisbon, Valparaíso, San Francisco and Salvador 
bene"ted from devices to move passengers on 
steep slopes. In areas where the economy was 
largely export-oriented, such as the co%ee regions 
of Colombia, aerial cable-cars connected great 
distances and allowed both cargo and people to be 
transported along hilly inter-urban topographies. 
Electri"cation meant a growing constellation 
of interests, and alongside this came the 
municipalisation of the railways and the dawn of 
automobiles that faced increasing popular hostility. 
!e internal combustion engine and the 
automobile, a horse-free machine able to travel at 
high speed with the power of many horses, o%ered 
the promise of adapting to a range of demands, 
localities, routes and freight needs. Lewis Mumford 
noted that mistakes made in the railways were again 
repeated with the car, as main roads criss-crossed the 
city despite the clustering, noise pollution and risks 
they brought with it. !e Futurists believed in the 
cult of speed, and other interest groups promoted 
tourism, security regulations, surging suburban 
malls and exclusive suburban or national road 
systems. Real estate and industrial interests praised 
regional motorways as expressions of national 
power. Directorates of Public Works were created, 
taxes for gasoline and vehicles and tolls were raised, 
pavements, routes, road intersections, tra#c lights, 
and organisations to control tra#c were enlarged 
and modernised, and suburbs grew. Bus and taxi 
companies appeared, public trains and trams seemed 
ine#cient and in$exible and electric buses became 
more important. Airplanes began to $y commercial 
routes demanding airports that required various 
changes and extensions facing the con$uence of 
urban growth and technological change. 
Urban systems that were sensitive to 
the ubiquitous car were proposed with large self-
su#cient housing complexes and motorways 
over the buildings in city designs that combined 
large roads and speed with islands of green space, 
dwellings with increasing density and paths for 
pedestrian. Le Corbusier, through the Athens 
Charter, summarised concern for the centres, the 
tra#c and the separation of city activities. Urban 
sprawl was made possible by a range of road sizes 
while streets in city centres were widened. In 
North America, urban motorway systems appeared 
with trefoils elevated above neighbourhoods and 
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communities. Ad hoc authorities had to be created 
to coordinate the construction of parks, roads, 
homes, bridges and tunnels in next to vast road 
complexes. Parallel to the idea of dispersing urban 
populations in new towns on the periphery of 
large cities, a range of incipient tools converged 
into a master plan as an overall tool to guide urban 
form, construction and mobility. For decades, the 
unlimited sprawl of many cities was the result of 
private developers taking advantage of the mobility 
o%ered by railways, buses and cars, a model that 
by the mid-20th Century was starting to stall. In 
many cities the state built low-income housing 
and allowed urban perimeters to expand into the 
surrounding agricultural land. In Mexico, Sao 
Paulo and Caracas large arterial roads were built to 
recover capacity and speed. 
Rapid urbanisation took place "rst in 
industrialised and then in non-industrialised 
nations spurred on by a range of di%erent causes, 
leading to uncontrolled sprawl and o&en the 
death of city centres. !e existence of a single 
core increasingly gave way to the idea of multiple 
poles to revitalise and organise urban space, and 
the notion of ‘cities within cities’ was mooted. 
Pioneering tra#c studies pointed the way to 
drawing on complex cross-disciplinary knowledge 
in pursuit of modal integration. 
In the growing chaos arising from busy 
crossroads, multiple uses of streets, lack of car 
parks and congested peak hours, there arose radical 
proposals to appropriate new land or the alternative 
of a better tra#c architecture, with an overall 
design that seeks to integrate the city, its tra#c and 
the built environment. In post-war Europe urban 
centres could no longer accommodate cars, which 
gradually gave way to pedestrians and bicycles 
and the regeneration of public spaces. Inspired in 
the urbanism of garden cities with roads doubling 
as green spaces, urban planning refocused much 
of its e%orts on road systems, which were either 
newly planned or widened, followed by housing 
developments which broke the continuity of 
previous grid-patterned streets. Urban inter-
municipal bus terminals and the relocation of 
massive wholesale markets brought new challenges 
for planning. Inter-urban systems with coordinated 
transport modes evolved in order to link urban 
nodes within large conurbations.
!e ‘unintended cities’ of the developing 
world and many ‘premature metropolises’, as well 
as a growing number of newly-planned cities, 
can be contrasted with the host of utopian cities 
that were proposed, particularly in the 1960 
and 1970s. !e poor, o&en located in the urban 
periphery in areas of high risk, at signi"cant 
distances from their work, in neighbourhoods 
with limited access, were increasingly segregated 
and marginalised from jobs and services, in the 
context of inadequate o#cial upgrading e%orts. 
!e majority of cities could not a%ord the cost of 
large mass transport systems, a gap that was "lled 
by a growing number of intermediate and o&en 
informal forms of transport, and o#cial attempts 
to rationalise urban transit systems. 
Dreams of models involving mega-
structures superimposed on interlinked mobility 
systems appeared in some of the more dense cities 
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in the 1960s. !ere was greater awareness of the 
importance of time, leisure, wellbeing, personal 
choice (albeit subject to the ubiquitous factors of 
income and physical ability). In practice, there was 
a need to create mass transit authorities, propose 
models for urban growth, stages and scales 
of the structure of mobility, reorganise trams, 
trolleybuses, and railroads and build the "rst 
stretches of new metros. 
In recognition of the speci"cities of 
urban life, in cases like Curitiba, Brazil, there were 
proposals to accommodate an integrated set of 
elements to ensure greater order and quality. !e 
widening of roads, construction of intersections 
and new tra#c light systems proved insu#cient 
against the levels of motorisation impelled by 
social and economic changes. Air and noise 
pollution and energy consumption levels became 
growing concerns. !e precepts of universal design 
were providing greater accessibility to transport 
systems. Once the attraction of the exclusively 
residential suburb had waned, there arose regional 
and urban periphery models incorporating small-
scale neighbourhoods. 
In developed economies, following the 
OPEC crisis of the 1970s, there were changes in 
patterns of economic activity within a context of 
increasingly $exible work and markets: expanded 
automated production, increases in geographic mo-
bility, fast changes in consumption patterns, privati-
sation, deregulation and a reduced role of the State.
With the appearance of new technolo-
gies, automation and integration systems, we are 
now witnessing a greater commitment to the en-
vironment, more awareness about service quality, 
advances in management models in the "elds of 
planning, construction and operation, and the re-
discovery and updating of transport technologies 
such as light railways and aerial cable-cars. !e 
performance of urban mobility systems embodies a 
society’s awareness of the need to design and o%er 
sustainable transport modes that make the most of 
technology with the aim of improving the quality 
of urban life. ‘Zero emission corridors’ and tolled 
motorways have superseded elevated urban mo-
torways. In contemporary metropolises marked by 
a diversity of mixed land-use areas, large and dis-
persed populations with high levels of job rotation 
settle in areas of frantic economic activity. 
New goals for cities include reducing the 
need for mobility whilst maximising access to trans-
port systems, improve access to all areas of the city 
and the region, and reduce sprawl, integrate urban 
functions, and create a greater sense of ownership of 
the neighbourhood by its residents and workers, seek-
ing to balance innovation with spatial organisation. In 
transport this marks a return to light railways, a rec-
ognition of the advantages of a range of modes, and 
whenever possible restricting movement to limited 
areas within the city. As the philosopher Emil Cioran 
argued, in the search for utopia we can only act when 
faced with the fascination of what is impossible.
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In the formal city where accessibility is a dominant factor, new transport infrastructure generally energises real estate markets and 
stimulates new activities and patterns of land use. 
!is principle is not so clearly applicable in poor and 
informal sectors of the city, which tend to function 
around more closed local economies and where lack 
of accessibility is simply one of a number of urban 
de"ciencies experienced by the inhabitants of those 
sectors. From this point of view, it would be illogical 
to suppose that aerial cable-car projects such as 
the Metrocables in Medellín will provoke, in and of 
themselves, broader processes of urban improvement. 
When the "rst Metrocable line was 
launched in 2004, the main objective was to im-
prove access of the residents of those sectors to the 
main Metro system, while simultaneously taking 
advantage of the under-used capacity of the city’s 
overground Metro. Once built, however, the city 
administration became aware of the potential of 
the Metrocable as a reference point for broader 
and more comprehensive urban interventions. 
Over time this set of complementary urban in-
terventions became known as ‘social urbanism’ 
(Echeverri and Orsini, 2010; Alcaldía de Medellín/
Universia, 2008) which in turn formed part of the 
 and   
Two Complementary 
Strategies
Metrocables
Peter Brand and Julio D. Dávila
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‘Medellín Model’, a project which was subsequently 
formalised at the annual meeting of the Inter-
American Development Bank held in Medellín in 
2009 and supported by that organisation through 
the creation of an observatory to systematise and 
disseminate the city’s experience.
!e model itself is a conventional but well 
executed formula of good urban governance prac-
tice, comprising good governance (planning, "scal 
discipline, transparency, participation and com-
munication) and stressing education, inclusion, 
culture, conviviality and entrepreneurship, as well 
as social urbanism.1 An analysis of the impacts of 
the Metrocables that fails to include the comple-
mentary interventions brought about by ‘social ur-
banism’ would be $awed. Innovations in mobility 
and urbanism go hand in hand, as will be shown in 
this chapter.
The Metrocables: 
Complement to a Mass 
Transport System 
!e idea of aerial cable-cars began to take form 
in Medellín in the mid-1990s. !e "rst line began 
operating in 2004, the second in 2008, the third 
(a tourist line) in 2010, and two other projects are 
earmarked for completion by 2014. What is new 
about Medellín’s cable-cars is the use of established 
technology generally associated with ski pistes 
1 For an overview of some current o#cial approaches to this 
type of interventions in Latin America, see Rojas (2010).
and tourist sites as a means of public transport 
in high-gradient low-income sectors of the city. 
Medellín was the "rst city in the world to make 
this imaginative leap. 
!e Metrocables form part of the Metro 
system (see Figure 1), which consists of two main, 
partially elevated rail lines and three aerial cable-
car lines: K Line (which serves Communes 1 and 2 
in the north-west of the city), J Line (Communes 
7 and 13 in the west) and L Line (a tourist line, 
setting out from the K Line terminus and giving 
access to the Arví Natural Park some 800 metres 
above the Medellín valley). As is explained in the 
next chapter by Coupé, Brand and Dávila, funding 
for Lines K and J was provided by Medellín Mu-
nicipality and the Metro Company, while L Line 
had additional funding from the Province (Depar-
tamento) of Antioquia, of which Medellín is the 
capital, as well as from the national government 
(see Table 1).2
Compared with other urban transport 
systems, cable-cars can be built over a relatively 
short period of time and at comparatively low cost 
as they require little in the way of land acquisition. 
!e cost of K Line was around US$24 million and 
that of J Line around US$47 million. A notable 
disadvantage is that it is not technically possible to 
exceed 3,000 journeys per hour without incurring 
2 According to the national population census, in 2005 
the municipality of Medellín had a population of 2.2 
million; it is the most populated and most resource-rich 
municipality of the ten that form the metropolitan area, 
with a total population of 3.1 million in 2005. ‘Communes’ 
(comunas in Spanish) are administrative sub-divisions 
within Medellín municipality.
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high additional costs.3 However, a big advantage is 
that in a context of global concern over-dependence 
on fossil fuels and the e%ect of emissions on climate 
change, Medellín’s aerial cable-cars operate with elec-
tricity mostly from hydro-electric sources, with virtu-
ally no local emissions (Dávila and Daste, 2011).
Although the Metro Company insists that 
the "rst Metrocable was a social project which aimed 
to extend the bene"ts of the mass transport system 
to poor and inaccessible neighbourhoods, the incor-
poration of high-density neighbourhoods into the 
Metro system’s area of in$uence, until then served 
only by buses and taxis, meant a signi"cant increase 
in the number of passengers for a then under-uti-
lised system (Brand and Dávila, 2011). 
3 Personal communication, Eng. Luis Pérez, Medellín 
Metro Company, December 2011.
Figure 1: !e Metro System in the Metropolitan Area of the Aburrá Valley  / Source: Medellín Metro Company
By 2012, K Line had reached its near 
maximum capacity of 30,000 journeys per day, with 
the majority of passengers transferring to the main 
Metro line (see chapters in this section on travel pat-
terns and users’ opinions of the system). At the time 
of writing in mid-2012 J Line carried less than half 
this "gure, but as the number of residents increases 
in the new urban expansion area of Ciudadela Nue-
vo Occidente located at the line’s terminus, a similar 
number of passengers is expected in the near future. 
!is implies a not insigni"cant contribution to the 
total of around 520,000 passengers transported daily 
by the Metro system.4
4  Data from personal communication by Eng. !eodor Kurk, 
Planning Directorate, Empresa de Transporte Masivo del Valle 
de Aburrá Ltda. (Metro de Medellín), December 2011. 
N
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the city owed a ‘historic debt’ to these forgotten 
areas (see chapter by Coupé, Brand and Dávila), 
compensation for the ‘debt’ was to come from the 
construction of high quality infrastructure and 
Bogotá and Panamá in the 1930s and 1940s before returning 
to post-war Austria where he became Director of Vienna’s 
Planning Directorate (Hofer, 1996).
Table 1: Metrocable Lines: Basic Information 
‘Social urbanism’ in Medellín emerged from around 
the time the "rst cable-car began operation in 2004, 
and hinges on refocusing signi"cant public invest-
ment towards the city’s poorest areas.5 Arguing that 
5 !e expression ‘social urbanism’ had been previously used 
in 1952 by Karl Brunner, an Austrian urban planner, who 
had a decisive in$uence in the planning of Santiago de Chile, 
‘Social Urbanism’: Origins and Signi!cance
K Line J Line L Line
Launch date August 2004 March 2008 February 2010
Construction time 14 months 15 months 10 months
Length 2,072 m 2,782 m 4,469 m
Commercial speed 5 m/s 5 m/s 6 m/s
Number of pylons 20 31 25
Number of stations 4 (including Metro station)
4 (including Metro 
station) 2
Number of cabins 
(capacity 10) 93 119 27
Distance between cabins 60 m 60 m 340 m
Operational capacity 3,000 passengers/hour 3,000 passengers/hour 1,200 passengers/hour
Estimated total cost US$24 million 
(at average 2003 
exchange rate)
US$47 million 
(at average 2007 
exchange rate)
US$21 million 
(at average 2009 exchange rate)
Cost per kilometre US$11.6 million US$16.9 million US$4.7 million
Funding sources Municipality: 55%
Metro: 45%
Municipality: 73%
Metro: 27%
Municipality: 38%
Metro: 34%
Provincial government: 
17%
Transport Ministry: 9%
Other: 2%
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striking architecture. With the slogan “the most 
beautiful for the humblest” (mayor Sergio Fajar-
do) the aim was “to activate the power of aesthet-
ics as a motor for social change” (mayor Alonso 
Salazar). !is involved a variety of urban proj-
ects structured around the Metrocable involving 
educational and cultural facilities, environmental 
upgrading and new public spaces, organised in 
space through the so-called Integrated Urban 
Projects (Proyectos Urbanos Integrales, or PUIs). 
Following the successful experience around the 
"rst Metrocable, similar interventions have been 
carried out in other areas of the city (Alcaldía de 
Medellín, 2010). 
In practice, Medellín’s ‘social urbanism’ 
consists of a set of ideas and experiences, some 
original, others borrowed, developed over the past 
"&een years. !e Metrocables are the jewels of 
this crown. Like all ‘social urbanism’ projects, the 
Metrocables were implemented with close involve-
ment and participation of local communities. 
Despite their low passenger-carrying capacity, the 
Metrocables do notably improve mobility conditions 
within the catchment area of the stations and their 
use involve no additional cost for Metro users (see 
chapter by Sarmiento et al.). !ey have also had a 
notable e%ect on urban integration. Marginal zones 
were given modern infrastructure that helps create 
connections and make residents feel part of the rest 
of the city (in the case of K Line, the journey from 
the city periphery 10 Km out to the highest point 
350 metres above the valley on which the city centre 
lies can take as little as 20 minutes, excluding wait-
ing times). Additionally, the Metrocables improved 
access to what were previously considered danger-
ous areas and opened them up to local, national and 
international tourism (see the chapters by Coupé 
and by Agudelo et al. in this book).
‘Social urbanism’ then developed a series 
of interventions around these infrastructural axes. 
In the case of the "rst Metrocable (K Line), atten-
tion can be drawn to the Juan Bobo housing proj-
ect, which received a ‘best practice’ award in Dubai 
in 2008. On di#cult, steeply-sloping and unstable 
land stretching along a small stream, the project 
improved access, ordered public space, relocated in 
situ and improved housing, and mitigated environ-
mental risks. !is was all done through an inten-
sive, micro-scale participatory process involving 
existing residents. !ere were no evictions, no land 
acquisition outside voluntary agreements, and no 
signi"cant costs for local residents.  
!e park-libraries are a development of a 
series of projects implemented by Bogotá’s authori-
ties a few years earlier, aimed at strengthening the 
presence of the state in low-income sectors of the 
city. In these, a wide range of services are o%ered 
to the community: access to books, information 
technology, training courses, cultural activities, 
recreation and sports spaces, social programmes, 
support for the creation of micro-businesses, 
among others. However, with six new high quality 
schools also built in the poor neighbourhoods of 
the municipality, the presence of the state is above 
all architectural: striking buildings which due to 
their scale, form, materials and colour stand out 
and contrast strongly with the monotonous hous-
ing environment, and loudly proclaim that the city 
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España Library-Park, Commune 1
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administration provides them with infrastructure 
and facilities worthy of the well-o% sectors of 
the city. !e architectural designs were selected 
through international competition, but most are by 
young Colombian architects; the Moravia Cultural 
Centre is the last public work of Rogelio Salmona, 
one of Colombia’s most outstanding architects. Be-
yond their immediate urban impact, these works 
have also stimulated a healthy debate on the qual-
ity of architecture in the city.
In terms of project implementation 
within the ‘Medellín Model’, three aspects deserve 
mention. First, the municipality established an ex-
traordinary capacity for project management, cen-
tred on the Urban Development Agency (Empresa 
de Desarrollo Urbano, EDU). Created in 2002, this 
public enterprise unit brought together established 
technicians, fresh young professionals and aca-
demics new to public administration, a fortunate 
combination which allowed the implementation 
of novel ideas in short periods of time (in the case 
of park-libraries, for example, as little as 12-15 
months). !e existence of politically independent 
municipal administrations was also important in 
avoiding old clientelistic practices; this was espe-
cially the case under the Fajardo (2004-2007) and 
Salazar (2008-2011) administrations.
!e second aspect relates to !nancing. 
Although the projects do not have especially high 
costs, all the projects have been "nanced by the 
city itself without having to resort to loans or inter-
national aid. EPM, Medellín’s public utilities com-
pany (see chapter by Coupé, Brand and Dávila) 
has been an important source of "nance for other 
urban interventions by providing substantial social 
investment funds to the city (close to US$900 
million in 2010-2011) through the transfer of part 
of its "nancial surplus. !is includes a signi"cant 
contribution to ‘social urbanism’ and can be seen 
as a clear example of the bene"ts of not privatising 
strategic public enterprises.  
Finally, it is worth underlining the func-
tional coordination and spatial coherence of these 
projects, in the sense that the aim was to go beyond 
site-speci"c interventions, develop synergies and 
create conditions for area-wide improvement.
Social Signi!cance
Behind these commendable and successful 
initiatives there was a deeper and more serious 
purpose: the reconstitution of the social fabric 
that had been shattered by decades of violence 
and which severely a%ected the city’s population 
(Hylton, 2007). All urbanism has an explicit 
social content, but ‘social urbanism’ in Medellín 
went beyond the conventional. !e municipal 
administration spoke not only of “building better 
architecture, which the people can be proud 
of and builds the community’s self-esteem and 
sense of belonging”, but also of ‘leverage projects’ 
that “lead to a profound social transformation”. 
!e aspiration was to build, literally, a new 
‘social contract’ through the provision of 
spaces of citizenship, places for democracy 
and environments of conviviality (Alcaldía de 
Medellín/Universia, 2008). 
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!ere are, however, many obstacles 
to achieving these high ends: a city which is 
increasingly socially unequal and spatially 
segregated, with high levels of poverty, a 
growing social housing crisis, structural 
unemployment, alarming levels of informality and 
underemployment, and restricted opportunities for 
young people.  Add the presence of youth gangs 
and criminal organisations resulting from the 
incomplete reinsertion of illegal armed movements 
in Colombia, the tra#cking and consumption of 
drugs, and turf wars for territorial control, and the 
challenges remain considerable (Brand, 2010). 
During a visit to Medellín a few years 
ago, the Catalan urban planner Oriol Bohigas 
voiced his admiration for an urban policy which 
he regarded as “fantastic, [and] of an extraordinary 
e#cacy”, then adding “one has to say the good 
things and also the bad things. We are talking 
about a city which in reality is a catastrophe, with a 
high percentage of the population living in shacks 
[…] we are talking about a city scarred by very 
serious problems” (El Colombiano, 2007). Given 
the magnitude of the city’s material problems 
that social urbanism tries to address, the e#cacy 
to which Bohigas refers cannot be but symbolic: 
the creation of sensations of social inclusion and 
the right to enjoy the city; the exercise of – if not 
full – at least a decent level of citizenship. !e 
importance of the symbolic dimension and social 
potential of public buildings resulting from good 
design and high-quality construction should not 
be underestimated. But this on its own does not 
lead to miracles.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have drawn attention to the 
close relationship between the "rst Metrocable 
line and the complementary projects of ‘social 
urbanism’ implemented around it. When this 
combination was attempted in the case of the 
second Metrocable line, the same close articulation 
between these two elements and with the 
surrounding urban and social fabric failed to 
materialise, for several reasons: the topography 
was more di#cult, complementary interventions 
were spatially disconnected from each other, there 
were lower levels of community participation, 
and J Line to a large extent sought to leap-frog 
the neighbourhoods closer to the Metro station 
in a bid to connect as e#ciently as possible 
the newly developed area of Ciudadela Nuevo 
Occidente, outside the municipality’s built-up area 
(see chapter by Coupé). In the case of J Line, the 
Metrocable and the practice of ‘social urbanism’ 
were pulling in di%erent directions. 
!e contrast between the two 
areas underlines the importance of the close 
articulation between the aerial cable-cars and 
wider improvements through complementary 
urban projects. Firstly, while the construction of 
an aerial cable-car system is relatively quick and 
easy, exploiting its potential to improve the quality 
of the inhabitants’ urban experience demands a 
broad and constant e%ort closely aligned to the 
wishes of the local community. Only in this way 
is it possible to ensure that cable-car bene"ts 
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extend to the whole community, users and non-
users alike. Continuous complementary urban 
improvement works also help consolidate trust 
in the city administration and foster private 
initiatives, whether individual, community or 
market inspired. 
Secondly, aerial cable-cars should be 
the start of solid public investment in the sector, 
not only in a "nancial sense but also in terms of 
institutional resources and committed personnel. 
In the case of the Metrocable’s "rst line, in the four 
years following its introduction, the city invested 
seven times the cost of the cable-car system in 
complementary urban projects.   
Other elements of the contemporary 
urban agenda such as economic competitiveness 
have not been disregarded in the city, and spaces 
for the business sector have been created with the 
same or greater care as ‘social urbanism’ has been 
applied in low-income areas of the city. Profound 
social di%erences remain and continue to deepen. 
!e leitmotif of the Alonso Salazar administration 
(2008-2011) was “Medellín: Solidarity and 
Competitiveness.” At "rst sight this is contradictory, 
alluding, it might be supposed, to an internal 
solidarity and an external competitiveness. ‘Social 
urbanism’ in Medellín is, at root, the juggling of 
these two di#cult to reconcile logics, kept a$oat to 
date through imagination and commitment. 
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In the "rst decade of the new millennium Medellín underwent a series of major urban changes that have been widely documented 
in the local and international media. !e city 
seemed to awaken from a dark period marked by 
economic stagnation, a lack of social cohesion and 
a sense of hopelessness arising from the violence 
that characterised the daily life of its inhabitants, 
especially the poorest.  
In 2009, an o#cial publication prepared 
jointly by the Medellín Municipality and the 
Inter-American Development Bank for the 
Bank’s annual assembly which took place in the 
city that year (Alcaldía de Medellín and IDB, 
2009), made reference to the city’s ‘extraordinary 
transformation’, which it attributed, to a large 
extent, to a series of policies and programmes 
of the municipal government, in particular the 
successive administrations of mayors Sergio 
Fajardo and Alfonso Salazar. !e publication went 
so far as to name this sequence of interventions 
as “the Medellín Model of good governance and 
integrated social development.” It was a second 
o#cial baptism for the city administration: a 
few years earlier the term ‘social urbanism’ had 
been coined to refer to a range of localised urban 
interventions by the municipality (see previous 
chapter by Brand and Dávila).
For the sake of brevity we will not probe 
into the accuracy of these assertions. As was 
noted in the introductory chapter, our objective is 
rather to examine the nature and impact of some 
Medellín:  
Institutional Context  
and Urban 
Paradigm Change
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of these local government interventions. We do 
not doubt that the city underwent considerable 
changes, especially in terms of a decline in levels 
of violence (particularly homicides), noteworthy 
improvements in the range and quality of public 
transport services and, in general, advances in 
quality of life indicators even for the poorest. In 
all of these the city administration played a central 
role, by channelling human, "nancial and political 
resources to sectors of the population, economy 
and infrastructure that desperately needed them.
!is chapter outlines the administrative 
and institutional framework underpinning the 
urban interventions that have made Medellín an 
almost paradigmatic example for Latin America’s 
medium-sized cities and other parts of the 
developing world. To the extent that the lessons 
from Medellín cannot be transferred to other cities 
without adaptation to their speci"c social, political 
and economic contexts, this background is 
indispensible to understanding the conditions that 
allowed Medellín municipality to direct substantial 
resources to a large sector of the low-income 
populations who were relatively marginalised from 
the rest of the city. Our focus is on some of the 
poorest sectors of the city most severely a%ected 
by everyday violence, but who were also the main 
bene"ciaries of the municipality’s urban and social 
programmes: Communes 1 and 2, in the north-
eastern hills of the city, and Communes 7 and 13, 
in the north-west. 
Medellín is the core of the Metropolitan 
Area of the Aburrá Valley, a conurbation and 
administrative authority comprising nine 
municipalities in the Departamento (province) of 
Antioquia, located in the north-west of Colombia 
(see Map 1).6 Medellín is the richest and most 
populated municipality in the conurbation, with 
a budget that is considerably larger than the sum 
of the other municipalities.7 Of the approximately 
three million inhabitants of the metropolitan area, 
2.3 million live in Medellín.
While the metropolitan area extends in 
a linear fashion along the Medellín river, the city’s 
pattern of growth is characterised by its expansion 
up the slopes of the narrow and deep valley, 
especially in the low-income neighbourhoods. 
In these areas, mostly built informally, coverage 
6 A tenth municipality, Envigado, is part of the conurba-
tion but not of the Metropolitan Area.
7  However, according to former mayor Sergio Fajardo, 
Medellín does not dominate the metropolitan area: “Me-
dellín’s mayor chairs the Metropolitan Board and has the 
right of veto; but I’ve never used it. Indeed, I would argue 
that far more integration is needed. As individual mayors 
[of autonomous municipalities] have so much power, then 
the mayor of the smallest municipality has as much power 
as I do as mayor of Medellín. I can’t mess with their a%airs 
and we play clean. Medellín contributes almost 85% of 
the resources to the metropolitan authority, and I’ve never 
said ‘well, as we contribute all this, I want so much back in 
jobs or projects or such like, or I want in$uence over this 
or that.’ Rather, it must be transparent.” (Sergio Fajardo, 
interviewed by Julio D. Dávila shortly before the end of his 
mandate as mayor; Medellín, 10th December 2007).
Map 1: Municipalities in the Metropolitan 
Area of the Aburrá Valley
Source: Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá
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of basic infrastructure services supplied by the 
municipality is adequate although other dimensions 
of urban development remain inadequate. 
In particular, the number and quality of 
roads in these areas of the city are de"cient and 
road construction is made di#cult by a steeply-
sloping and hazardous topography. !is is the 
backdrop to the Metrocable systems, a $exible 
(though not strictly-speaking mass-transit) public 
transport system, connected to the main Metro 
system that complements the traditional land 
infrastructure and responds to the travel needs of a 
portion of local residents. !e characteristics of the 
Metrocables and their relation to the municipality’s 
urban interventions will be examined in the 
chapters that follow.  
Medellín’s Communes  /  Source: Alcaldía de Medellín
1976: Study for 
the improvement 
of the North-east 
Commune
‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ’87 ‘88 ‘89
1988-
1989
Juan 
Gómez
1978: 
Metropolitan 
Transport 
Company 
(EMTVA) created
1984: 
Construction 
of Medellin 
Metro starts
1981: 
Metropolitan 
authority (Área 
Metropolitana del 
Valle de Aburrá) 
created
1985: 
Metropolitan 
Road Plan 
(includes 
"rst hint of 
Metrocable 
K Line) 
completed   
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Integrated Transport System expanded to 
include:
· BRT Metroplus (approved in 2005)
· Tram (approved in 2011)
1976: Study for 
the improvement 
of the North-east 
Commune
1993: Primed 
· Integrated 
Neighbourhood 
Upgrading  
Programme
1996: 
Nuclei of 
Citizen Life 
Programme 
Consolidation of “social urbanism”: 
· Library-parks 
· High quality schools
· Integrated Urban Projects (PUIs)
· New police stations in the city periphery
‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ’87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11
1988-
1989
Juan 
Gómez
1990-
1991
Omar 
Flórez
1992-1994
Luis A. Ramos
1995-1997
Sergio 
Naranjo
1998-2000
Juan Gómez
2001-2003
Luis Pérez
2004-2007
Sergio Fajardo
2008-2011
Alonso Salazar
1978: 
Metropolitan 
Transport 
Company 
(EMTVA) created
1984: 
Construction 
of Medellin 
Metro starts
Construction 
work on the 
Metro halted
1995: Metro 
inaugurated 
(30 
November)
2001: Metrocable 
K Line 
contracted
2004: Metrocable K 
Line inaugurated 
(August 7)
2006: Metrocable J 
Line contracted (26 
October)
2008:  
Metrocable 
J Line 
inaugurated (3 
March)
2008: 
Metrocable L 
Line contracted 
(22 October) 
1981: 
Metropolitan 
authority (Área 
Metropolitana del 
Valle de Aburrá) 
created
1985: 
Metropolitan 
Road Plan 
(includes 
"rst hint of 
Metrocable 
K Line) 
completed
Development of ideas and 
preliminary studies about the 
Metrocable 
Current Head 
of the Metro 
Company 
appointed
2010:  
Metrocable 
K Line 
inaugurated 
(Arví Park)
(10 February)
   
Figure 1: Conception, Construction and Operationalization of Metrocables and ‘Social Urbanism’
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!e history of the Metrocables is 
closely linked to three successive mayors of the 
municipality of Medellín (Figure 1) all of whom 
were young, highly quali"ed academically and 
intellectually distinguished, and each with their 
own vision for the city that went beyond that of 
traditional political groups. !e "rst one, Luis Pérez 
(2001-2003), had been a professor at Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia (Medellín campus) and 
rector of Universidad de Antioquia. Although he 
was a candidate for the Liberal Party, his proposal, 
and o&en his style of government and actions, bore 
his personal stamp. When the Metro Company 
unveiled its technical studies for the "rst aerial 
cable-car in 1999, based on the Metropolitan Road 
Plan of 1985 which hinted at the need for some sort 
of link to the low-income hilly areas in the north-
east of the city, he was alone among all the mayoral 
candidates at the time (including the subsequent 
mayor, Sergio Fajardo) in committing himself 
unreservedly to the project. In the midst of much 
cynicism concerning this new urban ‘toy’, as some 
called it, Pérez had the political courage, personal 
determination and management skill to carry out 
the project. He describes the situation as follows:
Medellín is a city that perpetuates and 
accentuates poverty […] All popular leaders 
in a class-conscious society are looked upon 
with suspicion. Low-income neighbourhoods 
[…] lacked large projects […] !e municipality 
carried out small paternalistic projects, which 
didn’t help anyone come out of poverty. 
[As mayor] I looked for a strategy which 
would help redistribute income, bring progress 
and urban development […] !e Colombian 
Constitution creates the conditions for what 
I call the right to the city […] I said ‘we must 
implement projects for the poor as if they were 
for the rich; the poor are entitled to more than 
conventional projects for the poor […] Poverty 
means no access to credit or to any of that which 
is essential for personal development. 
Out every 100 pesos invested in public 
infrastructure, only one peso reaches low-income 
neighbourhoods […] I decreed that contracts of 
up to 40 million pesos (US$20,000) be awarded 
to community organisations […] !is was a 
radical change in the way the city is conceived.
[For the "rst Metrocable] we had to 
purchase land. Our initial fear was that, this 
being a very violent neighbourhood, gang leaders 
would oppose property sales, but this was made 
by analogy with upper class neighbourhoods [...] 
where the rich initially refuse to sell, have their 
properties valued and then expect to be paid 
double for them. [However] local gang leaders 
issued the order to ‘sell your property because 
progress is coming’ [...].
[For the construction of the Metrocable 
itself] we invited tenders, as required by law, for 
an insurance policy on project implementation 
[which protects the state and the contractor 
against unforeseen occurrences]. !e "rst tender 
was unsuccessful since no insurance company 
was willing to take the risk. !is was a terrible 
discrimination against a poor sector of the city 
[…]. !e same happened with a second tender 
invitation, that is, it was impossible to secure 
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insurance. !at was humiliating. !ey said we 
were too generous, that we were going to simply 
throw money away. I ordered the Secretary of 
Finance to create a trust to let the money sit 
there, public money, to underwrite the insurance 
policy. !is meant freezing around 20,000 million 
pesos (US$10 million) until the project was 
completed […]. !is gives an idea of the tortuous 
path required to begin a project which today 
stands as a thing of beauty and where everybody 
takes pictures of themselves.
To be honest, I also had my fears. What 
would happen if one of the cabins fell to the 
ground […]. I’d be in prison today.
[A$er inauguration] residents of those 
neighbourhoods told me ‘I used to say I’m going 
to Medellín, now I say I’m going to the city 
centre.’ !ey didn’t grow up as Medellín citizens. 
!is little device integrates them […] they don’t 
feel discriminated against. We began to tear 
down those imaginary walls. I believe that this 
is a process.
[!e Metrocable] increased the value of the 
poor’s property […] and injected some dynamism 
in the sector’s economy. It’s the "rst time that a 
bank has opened a branch there […]. It brought 
economic dynamism and people feel proud.
!e Metrocable cost us 70,000 million 
pesos at that time, about US$30 million, to 
transport 40,000 people daily [sic]. And one very 
important thing: in Colombia we don’t produce 
gasoline, but we do produce electricity […]. !e 
Metrocable is a success due to the seriousness of 
the Metro (Company), to the wonderful social 
work it did. People love this means of transport, and 
this means that they respect it and take care of it.8   
!e "rst Cable was inaugurated by Pérez’s 
successor, mayor Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007). !e 
son of a well-known Medellín architect and urban 
planner, with a PhD in mathematics from a US 
university, he enjoyed a successful academic career 
at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá before 
becoming an independent mayoral candidate. His 
campaign manifesto was based on a rejection of 
political ‘clientelism’, a belief in the sacredness of 
public money, the importance of ethical behaviour 
and the professional competence of public 
o#cials, and the potential of the state to positively 
a%ect the lives of citizens. On receiving the "rst 
Metrocable he saw it as a platform to act with spirit 
and imagination in the poorer sectors of the city. 
Interviewed towards the end of his administration, 
he summed up his achievements as follows: 
[In my time as mayor] we are carrying out 
some signi"cant interventions in low-income 
areas, but I think that the majority of people in 
the city, when you ask them, will say: ‘these are 
investments in us, the people of Medellín’.
!ere is a phrase by [the writer] Héctor 
Abad, who is a very good friend of mine, who 
said that we carried out wealth distribution 
without appealing to a discourse of anger or 
aggression. And in that sense […] we have built 
park libraries, the whole of Medellín knows that 
there are park-libraries and everyone knows 
8 Luis Pérez, interviewed by Julio D. Dávila and Peter 
Brand (Medellín, 17th October 2010)
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where they are […] and even if they don’t use 
them, they still make people feel proud, feel part 
of society. We have vindicated the public sphere. 
We’ve put in all our e%orts in the public sphere. 
We’ve supported state education, at a time when 
the general trend is towards privatisation with the 
argument that state education is of poor quality 
[…]. Instead we argued that it should remain 
in public hands, as it embodies citizenship and 
solidarity. And in Medellín we have given great 
emphasis to public education because it is an 
opportunity for social development.
I don’t have any doubt that we have 
produced an incredible, incredible mental-
conceptual change in this city. And the city needed 
it. It has historic value. Within a few years when 
they look back on it, people will say ‘that was 
when they turned it around.’ What happened in 
the recent elections? A candidate won who is from 
our political movement, something that never 
happened before, not even in Bogotá.
We changed the skin [of the city]. 
Where once there was hopelessness, now 
there are public spaces where people can come 
together. Violence had isolated us. We found 
ourselves and established new relationships. But 
everything we built in a public sense is associated 
with knowledge, with culture, with productive 
development, in a "ght against social inequality 
and a search for conviviality.9
Alonso Salazar (2008-2011) succeeded 
Sergio Fajardo. He was Government Secretary 
9 Sergio Fajardo, interviewed by Julio D. Dávila (Medellín, 
10th December 2007)
during the Fajardo administration and prior 
to that had no previous experience in public 
administration. Salazar was a journalist, writer and 
sharp analyst, with an unequalled knowledge of 
popular culture and the world of drug tra#cking 
that a%ected the city. He kept the main thrust of the 
urban programme of the previous administration, 
further developing the proposals for aerial cable-
cars and complementary urban projects. 
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Without doubt they are all vital and 
important "gures, but it would be wrong to 
personalise the analysis too much. It would also 
be a mistake to talk of a new ‘urban regime’ in the 
European or North American sense of a more or 
less formal and tight alliance of interests between 
a political leadership and an economic elite.  
Rather, the period is characterised by continuous 
and changing confrontations within a diversity of 
interests in the city. However, what sustained this 
urban policy e%ervescence and innovation was an 
underlying unity that drew on the strong regional 
identity and sense of pride of Antioquia province 
and its capital Medellín, along with the solidity and 
stability of its large business corporations and the 
local bourgeoisie. Moreover, the city could draw on 
a long tradition of well-established urban planning 
capacity.
The Municipality 
and the Metro Company
!e Metro Company (Empresa de Transporte 
Masivo del Valle de Aburrá – Metro de Medellín 
Ltda.) was created in 1979 to manage and operate 
the mass transport system in the city. Construction 
of the main metro system began in 1984, and 
a&er long delays "nally began operating in 1995. 
!e Metro Company is responsible not only for 
the Metrocables but also for the bus rapid transit 
(BRT) system inaugurated in 2011, which brought 
dedicated road lanes to a $eet of high-capacity 
articulated buses. Since 2006 the Metro Company 
has been consistently voted the most appreciated 
public body in citizen surveys (Medellín Cómo 
Vamos, 2012).
!e Metro Company is owned in equal 
parts by the Medellín municipality and the 
Departamento (province) of Antioquia. Its board 
of directors is made up of two representatives of 
the governor of the Departamento of Antioquia, 
two representatives of the mayor of Medellín, and 
four representatives of the central government 
appointed by the country’s President. Its board 
originally appeared to have a strong political tint, 
but later acquired a more stable and business-
oriented management. !e representatives from 
central government tend to be local business 
"gures who help ensure stable technical-"nancial 
management,10 and indeed, the current chief 
executive has occupied the post since 2001. !e 
Metro Company is one of the very few metros 
in the world that is self-"nancing in operational 
terms, and enjoys an AA- "nancial rating (Fitch 
Ratings, 2011). !e functional autonomy of 
the Metro Company and the priority it gives to 
"nancial stability can, however, cause friction 
with the Medellín mayor’s o#ce in other matters 
related to urban development,11 but it undoubtedly 
constitutes a technically e#cient and "nancially 
10  Ramiro Márquez Ramírez, General Manager of the 
Medellín Metro Company, interviewed by Peter Brand and 
Julio D. Dávila (Medellín, 16th September, 2010).
11 José Fernando Ángel, previously Transport and Transit 
Secretary for the Medellín Municipality under the Fajardo 
administration, interviewed by Peter Brand, Julio D. 
Dávila and Iván Sarmiento (Medellín, 29th March 2011).
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solid company. !e construction of the Metrocables 
was carried out on these "rm bases. !is is very 
important in the Colombian context since central 
government, in principle, does not co-"nance urban 
aerial cable-cars due to their limited capacity (3,000 
passengers/hour) which is well below that of other 
mass-transit systems such as the BRT.12 
Medellín’s Public Utilities 
Company (EPM)
Another important public body in the construction 
of the Metrocables and implementation of 
complementary urban projects is the city’s public 
utilities company (Empresas Públicas de Medellín 
S.A. - EPM), a municipality-owned public 
12  Pedro Luis Jiménez, Coordinator, Management Unit 
for Private Participation in Infrastructure, National Plan-
ning Department, interviewed by Julio D. Dávila (Bogotá, 
2nd July 2009).
company providing water, sewerage, energy and 
communications services. It also produces 20% of 
the country’s electrical energy and has investments 
in other countries, especially in energy generation. 
It is the second largest company in Colombia a&er 
the national petroleum company (Ecopetrol), with 
an AAA national "nancial quality rating (Fitch 
Ratings, 2011).   
EPM not only provides, at commercial 
prices, the energy (largely from hydro-electric 
sources) for the Metro, but also makes a 
signi"cant contribution to capital investment 
projects in the city. Between 2001 and 2011, EPM 
transferred an average of 50% of its surplus to the 
municipality, which represented 27% of the city’s 
capital investment.13 Given the size and 
13 Federico Restrepo, EPM CEO (and former Director of 
Municipal Planning in Medellín under the Fajardo admin-
istration), interviewed by Françoise Coupé and Julio D. 
Dávila (Medellín, 25th March 2011).
2008 2009 2010 2011 % 
Ordinary transfers 333,327 399,519 509,343 437,346 55%
Discretionary transfers 187,500 187,500 337,500 360,154 45%
Total transfers 520,827 587,019 846,843 797,500 100% 
Annual change in transfers 13% 44% -6%
US$ equivalent (millions)* 265 272 446 431
Table 1: EPM Transfers to Medellín Municipality, 2008-2011 (in millions of Col$)
Sources: EPM, 2012 (www.epm.com.co/site/Home/Institucional/
Relaci%C3%B3nconelMunicipio.aspx) and Banco de la República, 2012 (http://www.banrep.
gov.co/series-estadisticas/see_ts_trm.htm#tasa) 
* Average annual exchange rate.
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pro"tability of EPM (in 2010 the company’s assets 
were valued at US$10 billion), these transfers are 
considerable (see Table 1) and a signi"cant element 
in the city’s capacity to "nance the Metrocables 
and complementary urban projects. In the period 
2010-2011, EPM’s contribution to the municipality 
amounted to US$877 million. !is gives an idea of 
the relevance of maintaining public ownership of the 
company (and its surplus) in terms of the social and 
economic development of the city.
All of the above suggests a structure consisting of 
very solid political institutions and public companies: 
technically e#cient, economically pro"table, and well 
coordinated around urban development policy.  
The Relationship 
of the Municipal 
Administration 
with Citizens and Their 
Organisations
The institutional structure described above is ef-
fective for the implementation of projects, but in 
and of itself does not guarantee their success in 
social terms. In the case of upgrading projects in 
low-income settlements, it is particularly vital to 
establish a close relationship with communities 
and local organisations so that such projects can 
be assimilated and ‘owned’ by residents. Medel-
lín has a long tradition of planning and urban 
management, and over recent years considerable 
effort has been made to strengthen relations 
with local communities and citizens in general. 
It is worth underlining two dimensions of this 
relationship: participatory planning and partici-
patory budgets.
Participatory 
Planning
!e 1991 Colombian Political Constitution placed 
participatory planning at the centre of a national 
political accord, with the aim of strengthening and 
controlling development plans at all scales so as to 
convert them into key participatory features of a 
new collectively constructed rationality. 
In the following years this idea was 
developed through extensive legislation, some of 
the most important concerning the programmatic 
vote (Law 131 of 1994), mechanisms for 
participation mechanisms (Law 134 of 1994), 
the creation of Local Administrative Councils 
(Law 136 of 1994), and participatory budgeting 
(National Decree 111 of 1996 and Acuerdo 43 of 
1997 of the Medellín City Council). Building on 
these foundations, Medellín’s planning system 
is considered one of the most interesting and 
advanced in the country.
Participatory planning has great potential 
when carried out with transparency and respect: 
it generates ties of mutual trust between civil 
society and the state, and constitutes valuable 
social capital for municipal or rural development. 
!is social capital is a crucial factor in promoting 
administrative e#ciency and community 
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participation, in that it allows information sharing 
in the collective analysis of complex processes, and 
studies demonstrate that it can help break the cycle 
of violence, political clientelism and corruption. 
It also encourages the participation of sectors 
generally excluded from public decision-making, 
and the integration of actors with di%erent and 
at times contradictory interests. Finally, it can be 
seen as a strategy to gain the commitment of civil 
society in the implementation of development and 
spatial plans, along with their speci"c programmes 
and projects.   
!e inclusion of social capital in urban 
management in Medellín has been an important 
feature extending across all stages of the process, 
from problem analysis to decision-making.  As 
an objective it has been announced in the titles 
of successive development plans: “Medellín: A 
commitment for all citizens” under the Sergio 
Fajardo administration (2004-7), and “Medellín: 
Solidarity and competitiveness” under the Alonso 
Salazar administration (2008-11).
Participatory 
Budgeting 
Participatory budgeting is a tool for annual 
planning which helps to prioritise demands 
through co-management (UN-Habitat, 2004). 
!is had previously been carried out in other 
cities, of course. Porto Alegre in Brazil pioneered 
participatory budgets in 1989 and by 2007 around 
150 cities had some experience of participatory 
budgeting. Medellín gave some tentative steps in 
this direction before 2004 (Valencia et al., 2008). 
From 2007 onwards these were strengthened and 
participatory budgeting was made into a central 
strategy to improve and strengthen the relationship 
between the local state and society. !rough 
this mechanism, the aim was to generate trust 
and governability via exercises in the collective 
construction of local development plans and 
the political participation of local populations 
(Carvajal, 2009). 
Participatory budgeting was the 
operational framework used during the 
construction and operation of Metrocable Lines K 
and J. !e municipality invested substantial sums 
of money in the 16 communes and the "ve rural 
zones (corregimientos) within its administrative 
boundaries: around US$348.2 million between 
2004 and 2011. !e largest investments were 
carried out in Communes 1 and 2 (commonly 
known as Popular and Santa Cruz) in the area of 
in$uence of Metrocable K Line. 
Through a participatory budgeting 
process local communities decide how to spend 
between 5% and 10% of municipal capital 
investment. Initially seen as a risky political 
commitment, today it is widely seen as an 
excellent management strategy. Though still a 
small proportion of total resources, communities 
have responded with enthusiasm, and 
participatory budgets have helped strengthen 
social and local community organisations. At the 
same time, these have developed a much broader 
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conception of local development. While they at 
first directed these resources to tangible physical 
works, they now assign a large part to processes 
of social advancement such as university 
scholarships for young people in Commune 1 
and programmes promoting conviviality and 
citizen participation. 
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“If you ask about the Cable and its current use, about the good and the bad 
of the system, you will hear di%erent opinions. But don’t worry [ …]. 
Everyone has their point of view depending on various issues […]. 
Go on asking and you’ll see …”    
A commuter queuing to get on to K Line
The  Metrocables: 
Risk, Poverty, 
and Inclusion
Françoise Coupé
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In this initial period housing was 
produced in stages, in accordance with the needs 
and economic possibilities of those who bought 
the plots. Bearing in mind that housing was largely 
self-built by dwellers themselves, the quality of 
construction is reasonably good. However, there 
are instability problems and the risk of landslides 
in some of the areas located alongside the steep 
stream valleys crossing the sector. !ere is also 
evidence of recent precariously built housing, 
An important part of the socio-economic analysis of the study areas served by the Metrocables consisted in visits to 
the communes and "eld observations, meetings 
with community leaders, and individual and group 
interviews with the inhabitants of the neighbour-
hoods traversed by both Lines J and K. In this 
chapter we illustrate the results of some of these 
activities, giving special emphasis to the opinions 
of commune residents. 
A Trip Through the 
Neighbourhoods 
Metrocable K Line starts from Acevedo station on 
the main Metro A Line, from where it crosses the 
river and rises up above Communes 2 and 1 until it 
reaches the Santo Domingo neighbourhood. !ere 
are signi"cant contrasts along the route.
!e neighbourhoods in Commune 2 
have smoothly graded slopes and have an informal 
origin. !is "rst lower part of the commune was 
established more than 50 years ago, when plots were 
laid out without planning permission but using a 
formal grid pattern which allowed for future road 
and utility connections. !e property developer sold 
the plots on an instalment basis to poor families; 
there was no initial public service provision and 
land deals were negotiated at the legal margins. 
Nevertheless, this urbanisation process subsequently 
allowed the route of the cable-car system to 
follow a road with good speci"cations through a 
neighbourhood with relatively ample public spaces.  
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some of which has bene"ted from interventions 
by the city’s Urban Development Agency 
(Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano, EDU) within 
the framework of neighbourhood upgrading 
programmes, parts of which received a ‘good 
practice’ award by the United Nations (see earlier 
chapter by Brand and Dávila).
Continuing upwards towards Commune 
1, the topography gets more di#cult and the 
majority of the steeply-sloping areas were 
developed following invasions of land by residents 
who could not a%ord to buy legal plots of land. 
!ese began in the 1970s through long and o&en 
violent processes of land appropriation, usually 
involving land belonging to private owners. !is 
form of land occupation helps to explain why 
the urban layout has poor speci"cations. Here 
the cable-car hovers above the dwellings, and 
its construction required the expropriation of 
numerous houses and changes to rights of way. 
Such were the spatial limitations of this sector 
that new public spaces were developed around the 
Metrocables by both the Metro Company and the 
municipality through its "rst Integrated Urban 
Project (PUI) (see previous chapter by Coupé, 
Brand and Dávila).
Here houses are generally smaller than 
in Commune 2, having started life as basic shacks 
though regularly consolidated and upgraded, 
while the neighbourhood around them became 
more densely built. !is type of housing still 
characterises the more recent settlements located 
in risk zones on the highest gradient slopes above 
the K Line’s terminus station (Santo Domingo).
Conditions are quite di%erent along the 
route of J Line, conceived as a way of connecting 
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the Metro system to the municipality’s main 
area of expansion. Departing from the San Javier 
terminal station of B Line of the main Metro 
system, it traverses zones at the edges of Communes 
13 and 7. !e terminal station is located in the 
established sub-centre of San Javier, a consolidated 
neighbourhood whose core is under transformation 
from increased commercial activity. From there 
the cable-car system passes above an informal 
neighbourhood and then a land invasion sector, but 
contrary to what happened in Commune 1, here the 
Metro acquired little land or access rights.
!e Cable then continues through a 
marginal sector of Commune 7, above several 
´barrios’ (neighbourhoods) that originated as land 
invasions – some inhabited and others abandoned 
due to the severe social con$ict that a(icts the 
area, especially due to the presence of illegal armed 
organisations – all on high gradient terrain. It then 
falls sharply down the valley to the La Iguaná river 
before climbing up to the city’s expansion zone, 
Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente, developed by the 
municipality in partnership with the private sector, 
and currently undergoing intensive development 
consisting of social housing estates. 
!is information is important in order to 
understand the di%erences in urban processes and 
living conditions in a city where 25,000 people arrive 
every year as a result of the low-level violence that has 
marked some regions throughout Colombia’s recent 
history (see chapter by Coupé and Cardona).
Informality, 
Education, 
and Violence 
Although the economic impact of the Metrocables is 
discussed in the chapter by Coupé and Cardona, an 
examination of impact should not restrict itself 
solely to questions of employment and income pat-
terns in the zones of in$uence of the aerial cable-car 
lines. !e deep inter-personal inequalities that char-
acterise Medellín is a composite of many factors, 
including “the type of insertion in labour markets, 
the instability and variability of incomes, household 
composition and the fragmentation of social spaces” 
(Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2006).                                     
Levels of unemployment are high, to 
which should be added those people working in 
the informal sector of the economy. According to 
the previously cited report, between 2001 and 2005 
the proportion of the working population in the 
informal sector of the labour market was over 53% 
for Colombia as a whole, and in Medellín this "g-
ure reached 55%.  !is proportion is even higher 
in Communes 1 and 2 and in some sectors of 
Communes 13 and 7. Despite new policies and 
considerable investment that helped improve living 
conditions, the city’s human development index 
and levels of inequality (through measures like 
Gini coe#cient), suggest that levels of inequality 
remain high (see Figure 1).                                                                                       
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why residents we spoke to saw in Metrocable K 
Line a signi"cant means to “make poor neighbour-
hoods visible” to the rest of the city.                          
!is type of understanding developed by 
the city’s inhabitants, those that live in the com-
munes and those using the Metrocables, contrib-
utes to major processes of community organisa-
tion, participation and local management. !is is 
aided by the practice of participatory budgeting 
(see chapter by Coupé, Brand and Dávila), and is 
articulated to wider consultations leading to the 
joint formulation and implementation of local de-
velopment plans by residents and local authorities.    
In this context, one of the greatest issues of 
concern is education, which is intimately connected 
!is situation particularly a%ects sectors with the 
highest level of work and economic insecurity, 
which at the same time face problems of social vul-
nerability associated with low levels of education 
and precarious health conditions. Moreover, they 
have high exposure to natural and socio-natural 
risks, high levels of drug dependence, teenage 
pregnancies and break-ups of traditional family 
structures, factors that contribute to the reproduc-
tion and perpetuation of inequality. !ese condi-
tions are also expressed in spatial organisation, 
with a trend towards social stigmatisation insofar 
as the general public tends to associate poverty 
with violence, and consequently a marked segrega-
tion of those populations. All this helps explain 
Figure 1: Human Development Index in the Area of In$uence of Metrocables 
and Medellín, 2004-2009   /  Source: Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá (AMVA)
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Ciudadela “Nuevo Occidente”
to expectations for economic and social change. 
For example, the inhabitants of Commune 1 regard 
education as the best and most e#cient strategy to 
counteract violence and inequality, to generate new 
job opportunities and to improve conviviality. !ey 
are aware of the limitations they face due to educa-
tional de"cits so are prepared to give their unam-
biguous support to the municipality’s early-learning 
(‘Good Start’) programmes for the under-"ves. !is 
also explains why education is an important com-
munity issue in participatory budgets, especially 
with regard to adult access to higher education, in 
which many community leaders take part.                                              
In addition to low levels of education in 
the four study communes, we should also highlight 
the question of access to the subsidised state health 
system14 as an important indicator of poverty and 
dependency on the state. In 2004, 57.4% of the 
population in Commune 1, 53.7% in Commune 2, 
and more than 30% in Communes 13 and 7 relied 
on state-subsidised access to the health system. 
!ese "gures have dropped in recent years due, 
amongst other reasons, to some household heads 
entering the formal labour market, regulatory 
changes that prohibit multiple a#liations, a change 
of methodology in the application of the system, 
and a national reduction in quotas. At the same 
14  In the Colombian contributory health subsidy regime a 
person formally linked to a "rm pays a percentage of their 
salary to have access to healthcare, a pension and profes-
sional liability insurance for them and their family. An 
individual who is not formally linked to a "rm does not 
have access to these services and as a result is vulnerable, 
and must resort to state subsidies for temporary access to 
healthcare services.
time there has been a steady increase in the pro-
portion of the population contributing to the state 
social security system. Over the period 2004-2009, 
the number of a#liates rose by 45% in Commune 
2, by 60% in Commune 2, by 11% in Commune 
13, and by 70% in Commune 7.                                             
Finally, mention should be made of the is-
sue of public order linked to the presence of armed 
actors in all the four communes, who engage in 
acts of frequent and sometimes extreme violence 
in order to gain control of local territories. !eir 
presence seriously a%ects time and place and has a 
considerable impact on the population’s living con-
ditions, subjecting them to extortion, aggression 
and a permanent state of anxiety. !is was espe-
cially evident during the workshops carried out as 
part of this research with the population from 
Commune 13, who pointed out the impact for resi-
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dents of intra-urban displacement, and com-
plained about the high numbers of homicides and 
illegal disappearances.                                                       
In the context of decades of limited insti-
tutional presence, beginning with the urbanisation 
process itself and later extending to new forms of 
vulnerability, the Metrocables acquire a special 
meaning for the neighbourhoods served by them. 
!ey are perceived as an element in a gradual pro-
cess of forging new links between the many in-
stances of the municipal government and the Met-
ro Company and what were until recently forgot-
ten areas of the city.                                                                                    
Residents’ Opinions                           
Interviews with residents and users of the transport 
system took place in the Metro, on buses and in 
public spaces or during the workshops held as part 
of the research. !e aim was to help understand and 
analyse the diverse perceptions of the Metrocables, 
and enrich our own re$ections and observations 
with their experience and opinions. Many similari-
ties but also di%erences and even contradictions 
came to light, with people coinciding over one issue 
and expressing marked di%erences over another.                  
However, one aspect of general agreement 
emerged in the areas of in$uence of both Metro-
cable lines: the way in which the cable-cars lines 
have contributed to making more visible those 
populations discriminated against due to their 
poverty and the violent environment in which they 
must live. !e creation of stigmatised and segre-
gated areas of the city based on their conditions of 
informality, irregularity and sometimes illegality, 
was seen as evidence of the ‘historical debt’ owed 
them by a protracted institutional absence of the 
municipality from these areas, and the need to 
generate transformations.                                                                                   
!e Medellín population as a whole seems to 
agree, shown in their curiosity to “ride the cable-car” 
or “get to know the city that we have turned our 
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back on”. !is is the case especially in relation to K 
Line (which terminates at Santo Domingo close to 
the España park-library and connects to the tourist 
aerial cable-car line to the Arví Park). Far fewer 
numbers have travelled on J Line (which connects 
to the San Javier Metro station) to visit Ciudadela 
de Occidente, even though it doubled as the ‘Olym-
pic village’ for athletes during the South American 
Games hosted by Medellín in 2010.                                   
Following this "rst approximation, a range 
of opinions began to emerge in di%erent shades 
regarding the impact of the Metrocables.                     
Many people interviewed along K Line 
spoke enthusiastically about the new “environmental 
tourism” in their area, even before the construction of 
the tourist L Line that connects up to the Arví Park. 
!ey quote visitors’ words such as “it was well worth 
coming … amazing scenery!”; “what a great view of 
the valley and the city!”. Yet few visitors seem to no-
tice the neighbourhoods around the stations. Resi-
dents mention new job opportunities, the opening 
of a restaurant or the $ourishing commercial activi-
ties but also refer, timidly, to the situation of many 
young people who act as local visitor guides, some 
of whom had had abandoned their studies and ap-
pear involved in “sex tourism”.                                              
One inhabitant from Commune 1 insisted 
that “the Cable is here and not in another area be-
cause it is strategic for di%erent geopolitical reasons: 
public order problems, the opening of a route to 
Guarne [a nearby rural village], controlling informal 
transport, amongst others.” He added: “if you want 
Focus group in Granizal neighbourhood
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proof of what I’ve said, just note your own presence 
here, doing a study with researchers from abroad.”        
!is issue caused a reaction among partici-
pants in one of the workshops. !ey responded 
that before the Metrocables “electricity could only 
be supplied via illegal hook-ups”, “businesses pro-
vided no income”, “people were afraid of coming 
up to these parts” and “they transported us in ve-
hicles (buses) that were 50 years old and lacked 
proper breaks”. !ey then proudly announced that 
“progress is clear” in their neighbourhoods where, 
besides the cable-car system itself, there are new 
and/or renovated educational institutions, well-
conceived public spaces or ones that are under 
construction, astro-turfed football pitches and 
business start-up centres (Cedezos).                        
!ese references to a ‘before’ sparked fur-
ther observations regarding the consequences of the 
construction of the Metrocables. Some people inter-
viewed complained that “the local labour force that 
was hired during project construction has returned 
to informal jobs and now face great di#culties in 
re-establishing access to subsided healthcare ser-
vices [which they had to give up] once they were 
employed formally through contracts with the mu-
nicipality and the Metro [Company].                            
!ere were also inhabitants who pointed 
out, with some resentment, what the projects had 
meant for those people who had lost their dwell-
ings or jobs due to the construction of K Line. 
!ey spoke of families that had to sell their hous-
ing “which was no longer a mere shack” for the 
construction of the stations or public spaces, that 
“had received money but not su#cient assistance, 
despite being victims of the project”, and of bus 
and taxi drivers who had lost their jobs and family 
livelihoods. And they added comments about the 
“change of socioeconomic classi"cation of Street 
107 and what will happen [to local residents] when 
the agreements made with mayor Fajardo get for-
gotten” (see the chapter by Brand and Dávila).          
Returning to the present, many people 
mentioned the impact of the Metrocables in terms 
of how environmental risk zones are understood. 
For example inhabitants in J Line’s area of in$u-
ence, especially people from the steep slopes of the 
La Iguaná valley, commented: “the Cable pylons 
77
Lessons from Medellín: Aerial Cable-cars, Poverty, and Urban Development
are constructed where we weren’t allowed to live 
because [they told us] the land is unstable and 
prone to landslides […] !e problem, then, is not 
one of risk but poverty and the lack of resources to 
stabilise the soil and build on these slopes.” Refer-
ences to K Line took a similar form, insisting that 
several families were evicted to build the España 
park-library, even though this new construction 
was “much heavier than the shacks.”                              
!e issue of drops in levels of inter-person-
al inequality was little-mentioned at "rst, despite 
its importance for the municipal authorities and 
the Metro Company (see the chapter by Coupé, 
Brand and Dávila). However, the impact of the Me-
trocables on inequality did emerge though two re-
lated issues. Firstly, some women, especially in 
Communes 1 and 2, referred to their experience as 
a learning process, with regard to the construction 
of the cable-car system, the implementation of the 
Integrated Urban Projects, the formulation of local 
development plans and participatory budgets: 
“women are empowered; more than the other lead-
ers, they know the reality of the sector and they 
make e%orts to generate spaces for discussion and 
debate. What’s more, everyone recognises how 
women have taken advantage of training pro-
grammes at all levels. In this sector women are 
strong and exercise leadership to transform living 
conditions.” !is could be interpreted as meaning 
that inhabitants of the four communes consider a 
decrease in gender inequality more a result of their 
own e%orts rather than an achievement that comes 
from urban and social policy or from inter-institu-
tional and community processes.                              
!ere are divergent views among residents 
of the Metrocables as a mode of transport: some 
point out a lowering of travel costs and time sav-
ings, whereas others complain about the long 
queues at peak hours.                                                      
!e chapter on the economic impacts of 
the cable-cars by Coupé and Cardona indicates 
that transport costs have fallen considerably for 
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those who make multi-modal trips (cable-Metro-
feeder bus), and this compensates for the waiting 
time lost during peak hours.  In this respect, one 
user of the K Line argues that “the week when the 
[Metro] company carries out [annual] mainte-
nance on the Cable and there’s no service is the 
most costly week of the year for me – it costs me 
twice what I normally pay – and it’s when I have to 
get up earliest to get to work.”                                       
Some participants mentioned di#culties 
in acquiring tickets and pointed out that “we 
would lose less time with the ‘Civic Card’ (a mag-
netic card for use in the Metro system, similar to a 
debit card), but to charge it and avoid having to 
queue twice, "rst to pay and then to get into the 
cable-car, you have to have money in your pocket 
for more than one journey, and here we all live a 
hand-to-mouth existence.”                                          
However, the price of a ticket and jour-
ney times are not the only things which influ-
ence the decisions of both users and non-users 
of the Metrocables when they opt for one or oth-
er means of transport. The people consulted also 
take into account issues such as destination, per-
sonal conditions, activities to be undertaken, 
safety and comfort, distance to the station, trip 
motives and who is accompanying them. Some 
young people added that “in the buses it’s pos-
sible to get on through the back door without 
paying, ask for a discount, or even arrange to 
pay later if you know the driver.” 
Furthermore, particular groups have spe-
ci"c and important comments which complement 
or contradict the opinions already expressed. 
Young pre-secondary school age children seldom 
use the Metrocables and, when they do, an adult 
generally accompanies them. For them, “taking the 
Cable is for fun,” an “adventure in the sky” or a 
“something to do” at the weekend.                             
Some informal sector workers complain 
that they are not allowed to use the Metrocables 
and even the Metro when they travel with their 
tool bags or lunch pots and argue that “the controls 
might be good, but they should also take into ac-
count that we live from the work we get here and 
there; due to the hassle [of the Metro], we have to 
travel on one or more buses or buy a motorbike; 
that’s not good.”                                                              
Other workers highlighted the fact that their activ-
ity (e.g. messenger, goods distributor and so on) 
requires many trips and “in this case, there is noth-
ing like a motorbike, though it’s no good for the 
whole family”.                                                               
Some workers or employees of large companies 
mention that they get Metro tickets as part of their 
wages, which forces them to use this means of 
transport, independent of travel distances from 
home, complexity of the journey or potentially bet-
ter options, such as a motorbike.                                     
For their part women o&en expressed their 
opinion from a gender perspective and mentioned 
that on both cable-car lines they are subjected to 
aggressive behaviour. Comments were made such 
as: “we get touched a lot at peak hours and the 
‘Metro Culture’ which is important but also repres-
sive, inhibits us from shouting out or protesting” 
or “the Cable is very useful for long trips made 
with just one ticket, the only thing is that although 
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in the cable-cars people respect you, in the Metro, 
which gets very full at six in the evening, there are 
a lot of badly-behaved men.” Men tend to agree 
with this: “the Cable is cheap; the bad thing is the 
queues which start at four in the morning. A man 
can do it, but it’s worse for women because they get 
hassled a lot.”                                                               
Women portray their safety and comfort in 
terms such as: “if I can a%ord to, I travel by cable” or 
“when I’m dressed up it’s better to travel comfort-
ably in a cabin because getting on a bus is di#cult 
and a taxi is too expensive.” Women tended to refer 
more than men to the ‘Metro Culture’ programme 
of strict rules regulating behaviour in the system, 
which they saw as an educational process whose im-
pact is waning over time. !ey complained of the 
negative tone of its messages (“Don’t eat”, or “Don’t 
lean against the wall”) and of the lack of assistance 
from the young police o#cers who are “very strict 
and o&en rude.” But they end up asking: “What 
would we do without the ‘Metro Culture’; where 
would we be?”                                                              
Disabled people represent a social group of 
almost 50,000 people in Medellín. !eir re$ections 
are similar to those of older people, arguing that 
the public transport system in general fails to take 
into account their di#culties, and that it has only 
recently started to change in this respect. Disability 
experts argue that it is important to recognise and 
take into account all types of disability in the de-
sign of access to and movement within stations, 
adding that some modi"cations introduced by the 
Disabled Metro users o&en have to ask for help from assistant Police o#cers 
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Metro such as ramps are not always the best solutions 
and because they are remedial they turn out to be 
very costly. !ey also point out the risks faced by 
Metro/Metrocable wheelchair users, people with 
crutches, the blind or deaf, or those with walking lim-
itations, and conclude that a lack of forethought cre-
ated obstacles which generate a level of dependency 
which could have been avoided, and which is very 
annoying for disabled users who have to ask for help.     
Conrado, a 71-year-old man, observed: 
“!ey don’t let me on the li& for disabled people 
and I have to walk up the stairs. I’ve even seen a 
girl who arrived with her old mother and they only 
let the mother use the li&; the daughter had to run 
to get up there when the li& door opened. !is is 
ridiculous because they have to travel together. !e 
Metrocable was not thought for people with dis-
abilities, and disability is not only for those who 
use wheelchairs.”                                                                
A respondent who has links to a founda-
tion who helps people with disabilities added “As 
the lack of attention to populations who su%er dis-
abilities constitutes a legal violation, the Metro 
Company has invested considerable sums in          
improving transport, while the municipality has to 
provide subsidies to people who are unable to use 
the Metro system.”                                                            
Finally, in their evaluation of the Metro-
cables some inhabitants in the K Line zone of in$u-
ence, especially students, refer to the additional 
services that the Metro provides, complaining of 
the lack of toilets but celebrating the existence of 
lending libraries inside the Metro stations 
equipped with computers for users.                                 
A young woman from Commune 1 said 
that she did her homework and borrowed books in 
the Bello or Acevedo stations before returning 
home, adding that her dream is to work for the Met-
ro but “not to sell tickets or give orders or to control 
the queues; only to drive a train on the A Line, 
which is the longest and most interesting of all.”                       
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This chapter uses primary and secondary data gathered as part of the research project of which this book is an output, to analyse 
users’ travel patterns in Medellín’s Metrocables system. 
A&er summarising the main characteristics of the 
mass transport system in the city and its surround-
ing municipalities, the chapter places travel patterns 
in context according to di%erent modes of transport 
used by the residents of the study communes. It then 
outlines the results of the analysis of primary data 
through discrete choice models, including the in$u-
ence of factors such as perceptions of safety, comfort, 
cost and time in the choice of transport mode.
At the time of writing in mid-2012 
the mass transport system of the Metropolitan 
Region of the Aburrá Valley (RMVA)1 comprises 
the Metro (overground), the Metrocables and the 
Metroplús (BRT system of articulated buses with 
dedicated road lanes). !e Metro A Line is 23.2 km 
long and runs along the Aburrá Valley from Bello 
in the north to Itagüí in the south. It has a total 
1  For the purposes of our analysis, Medellín is part of 
the metropolitan region of the Aburrá valley (RMVA), 
comprised by the nine municipalities in the Metropolitan 
Area (which from south to north are: Caldas, La Estrella, 
Sabaneta, Itagüí, Medellín, Bello, Copacabana, Girardota, 
Barbosa), plus Envigado municipality, which is not part of 
the metropolitan administrative authority. !e RMVA has 
an urban area of 184 km2 and a rural area of 965 km2, and 
a population of close to 3.5 million people in 2012 (see 
also chapter by Coupé, Brand and Dávila).
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of 19 stations and, by mid-2012, two more were 
under construction. !e B Line is 5.6 km long, has 
six elevated stations and runs from the centre of 
Medellín out to the west of the city, terminating 
at road level in San Javier station. Excluding 
waiting, total journey times are 38 minutes for A 
Line (between Niquía in Bello and Itagüí) and 10 
minutes for B Line (between San Antonio in the 
city centre and San Javier) (AMVA, 2007). 
As was noted in Brand and Dávila’s 
chapter, the Metrocable K Line has three stations 
and runs for 2 km in the north-east of the city 
in Communes 1 and 2. It connects to the Metro 
system at Acevedo station and users can transfer 
with no additional fare payment. !e J Line also 
has three stations and extends 2.9 km to the 
west of the city through Communes 7 and 13. It 
connects to the Metro at San Javier station and 
again transfers are free of any additional cost to 
users. Finally, the L Line has an extension of 4.6 
km and allows access to the ecotourism Arví Park 
(an undulating highland tropical forest area). It 
connects to the Metro via K Line’s Santo Domingo 
terminal station and terminates at the village of 
El Tambo in the rural district of Santa Elena (see 
Figure 2). !is is the Metro’s "rst tourist line. 
It has no fare integration with the main Metro 
system, and the standard fare price is higher than 
the typical Metro fare (3,500 pesos in early 2012 
or approximately US$2) although low-income 
families, students, the elderly and disabled bene"t 
from a 90% discount on the fare.
Figure 1: Lines of the Medellín Metro System
Source: www.metrodemedellín.gov.co.
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Figure 2: Metrocable Lines in the Metro System
Source: Own elaboration (adapted from Google Earth)
!e metropolitan mass transport system 
covers four municipalities and bus routes integrate 
the whole area of the 10 municipalities that make 
up the metropolitan region. However, the focus of 
this research was on the municipality of Medellín, 
the most populous of the ten municipalities (70% 
of metropolitan total). Medellín is divided into 16 
communes and "ve rural zones (corregimientos). 
!e K Line’s catchment area comprises 23 
neighbourhoods (barrios) with approximately 
230,000 inhabitants: 12 neighbourhoods in 
Commune 1 (129,806 inhabitants) and 11 in 
Commune 2 (99,381 inhabitants). 
In the case of the J Line’s catchment 
area there are a total of 37 neighbourhoods 
with approximately 315,000 inhabitants: 24 in 
Commune 7 (181,970 inhabitants) and 20 in 13 
(134,365 inhabitants). According to a 2005 Origin 
and Destination Survey (Área Metropolitana 
del Valle de Aburrá, 2006), the inhabitants of 
Communes 1 and 2 (K Line) made a total of 278,894 
journeys per day, which is equivalent to 5.5% of 
the 5,036,100 journeys in the RMVA on working 
days (in 2005). !e journeys of inhabitants of 
Communes 7 and 13 represented 9.2% of the RMVA 
total. Table 2 shows that in Communes 1 and 2 
walking is the main mode of transport, followed 
by bus and Metro. !is contrasts with Communes 
7 and 13 where bus is most common, followed by 
journeys on foot and the Metro, with a notably 
lower percentage to that in Communes 1 and 2. !is 
low incidence of Metro usage is explained mainly 
by the fact that when the survey was carried out in 
2005, the J Line was not in operation and access to 
the nearest Metro stations was di#cult for residents 
in Communes 7 and 13. 
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Mode of 
Transport
No. of 
journeys 
Communes 7 
and 13
% No. of 
journeys 
Communes 
1 and 2
% RMVA %
Public 
transport (bus) 175,720 37.91 90,070 32.30 1,593,000 31.63
Metro 40,971 8.84 51,587 18.50 376,000 7.47
Taxi 34,881 7.53 10,586 3.80 570,000 11.32
Car 38,578 8.32 5,069 1.82 597,500 11.86
Plane 130 0.03 40 0.01 10,000 0.20
School 
transport 19,331 4.17 3,449 1.24 200,000 3.97
Motorbike 22,475 4.85 9,570 3.43 228,200 4.53
Bicycle 2,950 0.64 1,542 0.55 45,100 0.90
On foot 128,445 27.71 106,981 38.36 1,416,300 28.12
Total 463,480 100.00 278,894 100.00 5,036,100 100.00
Table 2: Modal Distribution of Journeys in Study Areas and RMVA, 2005
Source: Calculations based on the 2005 origin-destination survey 
(Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá, 2006)
!is section summarises the results of 
the analysis of the impact of the introduction of 
the Metrocable K and J Lines on the transport 
decisions of residents in the two study areas. 
!e analysis is based on information produced 
through two types of instrument: "rstly, four focus 
groups, two carried out in each of the Metrocable 
catchment areas (see chapter by Agudelo et al. for 
a more detailed explanation of the process and 
Impacts on Transport Decisions 
of Metrocables Systems 
results; see also Córdoba, 2011), and secondly 
a stated choice survey based on a total of 392 
questionnaires (187 for J Line and 205 for K Line). 
With the aim of identifying and analysing the 
impact of the aerial cable-car system on people in 
the catchment area of the aerial cable-car systems, 
the population was classi"ed in terms of users (of 
the cable-car system) and non-users (bus users). 
From the stated choice survey carried out on each 
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of these groups, the main interest was to determine 
quantitative (journey time) and qualitative accessibility 
variables, so as to describe journey patterns before and 
a&er the implementation of the Metrocable systems, as 
well as exploring the reasons that underlie the use or 
non-use of this mode of transport. 
In conventional transport studies, 
modal choice models are based on quantitative 
variables such as time and cost as a representation 
of user decision-making. However this is a 
simpli"cation of choice decisions that to some 
extent distorts a more complex reality, in that it 
fails to acknowledge the particularities of each 
individual when making decisions of this kind. For 
this reason, it is increasingly important to include 
other variables such as safety and comfort, known 
as ‘latent variables’, which lead to a more complex 
model but one that more closely re$ects reality. 
!e de"nition of these variables was obtained by 
using primary data collected through qualitative 
research techniques. As mentioned earlier, in this 
case we used focus groups. 
To better gauge the conditions of users of 
the transport system, the "rst stage of qualitative 
research involved the identi"cation of the changes 
in mobility patterns and their implications in 
terms of accessibility. !e changes were presented 
in terms of three dependent variables: impedance 
to accessing the system, changes in access to 
opportunities, and changes in family or individual 
purchasing power. !e analysis also considered 
two independent variables: gender and age. 
Furthermore, in addition to the qualitative latent 
variables (safety and comfort) we identi"ed three 
quantitative time variables (access, waiting and 
journey times) and one of cost (fare). !e variables 
for safety and comfort were constructed on the 
basis of latent variable indicators:  three on safety 
and four on comfort. Indicators were obtained via 
a question using a Likert-type scale (from 1 to 7). 
!ese indicators were measured for both bus and 
Metrocable users. 
To incorporate latent variables as 
explanatory factors in discrete choice models we 
used the methodology developed by Ben-Akiva 
et al. (2002). !e result of this methodology is an 
integration of latent variable models, which aim to 
operationalise and quantify unobservable concepts 
using discrete choice methods; in other words, a 
model integrating choice and latent variables. !is 
methodology incorporates indicators of latent 
variables derived from the survey responses, and 
used to calibrate the model. 
We developed discrete choice models 
(DCM), multiple indicator-multiple cause 
models (MIMC) or structural equations, and 
hybrid models. For the analysis of the results 
obtained with each model, the TEST-t values 
of each variable were measured, requiring 
a level of 1.96 or above for a variable to be 
meaningful with a margin of error of 95%, 
or 1.64 for a margin of error of 90%. Utility 
functions for each modal alternative are 
shown below:
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Bus:    ȾȗCb + βTa * Tab + βTe * Teb + βTv * Tvb                                         (1)
Cable:   ASCcable + βc * Cc + βTa * Tac + βTe * Tec + βTv * Tvc                                      (2)
Cable+ integrated:   ASCCable+integrated + βc * Ccri + βTa * Tacri + βTe * Tecri + βTv * Tvcri     (3)
Where: Cb is the cost of the bus fare; 
Tab is the time of accessing the bus; Teb is the 
waiting time at a bus stop; Tvb is the travel time 
on the bus; Cc is the cost of Cable fare2; Tac is the 
time to access the Cable; Tec is the waiting time 
at the Cable station; Tvc is the travel time in the 
Cable; Ccri is the combined cost of the Cable fare 
plus an integrated bus route; Tacri is the time to 
access the Cable plus an integrated bus route; 
Tecri is the waiting time at a stop at the Cable plus 
an integrated bus route; Tvcri is the travel time 
in the Cable plus an integrated bus route. ASCbus, 
ASCcable and ASCcable+integrated provide an idea of the 
attractiveness of a mode compared to the bus, 
which is established as the constant at zero. !e β 
parameters are the parameters of each one of the 
types of variable: cost, access time, waiting time 
and travel time. In the case of the β parameters we 
expect a negative sign that indicates a ‘de-utility’ in 
terms of investing time and money for a journey 
whether it be by bus or Cable. With the β values 
utility functions were arrived at which allow us to 
predict, in accordance with variations in the values 
of time and cost, how many people have a higher 
probability of electing one mode or another.
2  When referring to the Cable mode, this includes a 
combination of aerial cable-car and Metro, as users can 
transfer from one to the other without payment of an ad-
ditional fare.
According to the stated choice survey 
(carried out in 2010, that is, two years after the   
J Line began operating), the probability of a user 
choosing the Cable in the catchment area of the 
K Line is substantially higher (62.9%) than the   
J Line zone of in$uence (50.6%). !is is not surprising 
given that the K Line is more established than the 
J Line, having been inaugurated six years be-
fore and being, moreover, in an area of higher 
population density. At the same time, municipal 
urban interventions (through the Integrated 
Urban Projects, PUIs) have been considerably 
more extensive in Communes 1 and 2, which 
help improve access to the Metrocable stations. 
Finally, the J Line catchment area continues to 
experience violence on a regular basis, a prod-
uct of confrontations between armed gangs (see 
chapter by Coupé), so local residents may oc-
casionally feel exposed to risks when walking 
to Metrocable stations. It is important to point 
out that although the share of respondents who 
choose the Cable is high amongst those sur-
veyed, in practice it is not possible for the Cable 
to meet this level of demand given its limited 
technical capacity (3,000 passengers per hour). 
In the case of the K Line, capacity would need 
to be increased or perhaps a parallel Cable built 
to meet this demand, which suggests that more 
detailed demands studies are needed. 
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Table 3: ‘Safety’ Latent Variable on Bus and Cable with Data Taken from 
the Bus and Cable, Respectively, and ‘Safety’ in the Bus with Data Taken on the Cable 
and Bus for the Study Area, Communes 1 and 2 (K Line)
Source: Own elaboration
Hybrid Models
Hybrid models were developed on the basis of 
results obtained with discrete choice econometric 
models (using socioeconomic and attribute 
variables) and structural equations (perception 
variables). !ese models allow us to inter-relate 
considerations developed independently by each 
model type. Estimation was made sequentially and 
simultaneously, in this way running a single model 
that includes perception variables with attributes 
and socio-economic variables, the latter being the 
ones used in traditional transport modelling. !e 
latent variables are an expression of the socio-
economic characteristics (age and gender) and 
the most important perception indicators used 
to explain the choice of mode in relation to this 
attribute (age, gender). Some of the results from the 
hybrid models that combine quantitative variables 
of time and cost (fare) with latent variables (safety 
and comfort) are outlined in Table 3.  
Hybrid Model 1 Hybrid Model 4
VARIABLES PARAMETERS TEST-t PARAMETERS TEST-t
ASCbus Constant Constant
ASCCable 0.524 1.45  0.871  3.65
ASCcable+integrated 0.0363 0.12  0.603  2.96
βTa (β access time) -0.0613 -8.79 -0.0524 -12.20
βTe (β waiting time) -0.0411 -6.54 -0.0433 -10.34
βTv (β travel time) -0.0360 -4.78 -0.0363 -7.33
βc (β cost) -0.00140 -6.05 -0.00104 -7.20
Βseg (β safety) 2.21 2.46 -0.958 -2.54
ℓ(β) -593.687 -1418.822
r2 0.230  0.249
n 702  1719
ℓ(β) =log-likelihood, r2 = correlation coe#cient, n= number of observations  
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In the hybrid model 1, the safety variable has 
a value of 2.46 in the TEST-t, which suggests 
that safety is a highly important variable. As the 
perception of safety on the bus depends on gender, 
the gender variable has a value of 1 in the case 
of a woman and 0 for men, this indicates that in 
Communes 1 and 2 the perception of safety when 
using the bus is higher for women than for men. 
However, in the Cable (with times and fares being 
equal) the modal constant of 0.524 confers greater 
utility to the Cable than to the bus.
!e results obtained in the study indicate that for 
bus users (data taken on the bus) in Communes 7 
and 13, the T-test of the comfort indicator relating 
to the probability of "nding an empty seat in the 
Cable (ICADC) had a value of 3.5, which con"rms 
that comfort in the Cable mode of transport is 
signi"cantly de"ned by this indicator. For the 
same respondents the indicator for bus comfort 
(ICADB) does not appear to be signi"cant, as 
shown by a value below 1.96 (1.409).
Safety is an important variable for both bus and 
Cable users. From a gender perspective, the 
women surveyed consider the Cable far less safe 
and comfortable than men. In the case of the bus, 
women consider it safer than men.
In general terms, data taken in both the Cable 
and the bus show that the J Line is perceived as 
less safe than the K Line, which coincides with 
the general perception of the city, given the 
violent confrontations that have taken place in the 
immediate vicinity of the J Line. According to bus 
users surveyed, the bus route running parallel to 
the J Line is considered less safe than that of the 
K Line. !is relates to the above in that although 
bus users in the J Line catchment area feel less 
vulnerable than when using the Cable, they are 
still aware of the problems of the area. Finally, data 
taken from Cable users suggests that bus use in the 
catchment area of K Line is perceived to be less 
safe than in the J Line area. !is is also reasonable 
given that the users of the K Line regard the Cable 
to be far safer than the bus, which is given a very 
low score. !is contrasts with the J Line zone 
where Cable users, conscious of the risk that stray 
bullets may occasionally criss-cross the air, see the 
bus as a safer mode of transport.
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It is di#cult to ascertain with precision wheth-er the Medellín Metrocables lines have had an impact on the economy of the study areas. 
!is is because it is di#cult to disentangle their ef-
fect from city-wide trends such as macro-econom-
ic processes, the e%ect of urban and social policies 
and other spatial-physical interventions, and the 
levels of violence linked to criminal gangs vying 
for control of local territories (Hylton, 2008; Brand 
& Dávila, 2011; Fukuyama & Colby, 2011). For this 
reason, we centre our analysis on issues of employ-
ment and income, neighbourhood businesses and 
real estate transactions, and identify trends on the 
basis of information available.
Impact 
of the Metrocables
 on the Local Economy
Françoise Coupé and Juan Guillermo Cardona
Jobs and Income 
!ere appears to be an association over time 
between the policy of promoting small business 
development and the construction of the "rst two 
Metrocable lines. !ese lines, as discussed earlier, are 
in turn associated with the Medellín Municipality’s 
Integrated Urban Projects, local planning processes 
and participatory budgets implemented during the 
Fajardo and Salazar administrations (see chapter by 
Coupé, Brand and Dávila).
Mayor Luis Pérez (2001-2003) promoted 
a “Bank of the Poor” which was later to become 
the “Opportunities Bank”, to provide micro-credit 
90
many people to start up their own businesses with 
little working capital, in home-based locations 
and as family enterprises.”1 !us, for example, 
local government o#cials identi"ed a high 
concentration of such businesses close to the 
terminal station of the Metrocable K Line, so chose 
this as the strategic location of a Cedezo as a way 
of maximising its bene"ts for residents with this 
pro"le in Commune 1.
!e type and location of smalls 
businesses can spur the development of e#cient 
local networks with suppliers and customers, as 
well as with consultancy and training bodies, to 
help exploit the bene"ts of association, territorial 
1  Source: http://www.culturaemedellin.gov.co/sites/Cul-
turaE/CulturaE/Paginas/CulturaE.aspx. Consulted 20th 
April, 2011. Pp. 35 and 36.
with $exible terms and repayment periods seeking 
to help generate incomes and raise living standards 
among residents in Medellín’s more vulnerable 
areas. Following this, the local authorities took 
steps to catalyse Medellín’s potential in the face 
of early signs of urban economic stagnation, 
through the creation of innovative businesses 
focused on key products and services. !is hinged 
on creating strategic public-private partnerships 
for business development and included, amongst 
other instruments, the creation of so-called 
Zonal Business Development Centres (Centros 
de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal or Cedezos), 
a microcredit network (Bateman et al., 2011) 
and the application of a participatory budgeting 
methodology with the support of neighbourhood 
and community promoters. !ese initiatives were 
included in the city’s development plans and were 
located in close proximity to the Metrocable line 
stations and in the heart of the Integrated Urban 
Projects in Communes 1 and 13.
In Communes 1 and 2 (served by 
Metrocable K Line) these interventions were 
proposed as “re-payment of an historical debt” 
owed by the city to those who live at the margins 
of formal processes, and whose livelihoods are 
disadvantaged by being forced to operate in the 
informal sector of the economy. !e economic 
response of residents in these neighbourhoods 
is explained in an o#cial document from the 
municipality: “Low levels of education and 
training, the age of the population and/or the 
end of a labour cycle, and the belief that work 
opportunities in the modern sector are scarce lead 
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proximity, agglomeration economies and close 
relationships between partners and collaborators.”2
In Communes 13 and 7 (Metrocable J Line) 
the impact of such a strategy has been restricted to 
the immediate area of the Metro-Metrocable transfer 
station, in what was in any case a stable urban sector 
with an important amount of established commercial 
and business activity and the presence of supporting 
organisations: banks and municipal administrative 
services as well as a Cedezo. 
Impacts are very limited beyond this 
central area due to the con"guration of the J 
Line, its orientation towards the Nuevo Occidente 
urban expansion zone and the weak linkages 
of the Integrated Urban Project to this urban 
sector (see earlier chapter by Coupé). Moreover, 
here statistical data on local economic and 
commercial activities are not particularly helpful, 
since they consist of averages for one of the most 
heterogeneous communes in the city. Information 
is unavailable on the immediate area of in$uence 
of the Metrocable J Line which is tangential to the 
two communes, and whose main objective is that 
of connecting to Nuevo Occidente, a large and 
rapidly growing concentration of municipal social 
housing projects.
Two questions arise in this context.  On 
one hand, what has been the impact of this set of 
interventions on the job and income conditions in 
the Metrocable’s area of in$uence and, on the other, 
what has been the impact of transport costs on 
household income and expenditure?
2 Op. Cit. pp. 73-75.
Table 1: Employment of Household Heads in the 
Catchment Areas of K and J Metrocable Lines, 
2004-2010
Year
Commune 2004 2008-2010
In Work
In 
Search 
of Work 
In Work In Search of Work
1 29.6% 5.0%
29.9%
m - 39.9%
f - 20.8%
7.2%
m - 8.8%
f - 5.7%
2 31.5% 7.6%
31.5%
m - 42.0%
f - 22.2%
4.5%
m - 5.8%
f - 3.4%
13 30.6% 9.6%
34.3%
m - 44.3%
f - 25.3%
6.2%
m - 6.7%
f - 5.7%
7 34.0% 6.1%
35.9%
m - 45.5%
f - 27.3%
7.0%
m - 8.3%
f - 5.9%
Source: Own calculations, based on data from 
Medellín Quality of Life Survey 
For statistical purposes, the activity 
of household heads falls within one of the 
following: working, in search of work, studying, 
housewife/husband, retired or receiving a pension, 
permanently disabled and unable to work. 
However, it is worth pointing out that the category 
‘working’ is a complex one, and during our "eld 
work we found a variety of situations: some people 
considered that a trip into the city to buy food in 
shops or markets was ‘work’, and young household 
heads who engage in odd jobs and also study are 
sometimes considered as ‘working’.  
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Businesses near Santo Domingo Metrocable station (K Line) 
!e number of people that declare 
themselves as working changed little between 2004 
and 2008/10 in Communes 1 and 2, and increased 
in Communes 13 and 7. In the latter, the impact of 
the Metrocable is di#cult to assess since over this 
period the municipality was building one of its 
largest housing developments in this sector. !ere 
are also numerous and di#cult issues concerning 
2004
(Legal minimum wage: US$201)
2009
(Legal Minimum Wage: US$279)
Comm.  
1
Comm. 
2
Comm.  
13
Comm. 
7 Medellín
Comm. 
1
Comm. 
2
Comm. 
13
Comm. 
7 Medellín
Men 141 142 165 200 248 303 310 343 360 493
Women 108 110 127 154 191 266 269 324 357 455
Table 2: Average Income for Men and Women Household Heads by Commune, 2004-2009
Source: Own calculations, based on data from the Ministry for Social Protection (legal minimum wage), 
and Medellín Quality of Life Survey (income); exchange rate is US$1=1,780 pesos.
the reliability of data, especially regarding the 
origin and previous employment situation of 
newly settled households (Table 1). Whenever it 
was possible to elucidate the di%erences between 
men’s and women’s work situation (shown as ‘m’ 
and ‘f ’ in the table), data for 2008/10 suggest that 
the share of male household heads who work is 
almost twice that of women. 
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Statistical data refer to "ve possible sources 
of income: from work, in kind, from secondary em-
ployment, from rents and from pensions (Alcaldía de 
Medellín, 2004). Between 2004 and 2009 (see Table 
2) Commune 1 had the lowest average income not 
only within the study areas but in Medellín munici-
pality as a whole. !is is despite signi"cant invest-
ments carried out in this area by the local govern-
ment, in the form of public space, social infrastruc-
ture and transport, and other investments in social 
development (see chapter by Brand and Dávila).
In interpreting this information it should 
also be remembered that the minimum legal wage is 
insu#cient to sustain a family. In all four communes 
situated in the Metrocables’ catchment areas, 
incomes of male heads of household were below the 
legal minimum wage in 2004, but in 2009 they were 
above this statutory level. !e same thing happened 
with the incomes of female heads of household in 
Communes 13 and 7, while in Communes 1 and 2 they 
remained below but close to the legal minimum wage.3 
3 !e value of the legal minimum wage is adjusted yearly 
by the national government and is the minimum that the 
law demands as payment for a full day’s work. Adjust-
ments are made taking into account the previous year’s 
in$ation rate and a productivity factor based on GDP 
growth or industrial sector and other considerations as 
de"ned by the Labour Ministry. By and large this legal 
minimum wage does not cover the cost of all basic goods 
and services needed to support an average-sized urban 
household. According to the National Statistics Agency 
(DANE), a person is considered poor if he/she earns less 
than the equivalent of US$2 per day, and extremely poor 
if they earn less than the equivalent of US$1 per day. A 
family of four is poor if they have an income of less than 
the equivalent of US$240 per month and extremely poor if 
they earn less than the equivalent of US$120 per month. 
!e cost of transport has a considerable ef-
fect on the income of those who travel for study or 
work purposes and Metrocable users frequently point 
out that especially in multi-modal travel (Cable-
metro-feeder bus) they spend less on fares than when 
using more than one bus route.4  In 2012, while a 
journey involving two bus routes cost 3,200 pesos, 
the integrated route (Cable-metro-bus) cost 2,150 
pesos. !e case was mentioned in an earlier chapter 
of a school teacher who commutes daily from Santo 
Domingo to a semi-rural school in Envigado to the 
south of the metropolitan area who "nds that trans-
port costs more than double for her during the week 
when the Metro Company shuts the aerial cable-car 
system down for annual maintenance. 
However, within a context of scarce 
household resources and the high weight of trans-
port costs on household budgets, both users and 
non-users of the Metrocables are only too well 
aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
Metro system in relation to alternatives such as 
the bus, motorcycle or on foot (see earlier chapter 
by Coupé on residents opinions). It is not surpris-
ing that many people prefer to work in their own 
neighbourhood and open small shops. 
Neighbourhood Shops 
!e neighbourhood shop is a deeply rooted 
institution in Colombian society. According to 
calculations by Nielsen (2004) despite a signi"cant 
growth in the share of large supermarkets in 
4 Data gathered in interviews and workshops undertaken 
as part of the research project. 
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overall sales over the last decade, small shops 
still account for 51% of the food market. !eir 
role in low-income settlements of large cities is 
particularly important since not only are they 
accessible but they also constitute an important 
source of income for many residents. 
A study carried out in Medellín, 
Soacha and Manizales between 2008 and 2010 
in the framework of an FAO-supported project 
(Rodríguez Reyes, 2010) outlines the context 
and a set of associated problems that are 
common to the three cities: shops generally sell 
a combination of food products including fruits 
and vegetables, personal hygiene products and 
other basic necessities purchased in bulk from 
wholesale markets, but few processed foods 
or animal protein. Shopkeepers are mindful of 
supplying good quality of products, they open 
seven days a week from dawn to dusk and, 
despite being in areas where people have very 
limited resources, including the shopkeepers 
themselves, they have access to basic road and 
transport infrastructure and water, electricity 
and telephone services. 
!ey are mostly family-run businesses 
in which the owner is also the administrator. !e 
labour force they employ includes his/her own 
family with no remuneration, as this is considered 
an extension of domestic responsibilities rather 
than payable work.  
In the three cities unemployed people 
with little in the way of business experience or 
training started close to 60% of the shops. As a 
consequence, businesses tend to be unstable and 
vulnerable, and some face local challenges in terms 
of adapting to a constantly changing customer 
base and even extortion from local criminal gangs. 
!e shops provide households with a source of 
sustenance and resources are managed in a fairly 
informal manner. 
Customers, who belong to the same 
socio-economic strata as the shopkeepers, buy 
products regularly and in small quantities for 
their daily needs since they lack the purchasing 
power to buy and store in bulk. In the 
relationship between shopkeeper and customer, 
proximity, personalised attention and credit are 
the greatest strengths, whereas lack of choice, 
high prices and poor presentation are the shops’ 
greatest weaknesses.   
In Medellín the shopkeepers complain 
of the high cost of infrastructure services and 
local taxes, lack of support from the authorities 
and di#culties in accessing credit. However, 
those who interact with local authorities on a 
regular basis report good relations with them.  
“!ese businesses now form part of an extensive 
urban food distribution network. Municipal 
authorities have the opportunity to work jointly 
with shopkeepers to improve the quality and 
variety of foods o%ered, strengthen their business 
management capacity, and promote their potential 
as service providers that can go beyond food 
provision” (Guarín, 2010).
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Figure 1. Home-Based Enterprises in Study Areas by Type, 2000-2009
Source: Own calculations, based on information from the Medellín Quality of Life Survey 2004-2009, 
Medellín Planning Department.
Figure 1 shows changes in home-based 
enterprises in the catchment areas of the Metrocable 
stations. In Commune 1 there was a signi"cant 
increase in ‘industrial’ activity (e.g. small metal-
working workshops) of 113% between 2004 and 
2009. !e number of home-based retail establish-
ments initially declined by 38% between 2004 and 
2007 and then rose by 30% while home-based ser-
vices grew by 363% (the sector denominated ‘other’ 
arose from a methodology applied by the municipal 
administration in 2004 and which was subsequently 
abandoned). !ese trends follow with the launch of 
the "rst Metrocable and the Integrated Urban Project. 
However, a causal relationship cannot be unam-
biguously established when taking other signi"cant 
factors into account improvements in levels of se-
curity, both locally and city-wide, and an associated 
increase in local rates of population growth.
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In Commune 2, industrial activity grew 
164% between 2004 and 2009; retail activities 
followed a similar trend to that in Commune 
1 with an initial reduction between 2004 and 
2007 followed by an increase of 26% a&erwards; 
the service sector shows a very large increase of 
1,369% over the period. Contrary to what occurred 
in Commune 1, Commune 2 shows a constant 
increase in the number of homes with some 
type of economic activity and a certain level of 
specialisation during the period. 
In Commune 13, where the J Line began 
operating in March 2008, there was an increase in 
industrial activity over the study period, with an 
initial increase of 23% and later 6%; the retail sector 
initially dropped drastically by 66%, probably due to 
the uncertainty produced by problems of violence 
and the so-called Orión Operation (an intervention 
of the armed forces to retake zones under the 
control of gangs and guerrillas towards the end of 
the Luis Pérez administration); by 2009 this had 
increased by 5%; the service sector shows a very 
fast pace of growth of 890% between 2004 and 2007 
and later a moderate increase. !is coincides with 
increased commercial activity around San Javier 
Metro station. 
In Commune 7, residentially-based 
industrial activity declined by 37% up to 2007 
and later increased by a modest 21%; the retail 
sector also dropped by 72% between 2004 and 
2007 due to an escalation of violence which 
a%ected residents in certain neighbourhoods of 
the Commune, followed later by a 17% increase; 
paradoxically the service sector, although 
operating on a no-credit basis generates greater 
income than retailing since it involves businesses 
such as sales of mobile phone credit and local 
‘casinos’ or slot machine joints; service activities 
rose by 538% between 2004 and 2009, a trend no 
doubt reinforced by the arrival of nearly 20,000 
new residents in Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente at the 
end of the J Line.   
In all four communes a signi"cant 
proportion of these activities tend to be of a 
subsistence nature. Many informal businesses 
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barely manage to survive, especially in the case of 
small shops selling through house windows. As 
said earlier, through programmes such as Cedezos, 
microcredit, and the ‘E-Culture’ (enterprise culture) 
programme to support business development and 
income generation, the municipal administration 
hopes to encourage entrepreneurs to develop their 
ideas and so speed up the transition from informal 
to formal enterprises. !is process also seeks to 
diversify sales and production towards products 
with greater value added. However in low-income 
settlements such as those in the areas of in$uence of 
the Metrocables, all this is only possible if businesses 
become economically sustainable economic in 
the long-term and criminality and violence are 
brought under control, including extortion and the 
uncertainty fostered by daily violence. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter, in the Metrocable catchment areas we 
can only analyse overall trends at the scale of the 
Commune, as there is no more disaggregated 
information available on job creation or 
impacts on income levels. !ese trends do have 
implications in terms of real estate transactions, 
the subject of the next section. 
The Dynamics 
of Property Transactions 
In the "rst decade of the new millennium Medellín 
underwent sustained population and economic 
growth with signi"cant implications for land 
development. Land use became more intensive 
and land values increased, especially due to 
limited land supply arising from the city’s di#cult 
geomorphological conditions and the densely 
populated metropolitan area in which it sits (DPU-
UCL et al., 2006; Naranjo Giraldo, 1992).
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!e highest land prices are found in the 
south of the city where high-income residential 
neighbourhoods, large shopping centres and head 
o#ces of the "nancial sector and other specialised 
services are located. !ere has been an outward 
movement of manufacturing establishment to a 
region located some 800 m above the river valley 
towards the east of the city, encouraged by the 
presence of free-trade zones, proximity to the 
José María Córdova International Airport, and 
ready access to the main highway to Colombia’s 
capital, Bogotá.
However, land prices for retail activity 
in the high, medium and low socio-economic 
areas of the city do not di%er that much. !is is 
due to the fact that a retail outlet in low-income 
areas of the city can be as or more pro"table than 
a similarly sized unit in middle and upper income 
areas, with the exception of units in top-market 
shopping centres.
Given these general circumstances 
and the urban interventions in some poor 
neighbourhoods, there have been substantial 
increases in real estate transactions in sectors 
where the land market had been previously $at. 
!e municipality’s Observatory for Land and Real 
Estate Markets began collecting data in 2004 and 
has contrasted it with comparable information 
from 1997. !is is very useful for the analysis of 
the impact of the implementation of both aerial 
cable-car lines. 
In Communes 1 and 2, in the K Line’s 
area of in$uence, real estate transactions for 
residential, commercial and service use for the 
period 2000-2007 can be seen in Figures 2 and 3. 
!is refers only to legal transactions such as those 
undertaken by the Metro Company, duly registered 
in public records and registers and bringing 
property tax obligations for the property-owner. 
Many other types of transaction, for example those 
in settlements on recent land invasions or relating 
to the sub-division of a property between members 
of the same family or friends, o&en remain as 
informal transactions for a long time and fail to be 
recorded in o#cial registers.5
Between 2000 and 2006 some 91% of 
recorded real estate transactions in Commune 1 
referred to residential properties (see Figure 2). 
However the number of recorded transactions in 
the commercial and service sectors rose signi"cantly 
from 25 in 2000 to 77 in 2007 (see Figure 3), 
which con"rms observations from our "eld work 
with regard to the appearance of numerous new 
commercial activities in residential properties.
However, this overall trend was not 
continuous. In the period 2002-2003, armed 
con$ict escalated and violence levels rose sharply, 
with the result that families were forced to leave 
the Commune, dwellings were temporarily 
abandoned and the number of transactions 
fell, especially in Commune 2 (Santa Cruz). By 
contrast, between 2005 and 2006 the number 
of transactions increased due to the start of a 
demobilisation process of paramilitary groups, 
a reduction in the level of urban con$ict and 
5 !e municipal Observatory uses information from the 
register of property sales provided by notary solicitors and 
the O#ce for the Register of Public Instruments. 
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Figure 2. Residential Property Transactions in Communes 1 and 2, 2000-2007
Source: Own calculations, based on data from the Land and Real Estate Markets Observatory, 
Medellín Planning Department. 
Figure 3. Commercial and Service Property Transactions in Communes 1 and 2, 2000-2007
Source: Own calculations, based on data from the Land and Real Estate Markets Observatory, 
Medellín Planning Department. 
101
Lessons from Medellín: Aerial Cable-cars, Poverty, and Urban Development
a consequent perception of greater safety, and 
expectations of neighbourhood upgrading 
arising from the construction of the Metrocable 
and subsequent implementation of the urban 
interventions and social programmes described 
earlier. Property owners no doubt anticipated 
that a resurgence of their neighbourhoods 
would have a positive e%ect on the value of their 
property. Tenants, who make up between 44 
and 62% of Commune residents, saw rents rise, 
though because such transactions are not o#cially 
recorded there is no reliable information to 
measure such increases.
In Commune 2, 89% of real estate trans-
actions were carried out in the residential sector. 
However, there were two hiccups in this upward 
trend of property sales. !e "rst occurred over the 
2002-3 period, as in Commune 1, and a second 
one took place between 2005 and 2006 when prop-
erty owners or those in possession held out for the 
higher prices which were expected as a result of 
the urban upgrading projects being developed or 
programmed. As a result of the drastic drops in 
transaction resulting from earlier uncertainties, 
these two communes experienced a much more 
vigorous market dynamic than in the higher socio-
economic sectors of the city such as Communes 
14, 11 and 10 (El Poblado, Laureles and La Can-
delaria). Similarly, the cadastral value of proper-
ties increased considerably over these seven years, 
especially in Commune 1 (see Figure 4) although 
absolute values remained comparatively low.
 Figure 4. Average Cadastral Value of Property in Communes 1 and 2, 2000-2007 (Constant Value, %ousands of US$)
Source: Own calculations, based on data from the Land and Real Estate Markets Observatory, 
Medellín Planning Department.
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Along J Line land and property transac-
tions have a lesser signi"cance for this study in that 
they obey di%erent urban processes. Besides, avail-
able data only spans the period prior to the launch 
of the J Line cable-car system in Communes 13 
and 7. By and large, the market was more active in 
Commune 13 than in Commune 7, though skewed 
by the intense activity around the San Javier Metro 
Station area, which gradually shi&ed in character 
from predominantly residential towards increased 
retail and service activities. !e increased activity 
probably re$ects the initial e%ects of the Com-
mune’s Integrated Urban Project initiated by the 
municipality there. 
!e number of transactions in Commune 
7 increased annually on average by 11% during 
the period, about the same as the city average. 
However, there was a sudden jump of 51% in 2001-
2 and another important increase over the period 
2006-7, the latter attributable to the arrival of new 
households at the new Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente 
where state subsidies for low-income "rst-time 
homebuyers could be used. 
Finally, according to data from Medellín’s 
Quality of Life Survey, in Communes 1 and 2 more 
new houses were built than $ats. In contrast, in 
Communes 13 and 7 (J Line area of in$uence) the 
number of $ats increased faster than the number 
of houses. !ese divergent trends re$ect di%erent 
development processes; the "rst case being one of 
piecemeal and still o&en informal development, the 
second being a case of urban renewal with single 
dwelling plots being bought to build $ats or new large-
scale developments in the form of apartment blocks.  
!e same survey also provides 
information on changes in house tenancy, giving a 
complementary perspective on transaction trends. 
For both Metrocable areas of in$uence, between 
2004 and 2009 the number of properties owned 
outright grew signi"cantly: over the 2001-2009 
period the number of households living in a debt-
free property increased by 12% in Commune 2, 
by 16.2% in Commune 1, by 32% in Commune 13 
and by 11.6% in Commune 7.
!e incidence of rental housing also 
shows interesting trends in these neighbourhoods. 
In Commune 2 the number of rented dwellings 
increased by a very modest 4%, but in Commune 
1 it rose by a more signi"cant 32%, from 9,069 in 
2004 to 11,889 in 2009. Commune 13 also saw a 
major hike of 30% while Commune 7 saw a more 
modest 11% increase. 
Conclusion
!e construction and operation of both 
Metrocables lines brought a new energy to the 
urban economies in their areas of in$uence. !is 
was the result of a joint strategy involving the 
Metro Company and the Medellín municipality, 
supported by a range of other public and private 
institutions. !ere is little doubt that some key 
indicators of economic activity improved in the 
decade following the launch of the K Line and the 
subsequent major urban upgrading e%orts, but 
income levels still remain below those of other city 
sectors, and physical upgrading and the associated 
social and economic development programmes 
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appear to have proven so far insu#cient to 
overcome the city’s serious inequality problems 
between rich and poor areas.  
A comparison of what has happened 
around the K and J Lines makes it abundantly clear 
that integrated, localised, parallel and coordinated 
strategies of intervention generate far greater 
bene"ts that the sum of independent, di%use and 
sequential projects. !e continuing ‘snowball 
e%ects’ of the former can be seen in such things 
as the local development plans and participatory 
budget management. 
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Users’ Daily 
Experience  
of Aerial Cable-Cars  
Laura Agudelo V., Ángela Mejía G., Iván Sarmiento O., Jorge Córdoba M.
The bene"ts of the Medellín cable-car sys-tems have been strongly promoted through publicity and educational campaigns, and 
generally accepted by the city and those who are 
infrequent users of the system (Metro de Medellín, 
2005a and 2005b; Agudelo, 2008). However, the 
content of these campaigns tends to contrast with 
the experience, particularly at peak times, of those 
who use the aerial cable-cars on a day-to-day basis, 
as dictated by the low-income imperative of keeping 
transport expenditure to a minimum. 
!ese and other realities were brought to 
light in conversations held through focus groups 
carried out with people who live in the study area. 
!e focus groups were organised according to the 
zones of in$uence of the Metrocable lines (K and J) 
of the mass transport system for the Metropolitan 
Region of the Aburrá Valley (RMVA), located 
in the communes to the north-east and west of 
Medellín (see chapter by Sarmiento et al.).
Our intention here is to illustrate the 
attitudes of the inhabitants of the zone of in$uence 
of the Metrocables regarding the use and non-
use of the system, and the reasons that led them 
to choose one mode of transport over another. 
With regard to non-users (bus users or users of 
other modes of transport) we were particularly 
interested in clarifying the importance of time and 
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cost factors in their decision to maintain their old 
transport habits and not to use the Metrocables. 
Regarding those people who do use the cable-
car, we wanted to understand what it is that 
they appreciate of the system that leads them to 
choose it. Gauging sensations and perceptions of 
inhabitants in the Metrocables’ zones of in$uence 
was the main goal of the focus groups, particularly 
in relation to impedance in accessing the system, 
changes in access to opportunities, and changes 
in the purchasing power of households and 
individuals. Guide questions were used during 
the focus groups to explore each of these in 
greater depth. With the help of these questions a 
semiological matrix was developed which allowed 
us to systematise the information and classify 
quantitative and qualitative variables. 
Applying this qualitative research 
technique involved organising focus group 
discussions for each of the two cable-car line’s 
areas of in$uence, the composition of which 
took into account household conditions, age 
and gender. In each zone of in$uence two focus 
groups discussions were conducted, one with 
a group for young people and another with 
adults; homogeneous groups facilitate individual 
expression and avoid possible inter-generational 
interference.   
In the J Line’s zone of in$uence the two 
focus groups were conducted in Commune 13’s 
park-library in the San Javier neighbourhood on 
5th December 2010. !e "rst focus group consisted 
of 12 adults over 25 years of age, all of whom 
live in the study area. !e second focus group 
consisted of 10 young people between 15 and 25 
years of age living in the study area.
!e focus group discussions on the K 
Line were carried out in the España park-library in 
Commune 1, located in the Santo Domingo Savio 
neighbourhood, on 12th December 2010. !e "rst 
focus group consisted of 16 adults above 25 years 
of age living in the study area. !e second focus 
group consisted of eight young people between 15 
and 25 living in the study area. 
Barriers to Accessing 
the System 
Access impedance was de"ned as the obstacles 
that transport users face in accessing the system, 
taking into account di%erent conditions of access 
and the particularities that impede their use.  An 
initial question: ‘How many times a week do 
you use the Metrocable?’ aimed to di%erentiate 
between frequent travellers and the non-users of 
the system. It is worth highlighting that, although 
the question does not refer to the use of other 
means of transport, some participants said they 
were not Metrocable users because they had access 
to other modes of transport. Within the group 
of adults in Santo Domingo, for example, Yaned 
and her husband Germán own a motorcycle 
and do not use either the bus or the Metrocable. 
Meanwhile, William uses the Metrocable every day 
because “that is what there is… there’s nothing 
else”. !is suggests that in certain cases people who 
have access to other means of motorised private 
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transport prefer that over the Metrocable or over 
all other form of mass transport. In this case, 
the Metrocable will capture users who previously 
used the bus, although it is likely that other 
users are attracted by the fare savings offered      
by the Metrocable.
In this sense, travel cost savings mean that 
the participants had a low resistance to choosing 
the Metrocable as a means of transport, even when 
taking into account the amount of walking that 
Metrocable use o&en implies. For example, to the 
question, ‘How far are you prepared to walk to take 
the Metrocable?’, Robeiro (construction worker, 
adult focus group, J Line) replied:
“In the morning [walking] takes me half 
an hour and in the a$ernoon at least 
forty minutes. In the morning I go on 
the Metrocable to Santa Lucía and from 
there I walk to Castel (in La Castellana) 
where I’m working, and in the a$ernoon 
I walk back to Floresta Station and take 
the integrated-fare bus and that way I 
save money. It’s not much […]  but every 
peso counts.” 
!is user buys an integrated Metro-
bus ticket for 2,000 pesos (approximately US$1), 
although this involves in fact two separate tickets 
(one for the integrated bus and another for the 
Metro and/or Metrocable). In order to save 50% 
of the total journey cost, he uses one of the tickets 
(that of the Metrocable/Metro) in the morning, 
getting on the Metrocable as far as the Santa 
Lucía Metro station, and from there he walks for 
20 minutes to his workplace. He uses the other 
half (the integrated bus part of the ticket) for the 
a&ernoon return journey, walking 40 minutes to 
the Floresta Station from where he can use the 
integrated bus which takes him home (to date the 
Metro has no way of controlling this separate use 
of an integrated ticket, nor is there any regulation 
requiring it). If someone like Robeiro is willing 
to walk an extra 50 minutes per day to save 1,000 
pesos, it means that the valuation of their time is 
20 pesos per minute (the result of dividing 1,000 
pesos by 50 minutes). 
Using the results obtained from discrete 
choice modelling (see earlier chapter by Sarmiento 
et al.), a Subjective Time Value (STV) was 
obtained for the inhabitants of the study zone. 
In determining the STV, the aim was to identify 
how the group of users value their time. For the 
inhabitants living in the Metrocable J Line zone 
of in$uence (Communes 13 and 7) the STV was 
46 pesos/minute. For the K Line (Communes 1 
and 2) this value was 42 pesos/minute. !is is 
equivalent to 2,520 pesos/hour (US$1.4/hour), 
20,160 pesos/day, and 604,800 pesos/month 
(US$336/month). !e monthly amount is close 
to the current legal minimum wage in Colombia. 
!e majority of journeys registered in the surveys 
are for work or study, representing more than 70% 
of the di%erent motives for homeward journeys.1 
1  !e stated choice surveys used in this project were car-
ried out at peak hours of the morning and a&ernoon and 
some intermediate times, talking to people in line waiting 
to access the Metrocable and accompanying the user in 
their journey; for the non-users we boarded the buses of 
the public transport system in the study area. 
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From the focus groups we may conclude that 
with such considerable travel cost saving, there is 
little resistance to choosing the Metrocable mode 
independently of walking and waiting times.
Some testimonies help to illustrate this: 
“I go this way [using the integrated Metro-bus 
ticket in two separate journeys] because it’s 
cheaper; if I pay two fares on the Metrocable, it 
will cost me 3,100 pesos, whereas this costs me 
1,900.” Robeiro (construction worker, adult 
focus group, J Line).
“!e thing is that people walk according to what 
they have in their pocket, because if you can pay 
[for transport], you pay, but if you can’t pay, you 
walk, for an hour or even more. If it’s raining you 
use an umbrella; come rain, thunder and lightning, 
you just have to walk.”  William (construction 
worker, adult focus group, K Line).
“As I’m a student a ticket costs me 300 
pesos less; I walk about 20 blocks, because 
from the university to the Metro there are 
about six blocks and from the Metrocable 
back to my house is like "$een blocks. 
I’m used to walking a lot, I love walking.” 
Manuel (University student, young 
focus group, J Line).
Other Metrocable users tend to estimate 
their journeys in time rather than distance, but it 
is worth pointing out again the low value they give 
to their time. People walk long distances to access 
the Cable and to get to their "nal destination. For 
example, Rosalía (a domestic worker, adult focus 
group, K Line) when asked the question ‘What 
would be the maximum you would walk, four 
blocks, for example?” She replied “Oh no, I’d walk 
two hours”.
And María (a cleaner, adult focus group, K Line) 
replied the following to the same question:
“I walk every day and it takes me 23 
to 24 minutes and I do that every day 
because [transport] is really expensive; I 
pay nearly 6,000 pesos if I travel by bus. 
So I get to the Floresta station at 5:05 am 
and I get to the university [walking] at 
5:24 am. In terms of blocks, I don’t know 
how many I walk.”
Users measure their journeys in time 
rather than distance as they are interested in the 
savings they make by walking some stages of their 
journey. Two women walk every day from the 
Metro station to their workplace, around 1.5 km 
at a speed of around 3.8 km/hour. The men who participated in the focus groups were prepared to walk more than the women whatever the weather. They reported walking for an hour twice a day, over a distance of between four and 
ϐǡͷȀǤThey acknowledge that:
“We have to get up earlier [to use the 
Metrocable] because with the bus 
I’d get there quicker, but you have 
to be patient with the queue [for the 
Metrocable] because here it is very 
long.” Orlando (construction worker, adult focus group, K Line) 
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A second question focused on the 
particularities that impede users’ from using 
a transport mode. To the question ‘Have you 
stopped using the Metrocable for fear of heights, 
rain, anxiety, insecurity, long queues?’, the 
following answers were given: 
 “When there’s a heavy storm they close 
the Metrocable and ask people to get o%; 
they have to go back and then they have 
to take the bus…” Robeiro (construction 
worker, adult focus group, J Line).  
“Well, we o$en go ticket in hand [to 
the Metrocable station] and they tell us 
there’s no service operating. So what can 
we do, if you’re going to work you have 
to call and tell work what´s happened, 
and if they’re helpful they’ll say OK catch 
a bus and we’ll give you a bit of extra 
time to get in.” Jorge Ignacio Jaramillo 
(construction worker, adult focus group, 
J Line).
!e adverse weather conditions which sporadically 
cause interruptions to Metrocable operations also 
produce inconformity with the service, with users 
complaining that these inconveniences increase 
travel time and cost.
Changes in Access 
to Opportunities  
Here we examine the incidence of the Metrocable 
in terms of changes in living conditions of 
residents. Implementation of the Metrocables 
brought changes to areas immediately adjacent to 
the transport system, with notable improvements 
in the quality and quantity of public space (viewing 
platforms, green areas and other public spaces), 
façades of buildings and an increase in the number 
of retail shops (Metro Company, 1998; see also 
Coupé and Cardona in this book). To the question 
‘What would you consider to be the incidence of 
the Metrocable in changing or improving your 
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living conditions?, there were a large number of 
interesting answers:
“I see commercial changes. La Campiña was a 
neighbourhood with very few shops, with very little 
going on. It’s as if seeing so many people living close 
to La Campiña; a lot of things began to happen. 
!e number of businesses just multiplied.” Manuel 
(student, youth focus group, J Line).
“Vallejuelos changed completely; they painted 
everything to make it look nicer. !e neighbourhood 
changed a lot […]. It’s nice, the houses are nicely 
painted. Below the Metrocable station is the police 
station, and the church is really close”. Maryori 
(student, youth focus group, J Line).
“[!ings changed] especially in the places close to the 
Metrocable pylons and about three blocks around 
the stations.” Jhonatan (construction worker, youth 
focus group, J Line).
“[Changes happened] in areas that are closest to the 
Metrocable.” Camilo (youth focus group, J Line).
“In La Campiña you don’t feel the change very 
much because it’s a bit far o%. In other areas 
[closer to the Metrocable], in Vallejuelos, Juan 
XXIII, La Aurora, you can see changes, but in 
La Campiña not much has happened.” Flor Alba 
(nurse, youth focus group, J Line).
Residents in the neighbourhoods noted a fall in 
the incidence of violence related to gang warfare, 
improved leisure activities for children, new 
meeting places for young people, the new public 
library as a new landmark, as well as rent increases 
and rises in the number of both informal street 
sellers and formal commercial outlets such as 
shops and bars. 
“As far as I know around the viewing platform 
there’s been an increase, not so much of shops 
as of street sellers, to the extent the municipality 
make them wear distinctive jackets; they sell a 
lot because there are lots of people. !ere’s the 
donkeys and colourful open buses for tourists; 
it’s a lively commercial area.” María Alejandra 
(housewife, youth focus group, K Line).
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“Around the Granizal sports pitch that´s 
improved a lot because they’ve put in lots of 
clothes’ shops and bars.” Duver (youth focus 
group, K Line).
“Well, here on Sundays at the terminal on the 
station side, they have put in lots of stores; 
there are some that are more for dancing, the 
park is more for fun and there´s something for 
everybody.” Verónica (student, youth focus 
group, K Line). 
Safety
Participants expressed fears related to public-order 
problems in Commune 13 (J Line).
“Although I use it [the Metrocable] a lot, I’m 
afraid of the violence that’s going on [in the 
neighbourhood], and there’s a lot of it right here. 
!ey say you shouldn’t go there, that it’s better 
to get o% and take the bus…” Ángela (domestic 
worker, adult focus group, J Line).  
“I have three kids and when I travel I travel with 
them. How am I going to risk taking them there 
[where the Metrocable station is]? So I prefer to 
take a bus or taxi.” Alejandra (housewife, adult 
focus group, J Line). 
“For example, when all that [violence] was going 
on in the Juan XXIII [neighbourhood] I only 
travelled by bus”. Fredys (construction worker, 
adult focus group, J Line).
To the question ‘Do you feel safer taking 
the Metrocable than the bus?’, the following 
responses were heard:  
“What’s more, when I’m carrying a bit of money 
in my pocket, the Metrocable seems safer to me.” 
Flor Alba (nurse, youth focus group, J Line)
“For example that particular place, at least as it 
a%ects me, the Juan XXIII Metrocable station is 
the point which is closest to the violence and the 
random shootings.” Angela (domestic worker, 
adult focus group, J Line).
“For me there is a di%erence because there’s better 
surveillance by the steps closest to the Metro station. 
You can see a lot more chaos in a public square than 
in the Metro because there’s more control and they 
don’t let people throw rubbish or, for example, if a 
child stands too close to the fountain they’ll make 
him move away.” María Alejandra (housewife, 
youth focus group, K Line). 
“!e thing is that the Metro system didn’t just 
increase the value of properties close to the lines, but 
increased it for the whole metropolitan area. !e 
Metro did all this. Medellín is not what it used to be. 
Before we didn’t feel the presence of the police; now 
there is greater safety, there is more surveillance; we 
can walk about more safely. !ere is greater safety, 
if you go around the Metro line and nearby areas 
you’ll "nd more security.” William (construction 
worker, adult focus group, K Line). 
  
‘Metro Culture’
and Social Regulation
An important feature of Medellin’s Metro system 
is contained in the Company’s set of regulations 
known as Cultura Metro (Metro Culture) that seek 
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to govern the behaviour of users. !is is reinforced 
through a number of educational and publicity 
campaigns in the Metro and elsewhere. In recent 
years, in response to changes in Colombian law, the 
Metro Company has sought to improve transport 
and accessibility conditions for people with limited 
mobility (PLM). For example the use of li&s, 
which only exist in 40% of stations, is restricted 
to extreme cases of physical disability.2 In other 
stations mechanical platforms have been installed 
on stairways, and these can take up to 10 minutes to 
ascend. !ese and other related issues were also the 
subject of discussion in the focus groups.
To the question ‘Why do you or would you stop 
using the Metrocable?, answers included:
“When there are lots of tourists, because of a 
queue of "ve hundred people when I’m hungry 
and tired on the way home […].” Manuel 
(university student, youth focus group, J Line)
“For example during the City’s Flower Festival 3 
and in December.” Johana (student, youth focus 
group, J Line) 
Notwithstanding the inconveniences suggested 
by Cable users relating to the $ow of tourists at 
some times of the year and during certain events, 
the Metro Company uses these dates and events 
to promote the advantages of the Metrocable as a 
means of transport and as a city tourist destination. 
2  According to the Metro Company, in 2012 there were close 
to 1,000 registered PLM users (Metro de Medellín, 2012).
3   Traditional week-long festival celebrated annually in 
Medellín in which the central event is a parade of large 
manually-carried $ower displays, the motto of which is 
“When a $oat goes by it’s Antioquia on show”.
!e Metro Company also makes an e%ort to alert 
users ahead of time, encouraging them to buy 
tickets in advance or top up their ‘Civic Card’4 in 
order to avoid congestion and long queues. !e 
Metro Company ignores the di#cult economic 
conditions of many users when it urges people to 
top up their card or buy tickets in advance. !is 
may be possible for those with a regular income, 
but even then such announcements may not 
coincide with pay-day. For many, buying tickets on 
a daily basis is the only option, whether in the peak 
period or outside it. 
In this respect, people from the adult focus group 
for the K Line commented: 
“Every week I top up my Civic Card to avoid 
the queues. You have to avoid wasting time, 
avoid the queues, because the 1st of December 
when I came to pick up my kids, the queue at the 
station &owed way outside but as I had my card I 
whizzed through easily. Before I had a Civic Card 
I would buy the ticket at night. !at’s what my 
brother does. He buys his tickets at night or on 
Sunday for the rest of the week; that saves time. I 
think everyone should try and save time”. María 
(employee, adult focus group, K Line)
“I top up the Civic Card every week […] and at 
the end of the week I recharge it again”. Orlando 
(construction worker, adult focus group, K Line).
4  !is is a contact-less intelligent card (TISC in Spanish), a 
pre-paid magnetic card available for journeys on the main 
Metro, the aerial cable-car lines and some buses. !is tech-
nology o%ers quicker access and lower fares on these modes 
of transport, speeds movement through turnstiles, avoids 
handling of cash, and saves users time (so long as the card 
has enough credit on it) (Metro de Medellín, 2012).
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“I recharge every fortnight or on pay-day”. 
William (construction worker, adult focus 
group, K Line).
“Now that I have to, I buy the integrated tickets 
each fortnight”. Diomar (light equipment 
operator, adult focus groups, K Line).
“I buy a ticket every time I travel”. Eucaris 
(domestic worker, adult focus group, K Line).
“Yes, every time we travel we buy [tickets]”. Janed 
(shop attendant, adult focus group, K Line).
“Depends on how much I’ve got in my pocket”. Fredys 
(construction worker, adult focus group, K Line).
On the same issue, one of the adults on the J Line 
(San Javier) observed:
“It depends, if you travel daily you recharge more 
o$en. If you travel only now and again, you have 
to top up less.” Luz Marina (self-employed, adult 
focus group, J Line). 
To the question, ‘What do to miss if you go on 
the Metrocable instead of the bus?, the following 
answers were given:
“On the bus you can eat, and o$en you get on 
when you’re really hungry. In the bus you can 
buy sweets for the kids when you have nothing to 
bring them, although you do sometimes get tired 
of (the walk-on hawkers)…” Angela (domestic 
worker, adult focus group, J Line).
“I like the fact that in the Metro you’re not 
allowed to eat because sometimes there is lots 
of rubbish and I like the fact that on the Metro 
there is only one stop. On the bus there are lots of 
stops, you stop here, stop there, everywhere, every 
"ve minutes.” Alejandra (housewife, adult focus 
group, J Line). 
113
Lessons from Medellín: Aerial Cable-cars, Poverty, and Urban Development
“Ah yes, that is the bad thing [on the Metro] and 
it’s like that [gesturing to eat secretly]. I personally 
miss chewing a ’Bom Bom Bum’[a popular sweet] or 
something to entertain yourself in the journey, but 
nothing is allowed; sometimes they even make you 
throw away your chewing gum”. María Alejandra 
(housewife, youth focus group, K Line).
“If you’re eating something you have to do it 
quickly if you’re going to get on the Metro”. 
Verónica (student, youth focus group, K Line). 
“Sometimes if I buy something on the way, when I get 
home to eat it I don’t really want it anymore.” María 
Fernanda (student, youth focus group, K Line). 
“And by then [the food] is cold, and that’s 
really bad”. Verónica (student, youth focus 
group, K Line). 
“I’m a pretty happy person, what I miss is the 
music; the buses have their music, I miss that”.5 
Camilo (construction worker, youth focus 
group, J Line).
Comfort
To the question ‘What do you not like about using 
the Metrocable?’ there were various responses:
“!e stairways, because sometimes there are 
several &oors to walk up. You used to be able to 
use the li$. I don’t know if that was while it [the 
Metrocable] was being launched, but you can’t 
anymore.” Angela (domestic worker, adult focus 
group, J Line). 
5   !e Metro Company requires users of personal music 
systems to keep the volume down.  
“You can’t sit down, on the platform &oor that is; 
the platforms are so big that there are parts where 
no one is standing and [sitting down] wouldn’t 
block the evacuation routes; you should be able 
to sit on the &oor.” Manuel (student, youth focus 
group, J Line).
“Peak times, the congestion.” Ower Arley 
(construction worker, adult focus group,  J Line).
“!e queues when you get there; it’s get in line, 
get in line, and it takes ages”. Jorge Ignacio 
(construction worker, adult focus group, J Line).
“!e overcrowding can get terrible and sometimes 
it’s better just to take the bus”. Ower Arley 
(construction worker, adult focus group,  J Line).
 “In December it’s very crowded”. Alejandra 
(housewife, adult focus group, J Line).
“One thing that a%ects me, is that I live opposite a 
[Metrocable] pylon and at 11 or 12 at night when it 
stops you immediately feel a peace, at rest, the stress 
stops. I live right here opposite, in this little park, 
there’s the pylon. !at’s where I live and my &at is on 
the third &oor so you hear it a lot.” María Alejandra 
(housewife, youth focus group, K Line).  
In summary, there is a gap between the Metro 
Company’s o#cial messages and the daily 
experience and perceptions of users, for example 
in matters of safety, comfort and impacts. 
Although no one can deny that there has been 
a remarkable upgrading in the areas close to 
the stations, this becomes less evident two 
blocks away from the stations. Furthermore, the 
carefully controlled and closely surveyed Metro/
Metrocable system conveys an image of security, 
but people’s perceptions and the environment of 
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violence outside the system, such as on the J Line, 
questions this institutional image. At peak times 
the comfort of the system is drastically reduced 
by long queues and di#culties in topping up    
user cards. 
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Political Resonances 
of the Metrocables
Peter Brand
Beyond ‘Good Government’ 
On the other hand the Medellín case demonstrates 
that the e%ects produced by a cable-car system 
on the material quality of life of urban residents 
are modest. !ey do not transport large numbers 
of people, and respond to the mobility needs of 
a relatively reduced number of people within the 
areas of in$uence. !e improvements in social 
indicators seem to be more attributable to the 
general economic conditions within the city and 
the e%ect of conventional social programmes in 
poor neighbourhoods. Nor have the Metrocables 
and complementary urban works been able to 
prevent growing social inequality in a period in 
Aerial cable-car systems are politically attractive. In the case of Colombia, even the then president showed his unre-
strained enthusiasm for the Medellín Metrocables 
and gave his commitment to promote a similar 
system in Soacha (as discussed in the following 
section of this book). Normally it is local political 
leaders, especially mayors, who have seen aerial 
cable-cars as projects with a substantial politi-
cal return: relatively cheap, possible to construct 
within a single administrative term and highly vis-
ible, aerial cable-cars respond well to the legitimate 
interests of a city administration.
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which Medellín became the city with the worst 
income distribution in Colombia. 
However, the perceptions of people 
(neighbourhood residents, the city’s population 
in general and especially visitors from outside) 
paint a picture of considerable success. !e visits 
of o#cial delegations and treatment in the media 
have hailed the Metrocables as a ‘good practice’ 
that should be replicated in many cities. Citizens 
in general became enamoured with the aerial 
cable-cars, and community leaders in the areas of 
in$uence are among their most ardent defenders.
It is relevant, then, to consider the political 
logic of the aerial cable-cars and explore their 
limitations and risks. !is is not to question the 
political interests themselves or attempt to submit 
them to technical rationality. Every successful urban 
administration creates hope and moulds citizen 
imaginaries. What is important, however, is to ensure 
that those legitimate political intentions surrounding 
the aerial cable-cars do not run aground.   
Public Power 
and Government 
Legitimation 
City governments today face acute challenges of 
legitimacy in the poorest urban sectors, confronted 
by those excluded from the economic and 
social circuits of globalisation. !e driving force 
behind urban development policy is economic 
competitiveness, which privileges the interests of 
both national and international capital and at the 
same time and almost universally, produces greater 
social inequality and the exclusion of those least able 
to participate in the ‘globalised’ city. Medellín’s aerial 
cable-cars, built in the poorest sectors of the city, 
clearly intend to demonstrate a concern for the lives 
of the most disadvantaged sectors of the population.
In this sense, Medellín’s aerial cable-
cars may be seen as going beyond the conceptual 
limits of governance understood simply as ‘good 
government’, with its principles of e#ciency, 
transparency and formal inclusion. !e 
Metrocables are better understood within the 
framework of the challenges for local democracy 
to recognise and incorporate those who have been 
excluded from urban life (Dávila and Brand, 2013). 
Government legitimation involves governance 
in the sense of the technical capacity to carry out 
programmes, but in the poor and informal sectors 
of the city it simultaneously implies a strategy for 
(re)establishing authority over urban sectors under 
weak state control. Such a situation requires new 
forms of government and innovative interventions 
in urban space (Swyngedouw, 2005) and the aerial 
cable-cars are a good example in this sense.
!e eminently public character of the 
aerial cable-cars is therefore not surprising. In the 
case of Medellín the Metrocables were conceived, 
"nanced, managed and operated by public 
bodies and companies. Moreover, especially in 
the construction phase and commencement of 
operations, there was extensive inter-institutional 
management and a close relationship with the 
bene"ciary communities. In contrast, there was no 
signi"cant participation of the private sector, other 
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than sporadic publicity and sponsorship of civic 
messages on the cable-cars and support of some 
cultural programmes within the Metro system. 
!e criticism of a ‘democratic de"cit’ levelled at so 
many public-private partnerships can hardly be 
applied to the Metrocables. 
The Political Potential 
of Aerial Cable-cars
In the case of Medellín, the Metrocables became 
key elements of an urban project presented 
discursively as the re-payment of an ‘historical 
debt’ that the city owed to its forgotten poor 
sectors. However, the modest impacts of the 
Metrocables on the material life of those residents, 
suggests that the political logic and coherence 
of the aerial cable-cars lies elsewhere; certainly 
beyond the conventional reach of governance 
understood as the judicious administration 
of the city (World Bank, 2000). It is clear that 
the Metro and Metrocables have contributed 
to the construction of an image of a city that is 
presented as not only economically competitive 
and innovative, but also socially progressive and 
committed to the poor (see also Stienen, 2009). In 
trying to understand how this has been achieved, 
the following aspects can be highlighted:  
Symbolic e&cacy: While only a small portion 
of the population in the areas of in$uence can 
be considered frequent users, the Metrocables 
produce wide and authentic perceptions of 
connection with and inclusion in the city on the 
part of the inhabitants of those neighbourhoods. 
Inclusion is not necessarily concretised in more 
travel and signi"cant increases in participation 
in labour markets and the material life of the 
city. It is more a question of the sensations 
that the Metrocables produce as symbols of 
inclusion of those neighbourhoods in the urban 
agenda, the attention and investment of the city 
administration, positive media coverage and the 
arrival of visitors of all kinds.
!ese e%ects are potentiated by the 
high visibility of the aerial cable-cars and 
the kinaesthetic experience that they o%er. A 
conventional road and bus system may have the 
capacity to move a higher volume of passengers, 
but they lack the visual and aesthetic appeal of 
the aerial cable-cars. In this sense the Metrocables 
"t within the logic of the urbanism of spectacle 
(Debord, 1994) as a dominant trend in the 
restructuring of cities, based on the political 
economy of commercialised cultural consumption 
through festivals, concerts, shows and similar 
events.  !e logic of local spectacles can also, 
however, sow seeds of dissent and constitute a 
terrain for re$exive action that “provoke radical 
critiques of inequality” (Fox Gotham, 2005) 
although there are few signs of this in the case of 
Medellín and the Metrocables.
State incursion: Studies of the increased 
mobility o%ered by the aerial cable-cars tend to 
focus     on the opportunities from within or the 
possibility of more and easier movement of the 
inhabitants of those areas towards the rest of 
the city. However, mobility is multidirectional. 
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Equally and perhaps even more important is the 
fact that the aerial cable-cars also allow the rest 
of the city to penetrate urban sectors that were 
previously inaccessible, unknown and perceived 
as highly dangerous. And it does this in a very 
particular way. !e aerial cable-cars are closed 
systems, strictly controlled and heavily surveyed, 
and they o%er a secure form of transport for 
both local residents and visitors, and a dramatic 
aesthetic and kinaesthetic experience. !e 
passenger, sealed o% in a cable-car capsule o%ering 
impressive panoramic views, glides silently above 
the roo&ops with glimpses into the private life of 
the poor neighbourhoods. !e Metrocables allow 
visitors (including tourists, international experts 
and journalists) a peculiar proximity to a distant 
world, so close yet at the same time so far from the 
experience of the passenger him or herself.
Taking this to its extreme, it produces 
what could be called the ‘King of Spain syndrome’. 
King Juan Carlos I rode the Metrocable to 
inaugurate the park-library located close to the 
terminal on the "rst line, which carries the name of 
his country. As the mayors of Medellín have o&en 
said, what was important was not the (very modest) 
support from the Spanish government in equipping 
the library, but the mere presence of the King: a 
ritualistic celebration of the conquest of this sector 
of the city on the part of the local administration. 
When this type of state presence is complemented 
by the presence of new institutions of law and 
intensi"ed police and military installations, the 
aerial cable-cars constitute the civic side of a process 
of ‘paci"cation’ of the poor sectors of the city.
Neighbourhood normalisation and social 
control: !e Metrocables bring with them 
demanding conditions of use, strict rules 
of behaviour and rigid citizen surveillance, 
especially within the Metro/Metrocable system 
but also in relation to neighbourhood life in 
general. Within the system, the ‘Metro Culture’ 
programme promoted by the Metro Company 
(Metro de Medellín, 2007) places strong emphasis 
on the notion of the ‘good citizen’ in terms of 
the values, attitudes and behaviour of users. !e 
poorly dressed, the badly spoken and those under 
the e%ect of alcohol have no room on the Metro 
or Metrocable; neither do those who carry large 
packages and even less so those without su#cient 
money to pay the fare (whom bus drivers o&en 
let enter free by the back door). While the 
majority of residents tend to accept all the above 
as something necessary and o&en positive, it can 
also provoke unease, inconformity and resistance 
among some users.
At the same time, the construction 
of the Metrocables opened the way for the 
fuller presence of state institutions, until then 
substantially excluded from or with restricted 
in$uence over those sectors. In this way the 
Metrocables facilitated the imposition of the 
rules of the formal city: legal connections to 
public infrastructure services, payment of taxes, 
inclusion in o#cial registers, and so on, in such a 
way that the Metrocables became a dispositive for 
the normalisation of urban life and the regulation 
of citizens, carried out through multiple and 
subtle mechanisms. 
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Conclusions
!e political e%ects of the Metrocables described 
above, and with them the increased in$uence and 
legitimation accruing to local government, are not 
guaranteed. For lasting political yield, such e%ects 
of an aerial cable-car system have to be exploited 
systematically and in various ways: through 
discursive production, complementary investment 
and social support programmes. In short, the 
Medellín experience allows us to highlight the 
importance of the following aspects:
!e need to integrate an aerial cable-car into the 
urban fabric and insert it in the daily routines of 
the inhabitants of the areas of in$uence. It is not 
absolutely necessary that all inhabitants use them; 
what matters is that they feel that it belongs to them. 
!e importance of the permanent and positive 
presence of the state in the areas of in$uence, 
continued by other means once an aerial 
cable-car commences operation. A passing, 
gestural intervention will be perceived as such 
by inhabitants. Complementary urban projects 
concerning improvements in public space, social 
infrastructure and programmes, local planning 
processes and participatory budgets, and so on, 
validate and consolidate the e%ects of improved 
mobility that an aerial cable-car o%ers. 
!e creation of sensations of social inclusion is 
strengthened to the degree that an aerial cable-
car system forms part of a coherent ‘city project’, 
allowing a potentially isolated artefact such as an 
aerial cable-car to spearhead an inclusive project 
in all dimensions of city life. 
!e political art of the aerial cable-car consists in the 
creation of authentic sensations of the inclusion of 
poor sectors of the city, sensations that need to be 
constructed and materialised in many di%erent ways. 
An aerial cable-car that hangs over an unchangingly 
impoverished social and urban landscape loses all 
charm and positive political signi"cance.
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Medellín’s Metrocables are a glorious initiative of urbaßn development and democratisation of access.  !ey 
provide a link to the metropolitan economy for 
populations that have been remote from its op-
portunities. !ey change the whole shape of eco-
nomic opportunity for hillside communities. !ey 
have already been replicated in Caracas and Rio de 
Janeiro and will surely continue to be so by many 
of the cities represented at the project workshop 
in Medellín (carried out in December 2011 as 
part of this research) from all over Latin America, 
and therea&er by cities with hillside settlements 
throughout the world. !ey will signi"cantly re-
duce the social stigma of living on the hillsides and 
signi"cantly raise the incomes and opportunities 
of those families. 
The Land-Use 
Links 
of Medellín’s Metrocables
At the same time, this is a moment to 
consider the relentless land development dynamics 
likely to take place.  It is necessary to empower 
hillside individuals and communities to take 
advantage of the positive impacts of this new 
mode and to cope with the potentially damaging 
impacts. !e latter could be an embarrassment to 
the otherwise great future of the mode.
Intensi!cation of Land Use 
In particular, the localities of stations of the 
Metrocable in Medellín are already heavily used 
as commercial and service localities, but the new 
access is going to generate much higher demand 
for such activities because of the very high 
movement of passengers through the stations.                     
Ralph Gakenheimer
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New client-serving establishments will appear, 
such as banks, restaurants, cafés, and food stores. 
It will be much easier for passengers to buy 
their groceries on arrival rather than carry them 
through the transit connections and in the transit 
cars. Accordingly, there will be strong forces 
toward increasing building densities and heights.  
Part of this commercial expansion will occur along 
the lateral access streets, but with a premium on 
being close to the Metrocable stations. !ere may 
also be e%orts to develop smaller, more numerous 
housing units along the lateral access streets.
Further Research 
to Meet Short 
Term Requirements
!e whole shape of access $ows and use densities 
will be subject to new pressures. !e geotechnical 
conditions of these zones have already withstood 
signi"cant loads as a result of urbanisation. New 
developments will increase this load yet further, 
dispersed over the length of the lateral contours 
of the slopes. !ere could therefore be need 
for additional studies to examine geotechnical 
conditions where the stations are situated, 
including other zones further away.  
!ese communities are originally prod-
ucts of spontaneous settlement, but it is important 
to develop community group capabilities for the 
guidance of private development initiatives. Devel-
opment control capability will be a complicated task 
requiring signi"cant public technical and authority 
support. Another alternative is more direct o#cial 
government guidance of the development. It is im-
portant that locational decisions be backed up by 
o#cial sources to assure safety in development.
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The Future
We must acknowledge that the future is sure to 
bring rapidly increasing construction of additional 
Metrocable lines, and therefore need for greater 
guidance for its land development e%ects. 
!ere will be increased demand for 
system capacity and increasing means of serving 
it.  A&er all, the current Metrocable lines are 
transporting commuters by using mechanical 
systems basically designed for ski stations and 
tourist attractions—travel $ows which are in 
general not peaked, and in which each passenger 
should have a good view. Greater capacity in the 
immediate future would require custom designed 
equipment and would be economically untenable. 
But the industry is sure to catch on to the promise 
of the Metrocable and will soon market equipment 
designed to serve it. It is surely feasible to multiply 
passenger line capacity by a substantial number.  
When that happens it is likely that existing 
Metrocables will not be soon replaced because 
the sunk costs would be so great (assuming that 
the suspension would have to be replaced as well 
as the cars). However we should be thinking 
about advice for future Metrocable construction. 
!ere needs to be careful examination of subsoil 
conditions, and zoning for permitted intensity and 
types of land uses. !ere needs to be speci"c plans 
for infrastructure capacity. !e construction and 
operation of water, stormwater and wastewater 
facilities will be a challenge. !ese services will be 
quite costly and precarious. 
Planning for the street transport that 
complements Metrocable will be a particular 
challenge. !e problem has a unique form. !e 
population surrounding the stations will show high 
residential densities, low auto-motorisation, but 
probably high use of motorised two-wheelers. !e 
passengers may show high use of informal transport 
systems along lateral connectors. In brief, this is a 
very new micro-environment for public transport.
One thing that is quite clear is that the 
priority for pedestrian circulation is higher in 
the locality of Metrocable stations than in other 
travel environments. !ere needs to be separate 
consideration of pedestrian transport—directions, 
volumes and modes. !at includes the use of 
stairways, li&s, and public escalators (already 
installed in one neighbourhood in Medellín’s 
Commune 13).
!e entire policy and management aspect 
of this unique transport environment presents new 
requirements for which the existing public services 
are not prepared in any existing metropolitan area. 
!is stimulates the idea of creating a new Metrocable 
transit management authority that can address this 
multimodal transport and land use environment. 
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An Outlandish Idea?
Soacha’s 
Cazucable
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The municipality of Soacha is located on a high plateau of the western part of the Andes known as the ‘Bogotá Savannah’. 
It lies at 2,500 metres above sea level and is a 
meeting point between some of the region’s 
strategic ecosystems1. Its urban territory is cut o% 
by the Western Ridge of the Colombian Andes on 
one side and the Bogotá River on the other and 
is traversed by the basin of the Soacha River. It 
is one of 116 municipalities in the Departamento 
(province) of Cundinamarca and occupies an 
important place in Colombia’s central region as 
1  !ese include the high and low moorlands of Sumapaz, 
the Bogotá Savannah high plateau, Bogotá’s river valley, 
and its physical connection with the Magdalena River val-
ley, Colombia’s main river artery (SDP, 2010).
the most populated municipality neighbouring 
the country’s capital city, Bogotá. Today, Soacha 
has the tenth largest population in the country, 
housing some of Bogotá’s population over-$ow 
of the last 30 years and part of the city’s recent 
migrant population, especially from low income 
households. In 2010, Soacha had a population of 
456,000 inhabitants living on 3,110 hectares of 
urban land, with a density2 of 146.6 inhabitants/
hectare3 (Montenegro, 2011).
2  Density is calculated by dividing the number of inhabit-
ants by the urban land area (measured in hectares). 
3  Soacha’s population density is slightly lower than that of the 
largest Colombian cities: Bogotá (194 inhabitants/hectare), Medel-
lín (221 inhabitants/hectare) and Cali (187 inhabitants/hectare).
Nicolás Rueda García and Luis Hernán Sáenz
Soacha: From Autonomous Municipality to a Strategic 
Component of the Metropolitan Area 
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Soacha is also the municipality with the 
second highest concentration of industrial and 
productive establishments in the region. Over the 
last few years, it has been the object of important 
urban and regional projects, such as the extension 
of the dual carriageway in the Bogotá-Girardot 
road (one of the main road axes in Colombia), the 
development of the Ciudad Verde Social Housing 
Macro-project with a production target of 42,000 
dwellings, and the future extension of the southern 
trunk road of Bogotá’s BRT Mass Transport System 
(Transmilenio) which will incorporate Soacha 
within the system4. !e municipality is located on 
one of the most important road intersections of 
central Colombia, connecting the capital region 
with the south, south-east and west of the country. 
Soacha was founded in 1600, a little 
more than 60 years a&er Bogotá (FEDES, 2010). 
Its recent history and growth are highly in$uenced 
by the process of development and expansion 
of Bogotá’s southern periphery, especially the 
localities of Bosa and Ciudad Bolívar.5 !e 
construction of major infrastructure projects 
such as the El Charquito hydro-electric plant at 
the end of the 19th Century, the Muña dam in 
the 1930s and the southern railway line which 
connected Bogotá with Girardot in 1898, and 
4  !e construction of the Transmilenio extension to Soacha began 
in 2010 but at the time of writing in mid-2012 it has stalled and 
will not be completed within the original timeframe of the project 
(see the chapter by Bocarejo and Velásquez in this section). 
5  ‘Localities’ are political-administrative divisions in Bogotá’s 
Capital District administered by local mayors appointed by the 
Mayor of Bogotá. Bogotá is sub-divided into 20 localities con-
taining over 1,200 neighbourhoods (barrios in Spanish). 
which provided the layout for construction of the 
Southern Motorway, have all marked the form 
and growth of Soacha’s urban area (Bonilla, 
2009). !ese elements of infrastructure brought 
about considerable tension between the local 
authorities of Bogotá and Soacha, until the 
physical separation between the two vanished 
with the gradual appearance of a conurbation. 
!e area of Cazucá, where an aerial 
cable-car project informally known as Cazucable 
is planned, and located on a hilly area south 
of the Southern Motorway on the border with 
Bogotá, is an example of the conurbation between 
Soacha and Bogotá (see Figure 3). Cazucá grew 
with the help of two fairly typical mechanisms in 
the development of urban informal settlements 
in Colombia: the "rst one, which was prevalent 
during the 1970s and 1980s, consisted of 
land invasions carried out through the illegal 
occupation of private lands by groups of families. 
With the support of the Communist party through 
the Central Nacional Provivienda (Cenaprov), this 
gave birth to two neighbourhoods known as the 
Julio Rincón neighbourhood, founded in 1978, and 
the Villa Mercedes neighbourhood, founded in 
1988 (Pinzón, 2007). !e second came about when 
some of the leaders of these invasions divided 
part of the land into plots to sell at low cost to 
households who arrived later, a practice commonly 
known in Colombia as ‘pirate sub-division.’ 
!e images in Figure 1 illustrate the 
process of rapid urbanisation that Cazucá 
underwent between 1996 and 2007. !e layout 
of Ciudadela Sucre, a relatively recent pirate sub-
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Main Functional 
Relations Between 
Soacha and Bogotá
!e spatial and functional conurbation of Bogotá-
Soacha is the most dynamic in the area of the 
Bogotá Savannah. !e high population pressures 
to which Soacha has been subjected and its 
strategic location have led to chaotic urbanisation. 
!is has been compounded by institutional and 
governance di#culties (see the next chapter by 
Acevedo et al.) that le& the municipality at the 
mercy of the informal land market, the result 
of which are vast informal settlements lacking 
adequate basic infrastructure services, educational 
facilities, parks and road infrastructure. 
!e main element that de"nes the 
functional relationship between Soacha and Bogotá 
is the Southern Motorway. !e Motorway traverses 
all Bogotá’s urban area from north to south, and 
turns into a National Motorway (connecting the 
capital with the southern and south eastern regions 
of the country) as it enters Soacha municipality.
Urban growth in Soacha has developed 
in a linear fashion along the Southern Motorway 
where a range of economic activities are 
located, providing access to urban services and, 
crucially, being a point of access and a link to job 
opportunities in Bogotá’s labour market (Bonilla, 
2009). With the construction of the Transmilenio 
bus rapid transit system in 2000, Bogotá was able 
to link up the peripheral populations in the north, 
south and west of the capital. In 2006 the trunk 
division located in the background of the 2007 
photo, shows evidence of urban design by the ‘pirate 
developers’. In contrast, the Cazucá neighbourhoods 
in the foreground show evidence of a chaotic, 
spontaneous and dense land occupation, the 
outcome of successive episodes of land invasion.  
Figure 1: Expansion of Cazucá Between 1996 and 2007
Source: Torres (2008)
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route for Transmilenio to the Portal Sur terminus 
station was inaugurated, in the limits between 
Bogotá and Soacha, thus giving greater and more 
e#cient access for Soacha’s inhabitants to Bogotá’s 
urban services, and in this way completing the 
transport links between the two.
Beyond the functional relationship 
through the Southern Motorway, the urban fabric 
that de"nes the border between Soacha and Bogotá 
as the physical limit between the two territories has 
disappeared. Neighbourhoods such as Cazucá with 
high levels of informality and located in areas which 
are di#cult to access due to topographical and 
social factors, "nd their functional relationship to be 
more e%ective with Bogotá than with Soacha itself. 
Domestic water and energy supply in places like 
Cazucá can easily be provided illegally due to their 
proximity to Bogotá’s trunk networks.
The Cazucable Project
!e idea of building an aerial cable-car system 
in Cazucá’s hilly area initially came out of a 
‘community council meeting’ carried out in the 
municipality by the then President of Colombia 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez in 2009. !e proposed project, 
known informally as Cazucable and developed by 
the Medellín Metro Company,6 consists of four 
stations covering a distance of 2.8 km and rising to 
155 metres above the Southern Motorway. It links 
up with the Southern Motorway at the proposed 
6  Information on the aerial cable-car project presented and 
analysed in this section comes from pre-feasibility studies 
carried out by the Medellín Metro Company in 2009. 
Terreros Station and rises up Cazucá’s hills, with the 
three remaining stations located along the way. !e 
third station on the route called Santo Domingo 
Station is located on the highest point, on the 
border with Ciudad Bolívar. !e route design does 
not follow the street layout, which is irregular and 
has developed organically. As a result, pylons are not 
located on the widest roads in the area. 
!e Terreros Station is designed as a 
modal interchange point where users can transfer 
between Transmilenio and the Cazucable, and will 
be developed in a building complex to be used as 
a transport node. !e three stations located on 
Cazucá’s slopes are located in areas designated for 
integrated upgrading by the municipality which 
bear the marks of being the outcome of non-
existent planning, with narrow, unpaved streets, 
and inadequate provision of public space. !e 
residential fabric shows high levels of occupation 
in single- or two-storey housing, with a single-
family typology built with poor-quality materials, 
in plots with an average area of 72 m2. 
In contrast to the existing housing, the 
proposed Cazucable stations are buildings with an 
average height of 25 metres and with a proposed 
ground $oor area of 700 m2 on average, which 
creates a con$ict in terms of scale and impact in 
the neighbourhood (Metro de Medellín, 2009). 
Additionally, the current design aims to provide 
some facilities and public space areas in the 
catchment areas of each station, with the aim of 
helping to meet major gaps while contributing to 
upgrading potential of the neighbourhoods. 
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Figure 1: Area of Intervention and Santo Domingo Cazucable Station
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from the pre-feasibility                             
Cazucable project (Medellín Metro Company) on Google Earth aerial photographs (2011).
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Planning Shortfalls 
of the Cazucable 
Project
Lack of a Metropolitan Vision
Despite being politically and administratively 
independent, the functional and spatial 
relationships between Bogotá D.C. and the 
municipality of Soacha are such that they currently 
are part of a conurbation (or metropolitan 
functional region). For various reasons, this has 
not been led to the creation of a metropolitan 
political-administrative entity (as is the case in 
Medellín with the Metropolitan Area). Despite 
the absence of a legal body, the formulation of an 
major development project such as the Cazucable 
should have arisen from recognising that this 
conurbation is a current reality, thus seeking to 
overcome the virtual border between the two 
administrations (see the chapter by Acevedo et al.). 
In the north western hills of Soacha 
municipality lies Altos de Cazucá, a residential 
area within Soacha’s Commune 4.7. Adjacent to it 
are the neighbourhoods of Estancia and Paraíso, 
within the Ciudad Bolívar district of Bogotá D.C. 
As mentioned earlier, these neighbourhoods are a 
7  Communes are administrative sub-divisions within 
Colombia’s medium-sized municipalities. !ey consist of 
clusters of neighbourhoods (barrios) and are administered 
by a Local Administrative Council (JAL), elected by popu-
lar vote. Soacha is sub-divided into six communes. 
continuously urbanised area that seems to defy the 
virtual boundary between the two administrative 
areas. To the untrained eye of a visitor, these 
residential areas appear as examples of the 
morphology and shortcomings resulting from 
informal and chaotic processes of urban growth, 
with poor or non-existent road infrastructure, 
basic infrastructure services and community 
facilities. Although Ciudad Bolívar is one of the 
poorest and most under-developed districts in 
Bogotá, its inhabitants fare better than those 
in Soacha’s neighbouring Commune 4. !is is 
because Ciudad Bolivar is located within the city 
of Bogotá, which ensures access to its residents of 
the bene"ts of local government action, such as 
integrated neighbourhood upgrading programmes, 
including the provision of road infrastructure and 
basic infrastructure services as well as community 
facilities for education, leisure and culture. !ese 
programmes also help improve connections with 
public transport systems and through this medium 
to other services that the city has to o%er (see the 
chapter by Álvarez Rivadulla and Bocarejo).
It is somewhat puzzling that, despite the 
close proximity between these neighbourhoods, 
the proposed Cazucable route does not stretch 
onto Ciudad Bolívar. !e potential administrative 
impasse arising from spanning two independent 
territorial units could easily be resolved through 
an agreement between the two local authorities. 
!is would permit spatial interventions in the two 
administrative areas, and equitably outline the 
rights and "nancial responsibilities of each party.
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Source: Own        
elaboration based on 
Google Earth aerial 
photographs (2011).
Figure 2: !e Boundary Between Soacha and Bogotá
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Apparent Underestimation 
of the Land’s 
Geological Conditions 
De"ciencies in the conception and planning of 
the project meant that some critical features of the 
terrain in Altos de Cazucá were underestimated. 
Quarries (e.g. clay, sand, and aggregates) towards 
the west of the area have been mined for decades 
leading a growing problem of terrain instability. In 
the municipality’s latest Urban Development Plan 
(POT)8 land use in the Cazucá sector is de"ned as 
residential, though this is expected to co-exist with 
the extraction of non-renewable natural resources, 
leading to severe land use con$icts. Over the 
past decade or so there have been a number of 
major landslides, which are the result of seismic 
conditions, the intensity of rainfall in the area, and 
human activity (digging of building foundations 
and inadequate disposal of grey water). By way 
of example, in March 2009 a landslide buried 17 
houses and put at risk more than 4,500 families 
8  In 1997 Colombia adopted a spatial development law 
(Ley 388) which decrees that all municipalities and dis-
tricts with a population above 100,000 inhabitants should 
carry out an Urban Development Plan (POT in its Spanish 
acronym). All physical development should be guided by 
the rules and norms adopted there. !e POT is the instru-
ment that de"nes land use within the municipal territory: 
it de"nes the ecological structure that should be preserved; 
it de"nes areas exposed to hazards and natural risks, areas 
where development is not permitted; it de"nes the perim-
eter surrounding lands for urban use and areas for potential 
expansion; it de"nes the location of the road plan and com-
mon facilities for parks and other public open spaces. 
who were supposed to be the object of a relocation 
programme. Following this, there were similar 
events that have decisively compromised the 
stability and the real possibilities of consolidation 
of this residential settlement. In August 2006 a 
report by Ingeominas9 and the Soacha Mayor’s 
O#ce entitled ‘Zoning of !reats by Landslides 
in !ree Sectors of the Municipality of Soacha – 
Phase 1’, included ‘Plans for the ‘critical zones for 
landslides in the sector of Cazucá’ where the most 
critical zones were identi"ed (Zmc) and the critical 
zones (Zc) which can be seen in Figure 4 (key: 
zmc: dark grey and Zc: light grey). 
As part of the Cazucable proposal, the 
"rm INTEINSA was commissioned to undertake 
basic geotechnical studies by the Medellín 
Metro Company. !e October 2009 preliminary 
report outlines the geo-technical analysis 
and recommendations for the design of the 
foundations of the stations and the pylons for the 
aerial cable-car system. Despite a careful analysis 
of the geological characteristics of the study area, 
and mention of 27 major landslides and mudslides, 
it suggests going ahead with the feasibility study 
for the construction of the aerial cable-car system. 
Notwithstanding the conclusions of this study, 
the geological conditions in Cazucá should be 
considered as critical, and in constant evolution 
and ever-greater deterioration. 
!is issue has been a serious source of 
concern for the municipal administration and 
the Soacha community. However, the Medellín 
9  Colombian Institute for Geology and Mining.
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Figure 4: Cazucá Landslide Risk Zoning
Source: Ingeominas (2006)
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Metro Company tried to allay fears in a technical 
study. Acosta (2009), writing in the national daily 
newspaper El Tiempo considers the situation 
thus: “Widespread fears that the soil in Soacha’s 
hills would not be able to sustain the support 
infrastructure for an aerial cable-car system due 
to frequent landslides during the rainy season 
was dismissed in the results of the project’s 
pre-feasibility study. !e terrain can take the 
weight of the stations and pillars, and it does not 
compromise the stability of the project.” 
It would seem that the studies carried 
out by the Medellín Metro Company o%er the 
necessary con"dence for construction. However, 
it is perhaps worrisome that the aerial cable-
car project has clearly established a marked 
separation between the transport by cable, on 
one side, and the problematic residential area 
of Cazucá, on the other. Although it appears 
that the stability and solidity of the stations and 
pylons can be guaranteed, the project fails to 
include interventions to substantially improve the 
critical geological conditions of the surrounding 
residential zones. !at is, should landslides 
become more frequent and more acute, the 
stations and pillars would remain in place, while 
some of the users of Cazucable’s services might 
well disappear.
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The experience of Medellín has attracted attention from other developing cities and has served as inspiration for aerial 
cable-car projects in Colombia and elsewhere.              
The aim of this chapter is to explore whether 
lessons from Medellín can be applied to the 
planned aerial cable-car project that has been 
planned in the zone known as the Altos de Cazucá, 
a marginal community in Soacha, a suburban 
municipality adjacent to Colombia’s capital city (see 
previous chapter by Rueda García and Sáenz García). 
Despite apparent similarities between Medellín’s 
Metrocables and the Cazucable project, when 
examined in some level of detail notable 
di%erences arise. !e most obvious is institutional. 
It would seem no exaggeration to suggest that a 
large part of the apparent success of Medellín’s 
projects are the result of the existence of a 
particularly solid agency (in technical, "nancial 
and political terms) in charge of designing 
the project, securing its funding, building the 
infrastructure and operating the service and 
"nancing any operational de"cits. !is was further 
strengthened by the strong commitment of one 
The Presidential Promise
 of an  
Institutional Limitations 
and Political Realities 
Jorge Acevedo, Juan Miguel Velásquez and Juan Pablo Bocarejo
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municipal mayor, which was instrumental in 
gaining the support of other municipal bodies and 
subsequently helped ensure the project’s success and 
the development of major complementary urban 
upgrading interventions by the mayor’s successors. 
In institutional terms, the Cazucable case 
contrasts radically with that of Medellín. Despite 
being a de facto conurbation, the jurisdictions of 
Bogotá’s Capital District and the municipality of 
Soacha are independent. !e project was born 
out of a local proposal and a Presidential o%er of 
support for the zone, the leadership of the project 
then passed to the hands of Soacha’s mayor. Due 
to political di#culties, this mayor was suspended 
for more than a year until May 2011 and was 
reintegrated in his position with only a few months 
le& before his term expired at the end of that year.
Of the municipalities that surround 
Bogotá, Soacha has the largest population, 
representing 26.8% of the regional total, followed 
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by Zipaquirá with 10.3%. !is size demonstrates 
its importance and weight in the process of 
urbanisation of the metropolitan region. Given 
its growth and the development and expansion of 
Bogotá, the border between Soacha and Bogotá 
began to disappear close to an old railway corridor, 
especially in the area of Bosa, one Bogotá’s 20 
administrative sub-divisions.
Despite Soacha’s considerable size, the 
municipal government’s institutional capacity in 
"scal, administrative and political terms is extremely 
weak. !ere are various bodies, amongst them the 
Bogotá Chamber of Commerce (CCB, 2005) and 
the Entrepreneurs Association of Sibaté, Soacha and 
the south of Bogotá (Asomuña, 2006), which argue 
that the municipality’s structure and administrative 
capacity are ine%ectual because it has been unable 
to develop at the same rate as the population and 
has serious problems of political instability. !e 
Bogotá Chamber of Commerce report further 
points out that this political instability has led to 
policy instability, a lack of transparency in the 
public sector, an absence of coordination between 
the public and private sectors, and a lack of medium 
and long term planning culture.
Indeed, Soacha’s 2008 Municipal 
Development Plan states that the municipality 
has experienced a gradual de-institutionalisation 
over the last few decades, thus giving rise to a 
series of socio-economic problems that have in 
turn hindered further development (Alcaldía de 
Soacha, 2008). !e municipality’s institutional 
weakness is also apparent to o#cial bodies based 
in the capital city, both at local and national levels. 
In interviews with representatives from Bogotá’s 
Planning Secretariat (SDP) and the city’s mass 
transport company (Transmilenio S.A., henceforth 
TMSA), for example, their view of Soacha came 
through. For the SDP, one of Soacha’s main 
problems is its inability to raise taxes and the on-
going drop in municipal revenues, which limits 
possibilities to develop joint projects between the 
two local authorities. For TMSA’s o#cials, Soacha 
su%ers from a problem of high employee turnover, 
which hinders any joint planning exercises. All of 
this puts in doubt Soacha’s capacity to plan and 
implement a project such as the Cazucable.  
!e National Planning Department 
(DNP)10 developed a methodology to measure the 
performance of Colombian municipalities in "ve 
areas: e#cacy, e#ciency, compliance with legal 
requirements, management, and environment. 
!e DNP calculates indicators annually to monitor 
municipalities’ performance and ranks its results 
from best to worst amongst all Colombian 
municipalities (close to 1,000). !e indicator for 
Soacha between 2005 and 2009 is shown in Table 1.  
10  DNP is a technical advisory body of the National Gov-
ernment that guides the programming and monitoring of 
investment resources towards the achievement of national 
goals over the medium to long term. It also in$uences 
policies and projects throughout the country, through 
inter-institutional work in coordination with both national 
and regional agencies. 
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!e municipality’s "scal performance 
is in continual decline. Soacha’s revenues have 
dropped as a consequence of its limited capacity 
to raise taxes and due to a weakened economic 
activity within the municipality. Soacha depends 
more and more on "scal transfers from the 
National Government, and as a consequence its 
investment capacity is very limited. 
!e municipality’s population is aware 
of this institutional weakness. Testimonies 
from inhabitants in Cazucá clearly give o% this 
perception. !e most common problems pointed 
out are related to the lack of presence of local 
authorities in the zone, social programmes have 
Table 1: Soacha’s Ranking Among Colombia’s Municipalities, 2005-2009
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
National rank 265 285 147 173 311
Source: DNP, Evaluation and monitoring of decentralisation (several years).
Although there are large $uctuations from one 
year to another, which might suggest problems in 
DNP’s methodology, the fact that the 10th largest 
municipality is placed either as 147th (at best) or 
311th (at worst) is a dramatic indicator of Soacha’s 
institutional weakness.
For the development of the Cazucable 
project, the municipality’s "nancial capacity 
is particularly important. !e DNP calculates 
detailed indicators to assess the evolution of 
municipal "nances in the country. Table 2 shows 
two indicators for the period 2005-2009, the most 
recent available information at the time of writing 
(in mid-2012).
Year Current expenditure as a share of municipal revenues Own sources as a share of total revenue2006 31.6 ʹͷǤͺ2007 36.9 20.6
ʹͲͲͺ ͶͺǤͳ 22.02009 ͷͺǤͷ 20.3
Table 2: Selected Financial Indicators for Soacha 
Source: DNP, Evaluation and monitoring of decentralisation (several years).
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limited impact, and the security services are 
ine%ectual. Likewise, the community has little 
knowledge of and in$uence in government 
decisions related to the commune11.
Soacha’s population size is that of a major 
medium-sized city, and yet the administration 
and capacity of the municipality are more akin to 
those of a town. !is is exacerbated because its 
economy is so closely linked to Bogotá’s. As the 
availability of land that can be built upon within 
the administrative boundaries of Bogotá’s Capital 
District has signi"cantly dwindled – particularly 
land that can accommodate social housing for 
people displaced by Colombia’s internal con$ict 
– there has been an in$ux into Soacha of some 
of the poorest and most forgotten families in the 
region who migrated to Bogotá but cannot a%ord 
to pay even the cheapest rents in the capital city. 
Soacha is a medium-sized city comprising some 
of the region’s poorest people, the majority of 
who work in Bogotá and use its services. Bogotá 
is the backbone of a region that is plagued by a 
range of needs and problems, and yet the attitude 
of its authorities shows a form of myopia in 
ignoring Soacha’s throbbing social problems that, 
sooner rather than later, will end up falling on its 
shoulders and will use up some of its resources. 
But currently, relations between the two authorities 
are almost non-existent.
!e Cazucable was o#cially born out of a 
promise from President Uribe, who entrusted the 
11  Data gathered in the "eld in 2010 and 2011 by the 
research team.
Medellín Metro Company12 (see the second section 
in this book) with deciding the best location 
and designing the project. TMSA’s participation 
was requested in an apparent attempt to apply 
Medellín’s institutional framework to the capital 
region. TMSA carried out various demand studies 
for the projected line, but it has not taken on 
leadership of the project (and it could not do so 
because the Cazucable lies outside its jurisdiction 
12   !e o#cial name of the company is Empresa de 
Transporte Masivo del Valle de Aburrá (ETMVA), Medellín 
Metro Company for short.
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and because TMSA was not in a position to 
undertake the construction and operation of the 
project). As a result, no one has yet proposed a 
realistic mechanism to fund either the capital 
costs or the operational deficits of the line once 
it is completed.
Worse still, no o#cial body has proposed 
even a simple list (with funding sources) of urban 
upgrading projects to complement the construction 
of the Cazucable, which as shown in earlier chapters 
seem to explain a substantial part of Medellín’s 
success. In line with all this is, the technical studies 
done so far appear to be rather sketchy (planning 
considerations, issues of land stability, and costs), 
while attempts to engage the community have been 
very limited. !e design, as it stands at the time of 
writing in mid-2012, hinges on the need to relocate 
many households while the terrain is marked by 
severe geological instability problems (see chapter 
by Rueda García and Sáenz García).
!e Cazucable project faces very 
complex institutional problems to convert the plan 
into reality. Resolving these problems requires 
de"ning who has ownership of the project. By 
‘owner’ we mean a public body with the capacity 
to make decisions over the whole project in its 
di%erent components: in terms of its design 
(location, technical elements, urban and social 
elements, complemented with urban design and 
infrastructure interventions in the catchment area, 
Photo: Luis Hernán Sáenz
142
No municipal government body has the 
capacity to take on the aforementioned functions. 
!e person most naturally endowed with the 
necessary competency to achieve success would 
appear to be the municipal mayor, with the help of 
a technical advisory team. However, institutional 
weakness within the municipality does not bode 
well for the project. In conclusion, the good results 
shown in Medellín and the lessons from this process 
would appear to be very di#cult to replicate in the 
case of the Cazucable.
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environmental impact assessment, and mechanisms 
for citizen participation in decision making); in 
its construction (property purchase, relocation 
of a%ected households, detailed designs, hiring 
suppliers and builders, auditing, monitoring, and 
accountability); in terms of funding the project, 
including any unforeseen costs (both own funding 
sources as well as timely access to funding from the 
National Government, the provincial government, 
Bogotá, and Soacha municipality, and bringing 
together all funding sources into a special fund 
for the project; in terms of operating the service 
once built (selection and hiring of an operating 
agency, permanent supervision of these services, 
management negotiation and signing of agreements 
for integration with Transmilenio services); 
in the "nancial structuring of the operation 
(mechanisms and criteria to set and to adjust fares; 
fare integration with other transport services; 
delineation of the requirements of funds to subsidise 
the line’s operation and sources of funding for 
subsidies (with municipal funds and perhaps funds 
from Bogotá speci"cally earmarked for this); and, 
"nally, e%ective coordination with other entities 
within the Soacha municipality for the de"nition 
of complementary urban infrastructure projects, 
and to ensure that an appropriate design is done in 
consultation with the local community, as well as 
the timely execution and "nancing of the project. 
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Soacha city centre seen from Julio Rincón neighbourhood (2011)
María José Álvarez Rivadulla and Diana Bocarejo 
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Soacha’s Commune 4, where the neighbourhood of Cazucá is located, is a zone of extreme social vulnerability. On 
various occasions during our interviews in the area 
we heard phrases like “Cazucá is like a Colombia 
in miniature”. !is does not refer to the country’s 
beauty or the extraordinary diversity of its $ora 
and fauna; rather it alludes to a convergence of the 
country’s worst problems in this reduced space: a 
mixture of poverty, unemployment, forced internal 
displacement, violence, gangs, drug tra#cking, 
environmental degradation, urban informality, 
to mention just the most visible. All these 
characteristics lead us to see this zone as a ghetto, or 
a ‘hyper-ghetto’ to use Wacquant’s (2001a) term, an 
excluded and stigmatised space1.  And it is within 
this context, as we will see in the following sub-
section, that the enormous expectations of the local 
population towards a project such as the proposed 
aerial cable-car system should be understood (see 
previous chapter by Acevedo et al.).
According to data from Colombia’s 2005 
population census, approximately 70,000 people live 
in the area. !e population is young, and there is 
a large proportion of children. Today this number 
can safely be said to have risen due to the rapid 
growth in an area with a considerable in$ow of new 
inhabitants every day. Almost 80% of the population 
living in Commune 4 today were not born there.
Of these migrants there are a high proportion of 
people who arrived due to displacement resulting 
from Colombia’s low-intensity internal con$ict 
over many decades. Number estimates vary. In 2005, 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) estimated that 40% of Cazucá’s population 
consisted of internally displaced people (IDP)2. It 
was because of this high "gure that UNCHR, jointly 
with the country’s Ombudsman o#ce (Defensoría 
del Pueblo) set up a ‘House of Rights’ in the area, a 
safe place where IDPs can seek support to ensure 
that their rights as enshrined in Law are respected, 
including receiving State subsidy and other forms 
of support. !e House is an important landmark in 
the neighbourhood and, in addition to registering 
IDPs, they attend to many other demands including 
organising training workshops.
Commune 4 constitutes an even poorer 
area than neighbouring Ciudad Bolívar in Bogotá 
(see the chapter by Rueda García and Sáenz García). 
!is is one of the poorest areas of the capital, but 
it nonetheless belongs to Bogotá, and so it bene"ts 
from much more organised and better endowed 
local government action, such as infrastructure 
upgrading as part neighbourhood regularisation 
programmes, social services such as libraries and 
parks, and connection to the public transport 
system and, through this, access to many of the 
capital city’s services. !e border between Ciudad 
Bolívar and Commune 4 appears as completely 
1  !e term ‘hyper-ghetto’ is used by Wacquant to refer 
to the worsening of living conditions in black ghettos in 
American cities provoked by economic liberalisation (dis-
appearance of labour opportunities, weakening of neigh-
bourhood institutions and $ight of the Afro-American 
middle classes to other areas of the city). See for example 
Wacquant (2001b) and Wilson (1996). 2  ACNUR
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blurred for any visitor looking towards Cazucá; 
what one sees is an uninterrupted spatial continuum 
of simple dwellings. Residents of Cazucá, however, 
are very clear in their mind about which street 
separates them from Bogotá. !ose who live on 
their side of this invisible line, for example, do not 
have access to reliable water services. 
Table 1 shows some vulnerability 
indicators of the populations in Commune 4 
and Ciudad Bolívar and the average for Bogotá. 
Some indicators, such as access to utilities, have 
improved since 2005 as some settlements in 
Commune 4 have been legalised and regularised. 
Nonetheless, the majority of the population still 
lack access to piped water, and their inhabitants 
are subject to the stark daily consequences of their 
structural vulnerability.
Soacha city centre seen from Julio Rincón 
neighbourhood (1986)
Table 1: Soacha’s Commune 4, Ciudad Bolívar and Average for Bogotá:  Some Indicators of Vulnerability  (percentages)
* Share of women aged between 12 and 19 years who have had at least one child born alive.
Source: Own calculations based on DANE, national population census 2005
 
Share of 
dwellings 
without piped 
water 
Share of 
dwellings 
without 
sewerage
Share of 
dwellings 
without 
gas
Incidence 
of teenage 
pregnancy*
Share of 
people over 
12 with no 
primary 
education 
Bogotá 1.4 2.1 20.2 6.8 10.2
Ciudad Bolívar 5.5 6.5 14.1 11.2 17.9
Commune 4 73.9 66.1 63.5 13.1 26.2
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!e enormous di%erences in access to 
basic infrastructure services are not as marked 
as those shown by the last two indicators, which 
highlight severe social problems. !e high levels 
of teenage pregnancy and non-completion of 
primary education in Ciudad Bolívar suggest that 
improvements in public service provision are on 
their own insu#cient to solve these structural 
social problems.
When asking people what are the most 
important problems in the zone, insecurity appears 
as the most recurrent issue (alongside lack of 
legalisation of their land, followed by lack of access 
to water). Insecurity and fear shape people’s lives, 
routines, journeys, and their con"nement: “those 
that leave before 6 am have to walk down in groups 
towards the Southern Motorway”; or “a&er 8 pm 
this becomes critical”; these are common phrases 
from the focus groups (on methodology, see next 
chapter by Bocarejo and Álvarez Rivadulla). At 
nightfall armed gangs impose a curfew in the 
neighbourhood: those who decide to go out risk 
the possibility of being robbed in the street on 
their way to work. What they fear is being mugged 
by one of the area’s youth gangs. 
We found that this particularly a%ects 
women. Many spend the majority of their time 
stuck at home, afraid to leave, in fear that their 
houses will be broken into and their daughters 
raped. !ey participate far less than men in the 
labour market. But fear is not the only reason that 
keeps them there. !ey have to take care of their 
Mini-bus stop in Ciudadela Sucre neighbourhood, Soacha
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children, carry out household chores and, in many 
cases also because their partners do not let them 
work. Stories of domestic violence are common, 
including the control of women’s activities. Added 
to all this is the fact that the neighbourhood does 
not have public spaces in which to socialise, and it 
is perceived as an area where “there is nothing to 
see.” !is means that being con"ned in the reduced 
space of their homes is very common for women.3 
!e e%ects of internal displacement 
are another source of fear and a central problem 
(also see Pérez Martinez, 2006; and Garzón, 
2005). !e presence of local armed groups is a 
di#cult issue to quantify and investigate, but it 
appears o&en in conversation with residents and 
local o#cials. A discussion of this issue is almost 
inevitably conditioned on turning o% the tape 
recorder and o&en speaking in whispers, as others 
can potentially overhear, and the consequences 
of speaking about this can be serious. Reference 
to these groups appears when speaking about 
‘social cleansing’ as the operatives of killers by 
young paramilitary groups.4 !e people associate 
these armed groups with certain spaces within the 
neighbourhood (e.g. “that hill belongs to him”) 
and of drug-tra#cking in the area.
Locals’ perception is that this situation is 
counter-balanced by state action. Police presence is 
almost non-existent. Indeed, during the "eld work 
carried out for this research the only police cabin 
in the zone, located in the La Isla neighbourhood, 
was burned down. Beyond the police, state 
presence in the zone is low. It is not that the state 
is entirely absent. Indeed the majority of people 
with whom we spoke mentioned said to be in 
receipt of some form of subsidy (in particular the 
conditional cash transfer programme known as 
Familias en Acción5). But even this form of action 
leaves much to be desired. !e cost of a subsidy for 
nutrition, for example, is around US$25 per month 
for a family with one or more young children. !e 
subsidy for secondary education is around US$20 
for each child school-goer. !e state schools in 
the area constitute what is perhaps the strongest 
state presence and yet they have many problems; 
amongst these are low numbers of teachers, poor 
teacher training, limited material resources, and 
threats from youth gangs. To this, we can add the 
labour market uncertainty faced by young people 
upon completing their schooling.
Due to all these problems, the relationship 
between inhabitants and the physical space they 
inhabit is ambivalent. In a small survey we carried 
out, the majority of people responded that if they 
had the opportunity, they would leave the commune. 
3  For a gender diagnosis of the zone see Garzón (2005). 
4  According to some estimations, close to 200 young 
people were murdered between 2000 and 2005 in Soacha, 
many of whom perhaps in ‘social cleansing’ operations 
aimed at ridding the area of what are perceived as ‘unde-
sirable’ characters. Out of this silent massacre only a little 
more than a dozen cases have been solved, an indication of 
dereliction of the judicial system’s duties (see Ruiz, 2005). 
5  !e Familias en Acción programme consists of provid-
ing direct cash support to bene"ciary mothers, condi-
tioned on compliance with commitments by their o%-
spring. !is involves guaranteeing children’s attendance to 
school, and regular health check-ups to monitor growth.
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Preference for staying is always justi"ed on the basis 
of low living costs (land, utility services, housing, 
and rent6), despite the stigma as perceived in the 
press or in the labour market (“once they learn 
where we live we won’t be hired, especially by large 
"rms”). We did not hear anyone praise the area, or 
highlight such factors found in other contexts such 
as solidarity amongst neighbours.  
!e reasoning given is that residents 
remain despite the negative aspects of the area and 
not due to any particular positive reason. But what 
is clear is that they are there to stay, given that the 
chance of "nding a better job and a higher income 
elsewhere is low. !is is relevant since one might 
see Commune 4 as a transit area, one step on the 
way to settling in Bogotá. But this does not appear 
to be the case for many of those we spoke to. 
In sum, the population for whom the 
Cazucable project has been planned is extremely 
vulnerable, even compared to other vulnerable 
areas in Bogotá and certainly when compared to 
the neighbourhoods from which inspiration for 
the project is drawn – the Medellín communes 
which, as described in detail in the second 
section of this book, have bene"tted from the 
Metrocables. Despite their undeniable social 
and urban problems, Medellín’s communes 
were more centrally located, had better access to 
infrastructure services, and already bene"tted from 
proximity to better infrastructure than Soacha 
before the aerial cable-cars were introduced. 
!ese considerations suggest that, in order to 
maximise the impacts of an infrastructure project 
in a highly deprived area like Cazucá, this should 
be accompanied by a series of more wide-ranging 
economic, urban and social interventions.
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Hoping to Be Seen: Perceptions of 
 Inhabitants 
About the Possible Construction  
of an Aerial Cable-Car System
“!at’s really lovely, really nice! !at is… 
how can I say it, I have no words to describe the Metrocable. 
We agree that there should be a Metrocable in Soacha and Altos de Cazucá”. 
Nubia, President of the Council for Community Action following a visit to Medellín’s Metrocable.
“It’s important for people. It improves our lives. 
It creates a good and digni"ed city. 
Roberto, Commune 4 resident. 
 
“Beautiful, beautiful. Well, for us it would be like touching the sky with our hands, for sure (…). It would 
improve security and would also bene"t labour conditions (…). We need this; it should be launched as soon 
as possible to give us access to jobs. It will also solve the transport problem”. 
Luis, community leader.
 
1  We would like to thank our students at the Universidad del Rosario who provided us with research assistance: Ivette 
González, Laura Diaz, Sebastián Villamizar and Natalia Duarte.
Diana Bocarejo and María José Álvarez Rivadulla1
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How should we interpret people’s fascination with an aerial cable-car system in areas of extreme poverty such as Cazucá? How is it 
that, despite the enormous needs of the inhabitants 
of Soacha’s Commune 4 and their daily litany 
of problems, an aerial cable-car is a project that 
inspires hope in them? !e value of aerial cable-
cars in places such as Cazucá goes beyond its 
possible transport bene"ts and is associated with 
the desires of thousands of inhabitants who wish 
to be seen and be socially included. We should 
ask ourselves about the meaning of the aerial 
cable-car along with many other infrastructure 
and technology projects which imply an 
understanding, not just in terms of operational and 
economic progress, by also its social and cultural 
relevance (see, for example, Kaika and Swyngedow, 
2000; and Siemiatycki, 2005). Moreover, there is 
a growing literature pointing to the paradoxes 
arising from the enormous expectations fuelled 
by some urban mega-projects, and which can lead 
to signi"cant failures and unful"lled promises 
(Siemiatycki, 2006).
!e general conclusion from our research 
suggests that this positive perception of the Ca-
zucable can be explained by the new social and 
political visibility that the inhabitants of Cazucá 
hope to gain. As shown in the previous chapter, 
they feel isolated and marginalised, abandoned 
and stigmatised both by local institutions and by 
other citizens in both Soacha and Bogotá. Rather 
than seeing the aerial cable-car system in all its 
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technical detail as a project that will solve their 
transport problems, the inhabitants of Cazucá see 
it as a potential social, economic and political cata-
lyst through which they hope to lead more digni"ed 
living conditions. In this way, the great enthusiasm 
of the population facing the possibility of building an 
aerial cable-car is associated with the meaning of the 
cable-car as a symbol of state presence.
Like any other symbol, the meaning 
of the Cazucable and residents’ expectations 
towards the possible impacts arising from its 
construction should be understood from Cazucá’s 
particular context. Su#ce it to mention a few 
conditions that help explain why this proposed 
infrastructure project generates such expectations: 
i) a widespread perception of social and political 
neglect of the area (see the previous chapters in 
this section for more information on the socio-
economic situation and the institutional context); 
ii) any project that commits local institutions in 
Soacha, Bogotá’s local authorities and, even better, 
the national government, is perceived as a pre-
condition for future projects in Cazucá; iii) the 
inhabitants see in the cable-car line a new proposal 
that can overcome local political inertia, scepticism 
and fragmentation among the citizenry; iv) a high 
degree of uncertainty surrounds the legalisation 
and regularisation of land in the area, which in 
turns hinders the upgrading of basic infrastructure 
services and other services (including leisure 
facilities such as parks and open spaces). !e Cable 
is seen as a project that can help integrate disparate 
state agencies, and thus help channel and commit 
resources from the local and national State, 
leading to the regularisation and a degree of urban 
planning intervention in the commune. 
An attempt to gauge perceptions and 
expectations as regards the future Cable compared 
to other types of social intervention turned out 
to be very di#cult for there is almost no record 
of unambiguous and substantial interventions 
by state agencies in the area. Cazucá residents 
are unaware of other completed or even planned 
interventions to compare and contrast against 
the proposed aerial cable-car. !e Cazucable 
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is perceived as a project with the potential to 
generate positive e%ects for residents. !e "rst 
e%ect is associated directly with the improvement 
of transport although, in the absence of other 
transport projects, residents fail to see that this will 
give rise to any potential synergies.  
For Commune 4 residents, the absence of 
state institutions is re$ected, amongst other areas, 
in the quality of access roads and the absence of an 
authority that regulates transport services in the 
area. As a leader of the Council for Community 
Action pointed out, regarding the quality of road 
infrastructure, “the Mayor’s O#ce has received 
many o#cial complaints, but there are always 
excuses: the mayor is not here, you need to "ll out 
the form again, the mayor is in house detention, 
I don’t know what else.” Another leader says 
that transport is a very old problem and it is not 
restricted to the quality of roads, but also relates to 
how it is regulated, and to how the local authority 
assigns bus routes. According to this leader, 
and this is a common view among many other 
residents, the issue “unfortunately (…) is that there 
is a serious lack of political will.”
!e new transport possibilities that can 
be generated thanks to the aerial cable-car should 
seriously take into account the economic possibilities 
of local inhabitants. For the majority of Commune 
4 residents, regular use of the aerial cable-car 
would depend on the cost of fares, its hours of   
operation, and the range of transport links it opens 
to them. !e proposal so far appears somewhat 
blurred to residents, and thus the speci"c improve-
ments that it might bring are uncertain. 
Beyond the solutions that the aerial cable-
car o%ers in transport terms, the most hoped-for 
positive e%ect for the inhabitants of Commune 
4 is the social and political visibility that could 
arise thanks to the Cazucable. It is signi"cant that, 
despite the complex social situation in Commune 
4 (as described in the previous chapter), its 
inhabitants give priority to the Cazucable project 
precisely because they think that it will be a 
catalysing intervention and indeed it is the only 
proposal for the area of which they are aware.
!e inhabitants hope that the Cazucable 
will help them legalise and regularise land tenure, 
thus kick-starting a process of upgrading of basic 
infrastructure services and construction of other 
urban infrastructure. !at is to say, despite the serious 
problems in the area (water supply, land tenure, and 
insecurity), local residents see in the Cazucable a 
new project that can provide them with the necessary 
visibility to generate investment commitments from 
the local and national governments.
Cazucá’s residents also hope that 
the Cable will lead to major urban planning 
interventions including the kinds of small open 
spaces and parks that were created in Medellín 
with the implementation of the Integrated Urban 
Projects a&er the "rst Metrocable line had been 
built (with a minimum relocation of households). 
Residents hope that this will lead to surfaced 
streets, pavements, and leisure facilities. For 
example, the only open spaces whose potential 
is mentioned regularly by the inhabitants of 
Commune 4, with the hope to one day turn it 
into a park, is a private plot owned by the largest 
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(informal) developer in the area, Mr. Forero 
Fetecua, in whose land lies an arti"cial lagoon 
that has been abandoned for many years and 
has brought many health and safety problems to 
children from the area.
Other hopes from the Cazucable include 
upgrading of commercial areas and the hope that 
this will create jobs (although it is not very clear if 
they hope that these new possibilities be born in 
the zone or as a consequence of transport improve-
ment). However, for some inhabitants the Cable 
may involve higher transport fares but also possible 
rises in the cost of land, rents and public services. 
Perhaps due to the local community 
leaders’ visit to Medellín and thanks to the 
publicity and visibility of the Metrocable as a new 
symbol of the city, another hoped-for e%ect is 
that it will attract tourists. !e idea of tourism is 
presented in a rather vague way and the positive 
e%ects expected arise from the belief that local 
residents would better look a&er their homes 
and make them “look prettier.” Young people like 
Edwin also explain that “a cable-car here would 
make the neighbourhood look more modern, don’t 
you think? With the cable-car people will pay more 
attention to what happens here and more people 
will come, and that will get rid of all the gangs 
[…]; tourists will come to look at this.”
For one of the o#cials working with 
internally displaced people in the area the aerial 
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cable-car “can be something positive and can help 
the community to move forward; tourism can 
become an income-earner thanks to the more 
direct links between Soacha and Bogotá (…). In 
this neighbourhood you have potential, you have 
people from everywhere, from the Atlantic and 
Paci"c Coasts, the Amazon; you can make it as 
touristy as you want to, but how much will depend 
on where you want it to go.” 
To conclude, the value that the Cazucable 
has acquired for the population in Commune 4 
rests in its power as a symbol of social, economic 
and political intervention. Medellín’s Metrocables, 
and the manner in which this model has been 
“exported” nationally and internationally, has 
generated expectations that transcend the "eld of 
transport. Moreover, for the inhabitants of Cazucá 
the hoped-for e%ects from transport are not very 
clear, as they do not yet know fare prices, hours 
of operation and the range of transport links it 
will bring with it. !e value of the aerial cable-
car therefore is rooted in its capacity to become 
a catalyst for social intervention. One of the 
challenges for the Cazucable, if it is implemented, 
is to respond to residents’ expectations as a 
multiplier of social investment. Without clear 
intervention commitments, whether these be 
in terms of improved urban planning or social 
interventions, the value of building the Cazucable 
is unlikely to meet these expectations.
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Over the last decade, Colombian cities have contributed to a large amount of innovation in urban mobility. !e 
implementation of Transmilenio, Bogotá’s bus rapid 
transit (BRT) system, and Medellín’s aerial-cable 
cars (examined in detail in earlier chapters of this 
book) provide successful examples of how mobility 
can be improved in developing country cities. 
Indeed, BRT projects have proliferated 
globally following the launch of Transmilenio in 
2000. Some have been implemented successfully 
while others have amounted to little more than an 
idea put forward by a particular administration or 
social actor. Asian cities, Latin American cities and 
even some cities in developed countries have systems 
of this type, with overt 100 projects built in the 
last decade (Hidalgo et al., 2007). In the case of the 
aerial cable-cars, although a smaller number so far, 
they have also generated a growing interest and taken 
on concrete shape in cities such as Rio de Janeiro 
and Caracas (see chapters by Amorim da Silva, and 
Naranjo, respectively, in the following section). 
However, attempts to replicate these 
projects have met with mixed results. Medellín and 
Bogotá’s successful projects have been replicated in 
some of Colombia’s main cities. Some of the BRT 
systems were seriously delayed, some over a decade 
a&er being planned. Although many cable-car 
projects have been proposed as a mobility solution 
for low-income populations in hilly areas, their 
"nancial and political viability is as yet uncertain.
As part of the joint research between 
University College London, Universidad Nacional 
(Medellín campus) and Universidad de Los Andes 
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in Bogotá, of which this book is an output, we 
were able to explore the situation of mobility in 
the municipality of Soacha, the largest ‘dormitory’ 
municipality for the Colombia’s capital city. As 
can be seen in the chapters by Rueda García and 
Sáenz García, and Álvarez Rivadulla and Bocarejo, 
the inhabitants of this zone are predominantly 
low income groups, who experience enormous 
di#culties in accessing job, education, culture and 
leisure opportunities, yet they seem to be aware of 
the promise of ‘trendy’ projects: Transmilenio and 
the cable-car form a central part of a proposal to 
improve living conditions in the area. However, 
more than a decade a&er the former was proposed, 
and following a range of studies for the latter, there 
are no tangible changes.
Soacha’s Transmilenio extension was 
planned shortly a&er it was "rst launched in Bogotá. 
A&er some speedy transport research, a line was 
de"ned to link with the expanding mass transit 
system. !e project was led at "rst by the National 
Government, speci"cally the National Planning 
Department (DNP), which had simultaneously 
outlined BRT systems for six other cities. Support 
was also received from the agency that created 
and operated the Transmilenio system. In 2003 
construction commenced. At the time of writing 
in mid-2012, the construction of a 5.5 km route to 
link Soacha and Bogotá had not yet been completed. 
Today, the inhabitants of Soacha spend around 90 
minutes travelling each way to get to work.
Similarly, the Cable project for 
Soacha’s Cazucá area (and known informally as 
’Cazucable’), arose out of an initiative from the 
National Government, and more precisely from 
a presidential initiative (see chapters by Rueda 
García and Sáenz García, and by Acevedo et al.).
While the BRT line has its origins in 
a technocratic context, the Cazucable proposal 
arose out of a political process, a ‘community 
council meeting’, one of many carried out by then 
President Álvaro Uribe over his two terms (2002-
2006 and 2006-2010), which in some way ended 
up replacing the planning and decision-making 
processes. !e Medellín Metro Company, which by 
that time had developed the necessary expertise in 
the development of urban aerial cable-car systems, 
led the project.
One might well ask: If both of Soacha’s 
transport projects have the necessary national        
government support and were designed by those 
responsible for the (internationally recognised) 
success stories in Bogotá and Medellín, why then 
have they met with such a di%erent fate? In what 
follows in this chapter we intend to respond to 
this question.
Transmilenio 
and Metrocables: Integrated 
Implementation
!e two successful projects in Bogotá and 
Medellín, respectively, have common elements 
that can o%er clues as to what might be required 
to successfully replicate such ‘trendy’ projects. 
Firstly, these projects arose out of local demands. 
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!e projects were managed, led, "nanced and 
executed by the cities themselves. Successive 
local administrations showed total political 
commitment to them, and these were therefore 
included in the city’s long-term plans.
Secondly, the projects had a clear 
technical direction and stable sources of funding. 
In the case of Transmilenio a management group 
(Ardila, 2003) provided leadership to a complex 
web of actors, but also led the operational 
and "nancial design, to "nally end up with an 
institution capable of taking charge of the system’s 
daily operation. In Medellín’s case, the agency 
responsible for the project was the Medellín Metro 
Company, which had already demonstrated its 
operational and management capacity through an 
exemplary operation of the metro system. 
Finally, the project’s conception was 
complemented by a vision that went beyond 
transport. In the Bogotá case, Transmilenio was 
included within a larger plan to improve public 
space, serve low-income areas with the new 
transport system, and in parallel provide social 
housing within its area of in$uence. A decade 
a&er its implementation it has had signi"cant 
impacts on density, property values, and land use 
(Bocarejo et al., 2012). In the Medellín case, the 
Metrocables were complemented by substantial 
public investment (exceeding by many orders 
of magnitude that of the Cables themselves) in 
urban development in the zones of in$uence of 
the projects, upgrading of public space, developing 
high quality facilities at a metropolitan scale, and 
housing upgrading within the context of Integrated 
Urban Projects (PUIs) (see the chapter by Brand 
and Dávila).
Our case study, the municipality of 
Soacha, does not appear to show any of these 
common elements. Both the BRT and the aerial 
cable-car were imposed from above by the National 
Government. !e mayor of this impoverished 
municipality saw the opportunity of a “gi&” from 
the Nation, but neither his technical team nor his 
political agenda saw it as a priority. Neither did they 
truly have the project in their hands. !e project 
has no owner and one of the main gaps, which 
makes its future uncertain, is the absence of an 
institution who can be responsible for it and provide 
the necessary technical capacity to implement it. 
Because in Colombia the national government 
cannot impose itself within the municipal realm, 
the project’s quality as a “gi&” from on-high meant 
that it had little rooting or connection with existing 
urban development plans or public space projects 
drawn up by the municipality.
The Importance 
of Adaptation 
to Local Needs 
!e idea of “best practice” is all about replicating 
successful projects. !ese Colombian examples 
are especially attractive, as they came out of 
what are regarded as previously critical urban 
conditions and had far-reaching (positive) 
consequences. However, a large part of the success 
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Bangalore
in implementing such projects in new locations 
has to do with the extent to which this adequately 
considers the characteristics of that place.
Transport demand studies that gauge a 
population’s travel needs, along with an adequate 
knowledge of the functional connections 
within the city, are key elements that cannot be 
underestimated in the formulation of projects 
of this nature. A failure to acknowledge users’ 
characteristics and their needs has generated, in 
many cases, low demands for the BRT and the 
cable systems, which makes them "nancially 
unviable or even unnecessary. 
In the case of the Cazucable, passenger 
demand is quite low, if one considers the 
investment proposed. Accessibility to the cable 
system depends on the quality of infrastructure 
(stairs, walkways) allowing people to reach the 
stations. In some cases, walking times make it 
more attractive to continue using poor quality 
systems that are more easily accessible. Likewise, 
a%ordability has an important role. On occasion, 
even with good access to new systems, individual 
mobility may not increase signi"cantly, and 
informal systems with cheaper fares continue to be 
preferred by users. 
!e challenge of integrating new systems 
with those already in operation is also crucial. 
!e experience in the implementation of BRT 
systems in Colombia shows that the integration 
between a disorganised and partially informal 
system and the new systems is complex. Indeed, 
it tends to generate unfair competition rather 
than integration. !is is one of the reasons why 
the implementation of these projects in other 
Colombian cities has been beset by low demand 
and "nancial unsustainability. 
Any Type
of Accessibility?
!e main criticism that can be levied of ‘trendy’ 
projects is that they can generate immediate 
political capital, and yet they o&en stand in the 
way of more serious, well thought-out, long-term 
policies. !e main pitch made by salesmen of these 
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projects is that politicians who make the decision 
will be able to “inaugurate” his/her own project 
within a single term in o#ce. 
In this sense, the Cazucable project faces 
a major dilemma: was the priority to ensure acces-
sibility (through a cable-car) to a population in                  
environmentally risk areas, as is the case in Medellín’s 
"rst Metrocable line, or was it preferable to plan an       
adequate relocation of the population at risk?
In this case, access to a highly precarious 
and risky area with a visible project was preferred 
to an action that would probably have generated 
better living conditions over the long term. 
However, the relocation and construction of a 
more adequate urban space is a longer process 
than merely developing a cable line and probably 
less attractive in political terms. 
Recommendations for 
a Successful Adaptation 
of ‘Trendy’ Projects
‘Trendy’ transport projects commonly fall ‘out of 
the blue’ and are not adequately researched in each 
context, nor integrated with land use and urban 
development plans and any existing transport 
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systems. As a summary of these re$ections we can 
then highlight some basic elements to facilitate 
their adaptation to other contexts. 
Firstly, baseline studies are extremely 
important in allowing us to understand, in detail, 
the social and mobility condition of the people 
who use the systems, while urban functionality 
and future plans should not be underestimated.
!is step allows us to arrive at the second 
essential issue, which is building institutional 
capacity. Studies should be developed jointly with 
those that will inherit and operate the project. 
Institution building was an essential element for 
the Transmilenio and Metrocable projects, to the 
extent that the agencies in charge of these had 
provide successful consultancy services for the 
implementation of these systems in other cities, 
not just in Colombia, but also internationally.  
A third issue is the development of 
integrated projects which include public space 
upgrading, while taking advantage of opportunities 
for social and urban development. Physical and 
fare integration with other modes of transport is 
another essential dimension without which the 
number of users would reduce considerably.
Finally, the proposed project must be 
assessed against alternative proposals, which 
should not be restricted to other transport options, 
but also to improvements in the living conditions 
of low income populations who have little option 
but to establish themselves in areas of high 
environmental risk in developing cities. 
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Introduction1
Community Initiatives  
and Their Adoption 
by  
Diana Daste
1  !is chapter is one of several outputs of the research 
project “Governance, Urban Mobility and Poverty 
Reduction. Lessons from Medellín, Colombia” led by the 
Development Planning Unit (DPU), UCL, run jointly 
with Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Medellín 
campus), Universidad de los Andes, and the Department 
of Civil, Environmental and Geomatic Engineering at 
UCL. !e Cali case study was funded by the DPU as a 
complement to the two case studies presented in detail 
in this book. !e views are solely those of the researcher, 
and she owes particular thanks to local government 
o#cials in Cali and Metrocali (2010, 2011 and 2012) who 
contributed valuable information and views. She would 
also like to thank community leaders David Gómez, 
Héctor Fabio Ospina, Yonny Rojas, and Harvey Mina 
for their support in the research, and their contribution 
to a deeper understanding of the Commune and their 
initiatives. !anks go to the SIDOC Foundation and all 
those who through their participation contributed to 
improve our understanding of this case study. 
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A branch of institutional theory (Easterly, 2008) argues that public policy sustainability is achieved when top down 
initiatives are supported by bottom up proposals. 
!at is to say, when informal institutions (culture, 
relations, behaviour) and formal institutions 
(such as grassroots organisations, Councils for 
Community Action, and NGOs) coincide and 
reciprocally support the implementation of 
government projects. 
Cali, Colombia’s third largest city, with 
a population of 2.1 million in 2005 (Alcaldía de 
Santiago de Cali, 2008), has seen the progressive 
weakening of its political institutions and has 
seen its national leadership erode away. !rough 
the MIOCABLE aerial cable-car project, Cali 
has a chance of improving mobility and urban 
development for some of the city’s most vulnerable 
sectors. However, at the time of writing in mid-
2012 the project has been halted. !is chapter 
tells how a proposal for integrated development 
– conceived and managed in its initial stages by 
the leaders of a vulnerable sector – can end up in 
limbo, thus revealing a lack of vision and a sense of 
exclusion on the part of the local government.
Origins of the Idea
!e idea of building an aerial cable car to connect 
the mountainous and very poor Commune 
20 (commonly known as Siloé from one of its 
neighbourhoods) with the $at zone of the city 
(see Map 1), date back to the end of the 1950s. 
Figure 1: ‘Promise’ Document to Build
 an Aerial Cable-Car, 1958
Source: Community leaders, Commune 20
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According to documents kept by local leaders, in 
1958 a certain “Mr Santamaría” promised to the 
residents that the Liberal Party would install a cable-car 
(such as that which had been in use to transport 
co%ee for export from the city of Manizales) if 
they voted for him. More than a party strategy, 
this promise (Figure 1), was a tactic to legitimise 
the creation of the so-called National Front, a 
political and electoral alliance in which Liberals and 
Conservatives alternated in the reins of power from 
1958 until 1974, starting with the Liberal President 
Alberto Lleras Camargo (Pécaut 2006). Despite 
the fact that the Party did not ful"l its promise, 
the community began to dream and think about 
how this idea could materialise, in their aim of 
promoting the development of Cali’s Commune 20.
Commune 20
Cali is composed of 22 administrative sub-
divisions known as communes. Commune 20 has 
a population of some 70,000 inhabitants (Table 1), 
representing close to 4% of Cali’s total population. 
!is area developed informally between the 
1930s and 1940s through the illegal occupation of 
municipal land by miners coming from Marmato 
and other neighbouring municipalities in the 
Departmento (province) of Caldas. !e new settlers 
surfaced the streets, installed a sewerage system and 
brought water to the area2 (DAGMA 2009).
2  Initially they built community taps where residents 
could "ll buckets, pots and other utensils. 
Neighbourhood Population 
El Cortijo                     1,467
Belisario Caicedo         3,255
Siloé 26,583
Lleras Camargo             7,204
Belén   8,041
Brisas de Mayo             12,144
Venezuela - Urb. Canaveralejo    2,890
Source: DAPM, 2010
Today, a large part of the land property 
deeds have been legalised and the Commune 
has been gradually formalised, but there remain 
sectors that sprang out of residents invading 
public land where tenure remains unclear. A 
mere 44.3% of the settlers have completed basic 
primary education. Incomes are amongst the 
lowest in the city, with 83.4% of its population 
classi"ed as socio-economic stratum 1 and none 
in strata 4, 5 or 6 (DAPM 2007).3 Coverage of 
basic infrastructure services supplied by the 
municipality ranges between 81 and 88% of                    
3  !e stratum division (0 being the lowest and 6 the 
highest) is an instrument used by the Colombian State 
to classify residential property, based on the physical at-
tributes of the housing units and the settlement, such as 
access to services and infrastructure. Strati"cation helps 
determine tax levels, utility rates, and access to housing 
and healthcare, amongst others.
Table 1: Population in Neighbourhoods                       
of Commune 20, 2005
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Map 2: Cali’s Communes
Source: Cali Planning De-
partment (DAPM)
households in the Commune. Neighbourhoods at 
the top of the hills and those originating in recent 
land invasions lack basic services, and many of the 
users complain about irregularity in the supply of 
services like water and electricity (DAGMA, 2009). 
Commune 20 is a zone stigmatised by 
violence and social and political marginalisation. 
It nonetheless has a history of leadership and 
self-management. !e community regularly 
puts forward proposals for transformation in 
a bid to demand from the city that it covers 
the historic de"cits arising from decades of 
inadequate investment in infrastructure and 
social development.
MIOCABLE’s 
Political Passage 
Development Proposals
From the middle of the 1990s several local leaders 
and grassroots organisations designed proposals to 
make an aerial cable-car line the initial axis for the 
transformation of Commune 20. Fundación Nueva 
Luz proposed connecting Cali’s mountainous 
zone through a aerial cable-car system that 
includes Commune 20 in a long route from 
south to north, as well as important natural and 
prominent local destinations such as the Virgin 
of Yanaconas, Cristo Rey, the Tres Cruces hill, 
and the Los Farallones National Park. Concerned 
with environmental conservation in the area, the 
project has as a strategic motivation to “turn the 
Cable into a sentinel that protects important city 
resources such as Los Farallones Park from the 
pressures of urbanisation” (Gómez, 2011).
At the end of the 1990s, community leader 
Rubén Hurtado, resident of the Commune 
and Coordinator for La Estrella Sports Centre, 
In to de"ciencies in public service 
infrastructure, Commune 20 only has three public 
libraries, it lacks leisure and culture facilities, 
and has few sporting facilities most of which are 
unserviceable due to their poor condition. All 
this contributes to the reproduction of a cycle of 
poverty and insecurity in the zone,4 a result of the 
lack of options for children, the youth and the 
community in general, to make positive use of 
their free time.
4  Recent data estimates that there were 99.3 homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants according to the Cali Mayor’s 
O#ce (2010).
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developed a touristic and ecological proposal 
for the Commune. His proposal was to convert 
one of the most dangerous zones of the city 
into an ecological and touristic district, using 
the topographical advantages of the area to 
help overcome poverty and marginalisation.5 
!e Cable would become a tourist attraction, 
o%ering transport to link hilly areas with 
the city’s $at areas and other tourist sectors 
of the city. Medellín’s Metrocable K Line 
5  !e source is Rubén Hurtado’s proposal to convert 
Commune 20 into a Tourist and Ecological District; 
document for private use, to which the author had access. 
shows that a combination of urban tourism 
with mass-transport is a viable option.6 !e 
project contemplated a broad participation 
of the community in terms of turning the 
Commune into a legally constituted Tourist 
District, assessing and quantifying costs of the 
intervention, designing routes and creating 
businesses with a capacity-building component. 
6 !e Metrocable has not simply fostered tourism in the 
zone but it has integrated tourist lines (L Line to Arví 
Natural Park) with the mass-transit system (K Line, 
Santo Domingo Station). See chapters in Medellín sec-
tion in this book.
Figure 2: Commune 20: Siloé Neighbourhood. Photo: Diana Daste
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Figure 3: Cali’s Proposed Integrated 
Transport System
Source: Metrocali S.A
Business clusters were a seen as a keystone 
in attracting tourism (restaurants, cultural                        
centres, artisanal squares, sporting events) and 
also ecological concerns (reforestation and 
watercourse cleaning). Although this proposal 
did not resonate with the local government 
because of di#culties for the local authority 
in securing a Tourist District classi"cation, it 
nonetheless served as an input for eventual 
debates in the Municipal Council chambers.
MIOCABLE: 
A Transport Solution
In 2006, due to an electoral coincidence, 
Councillor Carlos A. Urresty was responsible 
for managing the proposed project as 
President of the Cali Municipal Council. 
Urresty saw in the MIOCABLE the chance of 
attracting votes to support a future campaign 
for mayor and earmarked the resources to 
make it possible. Although his aspiration was 
to become mayor, this never materialised, 
but this gave the project a "rst debate in 
the Council during the administration 
of Mayor Apolinar Salcedo (2004-2007).                                       
!is administration was in charge of the 
construction of the city’s "rst mass transport 
system a Bus Rapid Transit System (BRT) called 
MIO (Mass Western Integrated System). !e 
MIO was launched in 2009 under the government 
of Mayor Jorge Iván Ospina (2008-2011), who 
would approve the MIOCABLE as a means of 
integrating Commune 20 with the MIO system 
(see Figure 3). During this political passage the 
project lost, almost in its entirety, the tourist and 
local business components proposed by Hurtado a 
decade earlier.7 
7 Although the Mayor’s O#ce expressed its interest in 
carrying out an urban upgrading project similar to that 
of Cerro Santa Ana in Guayaquil, Ecuador, this article 
argues that the management of the MIOCABLE was 
restricted only to providing a mode of transport.
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Figure 4: MIOCABLE Cañaveralejo Interchange Station, MIO Cosmocentro and Commune 20 
Photo: Diana Daste
In 2008 Metrocali, the public institution in charge 
of the management, design, construction and opera-
tion of the integrated transport system (SITM-MIO), 
started feasibility studies and negotiation of property 
acquisition for the MIOCABLE. Financing was   
approved using the proceeds from a petrol surcharge 
tax, of which the Municipality destined 70% to     
"nancing the SITM, including close to forty million 
US dollars to "nance the MIOCABLE. !is is a 
tax of 18.5% paid by major producers, importers and                     
distributors of gasoline and diesel oil.8                               
8 It is estimated that this will inject some US$266 million 
into the SITM over the period 2009-2018.  
Figure 4: MIOCABLE Cabin Prototype
Source: Metrocali S.A
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Length 2.2 km
Capacity 60 cabins (8 passengers each)
Operational capacity 22,000 passengers/day 
Capital investment US$38 million
Funding sources Municipality (petrol tax)
Contractor & project management Unión Temporal MIOCABLE (Leither, Ingeocable, Conalvías) 
Auditing Consorcio Integración Modal
Source: Own elaboration, based on information from Metrocali S.A.
Soil stability studies concluded in 2010 but by early 
2012 some plots of land were still in dispute. It was 
originally estimated that the MIOCABLE would 
be launched in the "rst trimester of 2012, with 
an expected demand of 20,000 trips per day. !e 
construction of the system started in April 2011. 
!e Cañaveralejo Interchange Station, connecting 
the MIOCABLE with the MIO BRT via transfers 
at the Cosmocentro Station (see Figure 5) was in-
augurated on 30th December 2011 (one day before 
the Ospina’s term came to an end). Construction of 
MIOCABLE was halted in March 2012.
Isolation from
the Municipality 
Negotiation and Implementation 
Prior to its eventual resumption, a number of 
problems must be sorted out, such as a shortfall of 
some US$15 million, land acquisition problems, 
and the need to update designs to comply with risk 
mitigation by-laws. !is chapter does not intend 
to disentangle the reasons for the suspension of 
the project. Its aim is to show how an integrated 
project born out of a grassroots initiative becomes 
detached from social demands and local know-
how once the local authority takes it up. !e 
implementation of the MIOCABLE is characterised 
by a lack of vision in relation to its potential for 
urban transformation with social impact, and a 
communications gap between public and private 
actors to optimise resources and mechanisms for 
crosscutting development.  
A Policy of ‘Little Islands’
!e MIOCABLE is included in the municipal 
development plan for 2008-2011 under ‘alternative 
means of transport’ (Alcaldía de Santiago de Cali, 2008). 
Table 2: MIOCABLE Project: Technical, Institutional and Financial Features
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Conceived in this manner, Metrocali has the 
mandate for execution, so will be carried out in 
complete isolation from other local entities. Cali’s 
Planning Department (DAPM) was involved 
in the process through its participation in the 
‘Committee for Technical Coordination’ where, 
alongside the city’s Environment Department 
(DAGMA) and Metrocali, urban impacts on 
infrastructure and mobility are examined.9
!e project is proposed in such a limited 
way that the local o#cials in charge de"ned it 
exclusively as a transport solution, one not framed 
within any integrated development plan and 
whose implementation focused on complying 
with operational technical and institutional 
requirements rather than promoting social and 
economic development for Cali or Commune 
20 residents.10 It is disheartening that there was 
no dialogue between municipal agencies that 
could potentially contribute to the project such 
as the Secretariat for Transit and Transport 
or the Secretariat for Housing. !e latter is in 
charge of ‘Cali es mi casa’ (Cali is my home), 
a programme that aims to provide city-wide 
services, public space, leisure facilities and parks 
alongside promoting a citizen culture and reducing 
the housing de"cit, mainly social housing. It 
is a crosscutting project, which also includes 
rural zones within the municipality (Alcaldía 
de Santiago de Cali, 2008). !is re$ected a 
9  On occasion they invite other municipal departments 
to analyse the impacts thematically. 
10  Interview conducted by the author with local gov-
ernment o#cials.
management style that a local o#cial would later 
dismiss as “a policy of little islands”, in which each 
body concerned itself with its own problems with 
no reference towards a common project.
Actors and Resources
A similar situation is seen in the relationship with 
non-governmental actors. Business foundations 
that participate in development projects in 
Commune 20 saw in the MIOCABLE the potential 
for a project for neighbourhood reorganisation 
and upgrading. !e SIDOC foundation, backed 
up by universities and the community, designed 
a project to improve access, provide social 
infrastructure, improved street layouts, and 
housing improvements.11 SIDOC had the capacity 
to manage resources earmarked for the process, 
so they presented the proposal to the Mayor’s 
O#ce. As they were granted no o#cial support, 
they limited their e%orts to the private and non-
governmental sectors. 
On Deaf Ears
Local authority consultations about the 
MIOCABLE project paid little heed to people in 
the Commune who insisted on a more broad-
ranging project and one which took into account 
11 Interview conducted by the author with Viviane Ar-
mitage, director of the SIDOC Foundation, who also pro-
vided documents and studies carried out jointly with the 
Universidad de Cali and Santiago de Cali, January 2012. 
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Figure 6: A ‘Guala’  / Photo: Diana Daste
the environmental risks of the area. !ey ignored 
these demands and dropped the tourism and 
business components of the proposal. Consultations 
centred instead on presenting the aerial cable-car 
route, instructions on the use of the future system, 
and advocating for the advantages of building an 
artisanal cluster and local job creation. !e cluster 
was supposed to be ready for the "rst phase of the 
project but, by early 2012 little progress had been 
made in the proposal design.  !e over 1,000 jobs to 
be created remain a promise. 
!e fact that large sections of Commune 
20 was categorised as a zone of medium and high 
environmental risk (DAGMA, 1998) justi"ed, 
for many years, the lack of o#cial investment 
in the area. !e proposal for a cable-car line 
highlighted fears about the stability and safety 
of the system. Community leaders voiced these 
during consultation events.12 Again, these fears fell 
on deaf ears for the local government, which today 
is evidenced by the project’s suspension. 
The ‘Gualas’: Claims 
and Opportunity
 
“Guala” is the local name given to 4-wheel-drive 
vehicles providing informal transport services 
in Commune 20. !ese are manually adapted to 
the steep terrain covering routes that neither the 
MIO nor the MIOCABLE can reach. An eventual 
formal integration of these vehicles into the SITM 
would open opportunities for residents and local 
12  Interview conducted by the author with members of 
Commune 20, community leaders and journalists. 
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Figure 6: MIOCABLE Proposed Route Cañaveralejo Station, 1.  Tierra Blanca, 2. 
Lleras Camargo, 3. Brisas de Mayo / Source: Metrocali
entrepreneurs to become involved in the system. 
!e owners of the vehicles, the Municipality and 
Metrocali, who continue to search for mutually 
bene"cial solutions, have seen this as a possibility 
ever since the MIO was given the green light. !eir 
o#cial acceptance as transport service providers 
would help counteract at least three limitations of 
the proposed aerial cable-car system: insecurity 
by gangs who take control of routes within the 
catchment areas of the stations, the considerable 
distance between the proposed stations, and the 
di#cult topographical conditions which are o&en 
di#cult for pedestrians. 
Fare integration based on assigning routes 
and a form of mode sharing that is favourable for 
transport workers, for the Municipality and for us-
ers is a considerable challenge. By mid-2012, a single 
trip on the MIO costs 1,600 pesos (US$ 0.84) while 
‘guala’ fares (albeit with limited coverage in the 
city) range between 800 and 1,000 pesos (US$0.45-
US$0.56). !e central axes of opposition are the high 
costs involved in enabling these vehicles to comply 
with standards of safety, comfort and punctual-
ity. !e municipal government should support the 
funding of this process, in the understanding that 
the majority of these transport workers, who are res-
idents in the commune, lack the "nancial capital to 
make the necessary adjustments to operate formally. 
To facilitate this, the Mayor’s O#ce would probably 
need to provide some "nancial support. 
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Conclusion
!e MIOCABLE is an urban grassroots initiative 
that ended up being o#cially implemented in a 
limited and exclusionary manner. !e case study 
shows that, in spite of "nancial, institutional, 
human and legal resources, the project has 
not exploited its transformational potential 
because if failed to integrate top down policies 
and institutions with bottom up initiatives. On 
the basis of the valuable lessons from Medellín 
documented in this book, the Municipality of Cali 
still has a chance to promote a progressive form 
of urban renewal, within a broader framework of 
improved mobility and citizen culture. !is would 
require integrating strategic actors and sectors 
from di%erent levels of society who are keen to 
contribute to the design and management of their 
own development. 
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Figure 1: Location of San Agustín District in the City of Caracas
Source: Inmetra Caracas, 2006
The San Agustín 
 
The Price of Urban Integration
Nathalie Naranjo
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T he San Agustín MetroCable is a                non-conventional public transport system in an informal human settlement (or ‘barrio’ 
as it is locally known) in Caracas, capital of Venezuela. 
It represents an attempt to integrate an area of 
restricted accessibility with the city’s Metro network 
and, at the same time, provide equality of opportunities 
for the inhabitants of the San Agustín del Sur Ward 
to integrate into the city’s activities.
Feasibility studies had been carried out 
by 2006 with a view to develop aerial cable-car 
lines in two of the city’s low-income areas. In early 
2007 the President of the Republic announced that 
Caracas would have the "rst, non-recreational, 
public transport system, using aerial cable-car 
technology, in the San Agustín del Sur zone, a 
small but densely built-up area in the central part 
of the city. In this sector the proposed system 
would join the Metro’s Line 4 and then through 
which it subsequently connects with lines 1 and 21.  
Preliminary studies, "rst contact with the 
community and exploratory work were made in 
March 2007, when the San Agustín MetroCable 
project o#cially commenced. !e budget until 
completion of the work was estimated at US$54 
million, but the project su%ered a series of 
setbacks and its inauguration was postponed on 
six di%erent occasions, with test period starting on 
the 19th November 2008, and operations starting 
formally on 20th January 2010, with a service 
1  http://www.metrodecaracas.com.ve/mapa_rutas/
mapa_met_mbus.html
that was initially free for users. A second aerial 
cable-car line (MetroCable Mariche) with a total 
projected length of 4.84 km is currently under 
construction in the east of the city.2
  
The Urban Context 
in San Agustín 
del Sur 
!e San Agustín ward (parroquia in the Spanish 
original) is located in Libertador municipality 
of Caracas Capital District. A clear barrier 
constituted by the Guaire River and the Francisco 
Fajardo motorway, the main access road in the 
city, separates the area into two distinct parts: San 
Agustín del Norte (North) and San Agustín del 
Sur (South), between which there is no physical 
and functional integration. It is also formed by the 
sectors Av. Bolívar, Parque Central and El Conde. 
San Agustín del Sur comprises La Charneca, 
Hornos de Cal, La Ceiba, El Manguito and El 
Casquillo. !e ward extends over 1.59 Km2 with a 
population of some 40,000 inhabitants in 2007. 
San Agustín del Norte has an excellent 
location within the Metropolitan District of 
Caracas with accessibility to the city centre, and 
also with direct connection to the east and west. 
However, San Agustín del Sur does not have the 
2   http://www.metrodecaracas.com.ve/obrasyproy/
proy_mc_mariche.html
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Figure 2: Aerial View of the San Agustín Ward / Source: Based on Google Earth
1. San Agustín del Norte / 2. Autopista Francisco Fajardo – Río Guaire / 3. San Agustín del Sur
same advantages given by virtue of its location 
between the Fuerzas Armadas Avenue and the 
Helicoide to the east, the Botanical Gardens 
to the east and an informal settlement to the 
south, not having main access roads other than 
Leonardo Ruiz Pineda Avenue, which has created 
particular dynamics for each sector of the ward 
and its internal zones.             !e San Agustín 
del Sur sector is weakly integrated with the rest 
of the ward and the centre of the city through a 
pedestrian bridge that joins both sectors; likewise 
the connection is indirect due to a poorly de"ned 
connection that joins with the Fuerzas Armadas 
Avenue. It is linked with the rest of the city 
through the Francisco Fajardo Motorway. !is 
sector has a better connection towards the East 
1
2
3
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in the direction of Venezuela Square and to the 
West with Leonardo Ruiz Pineda Avenue towards 
Puente Hierro.
Both sectors of the ward are poorly endowed in 
terms of roads, infrastructure and real estate, 
which has gradually led to further deterioration. 
!e San Agustín del Sur sector can be divided into 
two large zones:
!e formally developed zone. !is includes 
the strip of the Leonardo Ruiz Pineda 
Avenue, the sector of Los Pasajes, developed 
by the Worker’s Bank (Banco Obrero), and 
the area of the Vuelta El Casquillo.
!e informally developed zone. !is 
comprises the following neighbourhoods: 
La Charneca, Hornos de Cal, Marín, 
La Ceiba, El Manguito, El Mamón and 
El Helicoide (as listed under the third 
inventory of neighbourhoods carried out 
by FUNDACOMUN, 1989).
Urban dynamics in the San Agustín del Sur sector 
is very slow and change is almost imperceptible. 
!e informal zone appears to be more chaotic 
with poorly constructed buildings and marked 
contrasts. !e few open spaces are located in 
areas prone to landslides where high levels of 
environmental risk act as deterrents to future 
occupants.
It is worth mentioning the space 
generated by the steps, which are the only means 
of communication and key interaction in the 
majority of the informal areas of the city. In the 
case of San Agustín del Sur, perhaps due to its 
steep topography, the spaces generated by the 
steps are basically North-South, with very few 
East-West connection points, and this reinforces 
the creation of relatively isolated areas within the 
neighbourhood.
In 2008 some houses bene"ted from the 
“substitute a shack for a house” programme of 
the Ministry for Habitat and Housing jointly with 
the Mayor’s O#ce of the Metropolitan District 
of Caracas and the Libertador municipality. In 
this programme, dwellings in highly precarious 
conditions were replaced with newly built 80 m2 
two-storey houses, comprising three bedrooms 
and two bathrooms. In parallel, on the other side 
of the hill line by Terrazas de las Acacias, the 
Terrazas del Alba development was built, a social 
residential complex to provide housing for people 
in need, and where those a%ected by the building 
of the MetroCable stations were relocated.
According to the views of local residents3, 
basic need products can be bought in San Agustín 
del Norte by residents of the formal sector of 
San Agustín del Sur, or towards Victoria Avenue, 
El Cementerio and rural areas for residents of 
the informal sector, especially if they live in the 
higher parts, close to the Terrazas de las Acacias 
urbanisation. Networked services such as water 
and electricity have been gradually regularised, 
although in a sporadic and precarious manner; 
electricity, for example, is provided by overhead 
3 Interviews were carried out with di%erent neighbour-
hood residents as part of the "eldwork for the Environ-
mental Impact Study of the San Agustín MetroCable.
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cables (as opposed to underground lines). 
Drinking water is supplied regularly at least 
three times a week. Gas is bought in canisters 
from service providers twice a week, both in the 
lower part of Los Pasajes and in the Terrazas de 
las Acacias sector, from where residents can hire 
‘wheelbarrow’ services to take the canisters to any 
part of the neighbourhood. !e telephone service 
is managed directly by the national telephone 
company in some sectors, such as the formal part 
and the La Ceiba neighbourhood, while those 
without landlines must resort to using mobile 
phones, which have good coverage with any of the 
major operators.  
Solid waste is regarded as the most 
de"cient public service, as there is no adequate 
system to collect it regularly, especially in the 
higher parts of the neighbourhood, where $y 
tipping is common, and open spaces converted 
into improvised dumps. !e municipality has tried 
to solve this problem by building waste drainpipes 
to transport solid waste down the hills where it can 
more easily be collected and disposed of. 
The San Agustín 
MetroCable Project 
!e San Agustín MetroCable was located in the 
San Agustín del Sur sector to serve the poorest 
population in the zone, thereby connecting 
them with the Metro system at Parque Central 
Station, but also o%ering local residents a valuable 
alternative to the arduous access through long 
steep routes consisting of concrete staircases which 
currently provide the only access route to their 
dwellings. Residents must negotiate an average 
of 800 steps to climb up the 200 metres between 
the lowest part of the neighbourhood and the 
mountain ridge. 
!e C.A. Metro de Caracas administers the project. 
!e aims of the cable-car lines were:
“To build a mass transport system of 
a cable-car type to meet the mobility 
and accessibility demands of the San 
Agustín del Sur sector, in the Libertador 
Municipality of the Capital District”.
“!e project aims to improve the quality 
of life of the inhabitants in the areas 
served by the project, and also contribute 
to redistribute the local population over 
space towards the Ministry of Habitat and 
Housing’s plans in the poorest zones.”
 “!is system will contribute to 
upgrade the spaces around the stations, 
complemented with new buildings for the 
provision of services and leisure such as 
parks, libraries, school canteens, internet 
rooms, and nurseries, as well as education 
and health facilities, amongst others”4.
Work began in early 2007 and, as said earlier, 
operations formally began in 2010 at no initial 
cost to users. Fares were introduced three months 
later including single trips on the aerial cable-
car, or integrated fares comprising use of the 
4  http://www.metrodecaracas.com.ve/obrasyproy/"-
chatec_mcable.html
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Figure 3: San Agustín MetroCable Route
Source: Cametro, 2008
Metro system. !e cost of the project was initially 
estimated at US$54 million (Cametro, 2008). 
!ree years on, total costs had been revised 
upwards to US$318 million, with expenditures 
of some US$257 million by mid-20125, including 
complementary buildings and facilities around the 
stations. !e line was projected for a daily demand 
estimated at 15,000 passengers (1,200/hour), a 
length of 1.8 kilometres, 51 cabins with a capacity 
of eight people each (six seated and two standing), 
and a commercial speed of "ve metres per second 
for a total of journey duration of nine minutes for 
all "ve stations (Cametro, 2008). 
It is unquestionable that the MetroCable 
made a mark on the inhabitants of one of the 
most depressed neighbourhoods in the capital 
5  Cametro O#cial site: www.metrodecaracas.com.ve
city, including: greater accessibility to the mass 
transit network, reductions in travel times to 
connect to the city, improved accessibility to 
the mass transit system for people with special 
mobility needs; improvements in speci"c 
infrastructure such as rubbish shoots, schools, 
sports facilities; and jobs for local inhabitants 
(approximately 200 between cabin attendants 
and maintenance of outside areas). However, 
despite meeting the proposed objectives, it has 
not achieved the main goal to transport the 
greatest number of people possible and connect 
them with the rest of the city. By mid-2012, the 
system was operating well below capacity, with 
estimates ranging between 4,500 passengers/day6  
and an o#cial estimate of over 6,000 passenger             
6 http://www.vtv.gov.ve/index.php/nacionales/75414
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s/day7, low "gures given the system’s operational 
capacity of up to 15,000/day. According to o#cial 
projections (Cametro, 2008), by early 2013 it 
should be transporting 11,000 passengers daily, 
a number which seems unlikely given the low 
number of service users at the time of writing in 
mid-2012. 
Alongside the low demand for the system, 
we could point out other aspects that merit more 
in-depth research such as: lack of connection to 
the system for inhabitants in the lower part of the 
neighbourhood, lack of pedestrian connection 
between stations, the fact that people cannot carry 
loads in the cabins (an expectation generated 
before operation commenced), which is especially 
important for people working in the formal and 
informal commercial sector. !e fact that, in 
contrast with the case of the K Line in Medellín’s 
Metrocable (see the earlier chapter by Brand 
and Dávila), a tourist route for Caracas has not 
been contemplated in the plan, local activities 
such as the manufacture of musical instruments         
7  http://venezuela-us.org/es/2011/01/21/metrocable-san-
agustin-cumple-un-ano-al-servicio-de-los-venezolanos/
(a local tradition in the area) have also not been 
included in any proposal, policing is only provided 
inside the stations, and issues of privacy remain 
unresolved, which has caused complaints from 
people who resent the invasion of their privacy 
by cable-car users due to the proximity between 
houses and the cabins8. And all this at a cost of 
US$318 million.
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The Old Dream
of an Aerial Cable-Car
Freddy Koch
The city of La Paz is the capital of the De-partmento (province) of La Paz and seat of government for the executive and the legisla-
tive powers in Bolivia. It was "rst founded in 1548 
by Alonso de Mendoza in Laja, a zone in the high 
plain (altiplano) characterised by its $at topography, 
windy and cold climate, and the city was established 
as a resting point between Cusco and Potosí.
!ree days a&er its founding, it was 
moved to the east, at the border of the high plain 
where the ravines start and where the climate 
is slightly warmer, called Chuquiago. From this 
moment, La Paz sealed its destiny as a unique 
city enclosed in an open valley in the form of 
a bowl, with an exit to the south following the 
Choqueyapu River.
In the lowest part of the city one can 
"nd the institutional and historical centre, 
meeting place of political powers, with residential 
neighbourhoods rising up the slopes to each side. 
Later the growth of the city and, crucially, the 
migration processes from the countryside, gave 
rise to the birth of a commuter town in higher 
up the hills where the altiplano begins known as 
the city of El Alto, with a population that today is 
larger than that of the valley.
According to the 2001 census the 
population stood at 1,552,156 inhabitants in the 
metropolitan area including the city of El Alto (INE, 
2001). !e city centre is at approximately 3,650 
metres above sea level and forms – together with the 
city of El Alto – the main urban nucleus in Bolivia. 
Historical Background
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Figure 1: Tram System in La Paz, Bolivian Power 
Co., 1921 / Source: Allen Morrison Collection
The Trams: A Sustainable 
Transport System
At the beginning of the 20th Century railroad trans-
port tended to prevail in Bolivia’s cities. Tram sys-
tems were developed in La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa 
Cruz and Oruro, which date from the same period 
when the motorcar "rst appeared, and which in that 
era was considered merely for luxury private use. 
Despite its topographical characteristics 
(heights and gradient of streets), an electric system 
of eight trams of one single car-motor within the 
urban radius was inaugurated in La Paz on 16th 
July 19091. Figure 1 shows the coverage of the 
tramlines in La Paz in the 1920s. 
In 1913, the service initially reached 
San Jorge in the southern stretch; later it was 
extended to the residential zone of Obrajes and in 
1921 a route was inaugurated which went towards 
Mira$ores. At the end of the 1920s the routes 
were reorganised: the rails of the Comercio Street 
were moved to Ingavi Street, the route of the Arce 
Avenue was moved to the 6 de Agosto Avenue and 
the itinerary of the Sopocachi line was also altered 
(see Figures 2 and 3). In 1936, the Bolivian Power 
Co. reported a $eet of 20 working vehicles and 
a route of 15 kilometres of rails. Unfortunately, 
the majority of the tram routes travelling in both 
directions had to share a single rail track in double 
route streets, which made tra#c intolerable, and 
this was su#cient reason for the La Paz tram to 
close its operations in 1950. 
1 See http://www.tramz.com/bo
Development 
of Transport Plans 
From that period until the 1980s, the number of 
vehicles in La Paz grew slowly at rates under 4% 
per year. !e "rst public transport systems were 
organised and administrated by independent 
transport providers organised in unions and 
most trips were covered by this service and 
individual transport. At the end of the 1970s, the 
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Figure 2: Trams in the Centre of La Paz, 1920s
Source: Allen Morrison Collection
con"guration of the city through the length of 
the tight valley meant that there was signi"cant 
congestion of private vehicles and the ine#ciencies 
of the unionised transport system became more 
evident. !e transport systems between La Paz 
and El Alto (private buses for between 50 and 
60 passengers) began to decline with service 
deteriorating markedly. At this point, the "rst ideas 
to change the system and search for alternatives 
arose. !e "rst change in the transport system 
was the con"guration of the Municipal Company 
for Automotive Transport (EMTA) that provided 
services for trunk routes with "xed bus stops and 
buses with a capacity of up to 105 passengers. 
Later, this system would fail due to terrible public 
administration, lack of reserves and strong 
competition from unionised transport.
In 1986 La Paz had a population of 993,000 
inhabitants with an average annual growth 
of around 4%. Approximately a third of the 
population lived in El Alto, which had a far faster 
growth than the valley, due largely to greater 
availability of space (Oster, Gakenheimer and 
Menéndez, 1988). 
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!e then mayor of the city of La Paz 
Ronald McLean Avaroa, based in the Project for 
Municipal Strengthening (PFM), designed with the 
support of the World Bank, saw the modernisation 
of transport systems as a political opportunity and a 
priority, mainly in relation to routes leading towards 
the south of the city and links with El Alto. !is led 
to an international call for proposals for mass transit 
systems between La Paz and El Alto. El Alto by this 
time had already turned into a municipality in its 
own right (2nd March 1985). Table 1 summarises the 
most important proposals presented:   
Professor Ralph Gakenheimer of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was 
approached to evaluate the proposals. A team of 
doctoral students from MIT then carried out more 
in-depth evaluations of the di%erent options for the 
La Paz-El Alto transport system at the end of 1988. 
Company Estimated cost (US$ million) Mode Capacity(passengers/hour) Journey time (minutes)
Romania
Auto Export-Im
Romeléctrico
13 Trolley bus68 units 6,800 N/A
MAS-Tectronic
Pentepla-Brazil 29
Trolley bus
101 units
12,000 
18,000 51 
German Group
Hansa-Siemens
Hochteil
100 Light Train 60,000 17 
Fomerbol-Alschtom
BCEOM-France 65 Light Train 20,000 43.5 
Grenier
Doppelmayr
Austria
6.4 (min)
19.4 (max) Aerial cable-car
5,000 
18,000 7.5 
German Group
Hansa-Siemens
Hochteil
23.8 (min)
95.2 (max) Aerial cable-car
5,000 
18,000 7.5 
Pomagalsky/
Barrengu
France-Argentina
14.4 (min)
4.2 (max) Aerial cable-car
5,000 
18,000 7.5 
Table 1: Mass Transit Proposals Between La Paz and El Alto, 1986
Source: Gakenheimer (1986) 
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Figura 3: Tranvía con 
puerta central en la avenida 
6 de Agosto, esquina avenida 
Arce, 1920s
 
 
Fuente: Colección Al-
len Morrison
Figure 3: Tram with a Central Gateway on 6 de Agosto Avenue,
Arce Corner, 1920s 
Source: Allen Morrison Collection
!e conclusions from Gakenheimer’s 
work highlight a number of issues: i) the highest 
demand is between the centre of the city and El 
Alto; indeed it is the transport system between 
these two zones that would de"ne the rest of the 
system; ii) the most attractive option is the trolley 
bus system, due to the low costs and high capacity; 
iii) more "nancial, technical and demand studies 
are necessary to take a well-reasoned decision. 
!e students’ report in 1988, more than simply 
providing more detail in the evaluation, highlights 
the important issue that rather than a merely 
technical, the decision is essentially a political    
one where large economic interests are in play. 
!is included not merely the service providers   
but also the multilateral banks who bet for one 
system or another. In the end, nothing concrete 
came out of the bids. 
In the 1990s, the national government 
policy to liberalise public transport as a form of 
countering high unemployment led to the rapid 
expansion of transport unions. !ese, along with 
other groupings such as transport cooperatives 
and other public transport associations, turned the 
transport sector into a strong political lobbying 
group, and one with whom municipal mayors 
preferred not to quarrel. None of mayor McLean’s 
successors proposed structural changes to the 
system and allowed instead the public transport 
system to grow and develop in a chaotic manner. 
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!e weak policies of the 1990s bore 
fruit in the following decade. !ousands of 
15-passenger minibuses became the public system’s 
most important mode of transport. By 2001 there 
was over 35% of spare capacity on public transport 
routes and, with little renovation of an ageing $eet, 
the system began to falter.
In 2001, La Paz’s mayor, Juan del 
Granado, launched an initiative for the 
presentation of urban infrastructure projects 
whereby bidders would gain additional points 
in the tender should their proposal be eligible 
for funding. Within this framework, the Bolink 
Company outlined a project to build an aerial 
cable-car line between La Paz and El Alto. !e 
proposal estimated that it could attract 25.7% of 
the demand (52,000 of a total of 234,000 trips/
day). !is proposal was at the level of ‘pre-design’ 
and it showed various $aws, or at least many 
of its assumptions can be questioned. Another 
project that was born from this conjuncture is 
the construction of an elevated train above the 
Choqueyapu River, as an additional solution to 
meet the demands in the southern zone of the city. 
An important milestone appeared in 
2004 when the Tonichi Sistra Consortium, with 
funding from the Inter-American Development 
Bank, unveiled a study for the "nal design of a 
mass transport system using BRT (Rapid Transit 
Bus) technology. !e conclusion and value of this 
study does not lie so much in entertaining a viable 
alternative to systems such as the aerial cable-car 
line, but it shows that the implementation and 
success of this system could only be possible by 
dislodging at least 5,000 transport suppliers from 
the current system. !is was a decisive issue in 
causing decision-making to stall once again. 
By the time of the municipal elections of 
April 2010 none of the candidates could leave to 
one side the urgency of tackling the city’s public 
transport problems. Without doubt this issue was 
now high in the public agenda.  
Luis Revilla, who won the mayoral 
elections in La Paz, bet on solving the transport 
problem as the "rst of ten main tasks of his 
administration. !e creation of solid urban 
mobility technical teams to sort out the problem 
was one of his "rst actions. At the time of writing 
in mid-2012, the urgent tasks for these teams 
involve updating studies and outlining a system 
within which the aerial cable-car is part of an 
integrated transport system. 
Within the current conjuncture, in 
August 2011 the National Government approved 
the General Transport Law No. 165, which would 
create a legal umbrella for the implementation of 
transport systems based on principles of equity, 
e#ciency, and sustainability. !is law was very well 
received by the Bolivian public, and in some way 
was used also as a political $ag for the National 
Government of President Evo Morales in the 
months following its promulgation. 
Within the framework of this Law, 
the Law for Autonomies and Administrative 
Decentralisation and the State Political 
Constitution, on the 12th April 2011 the Municipal 
Government of La Paz promulgated the Municipal 
Autonomy Law No. 15 – the Municipal Transport 
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and Vehicular Transit Law. !is Law is designed 
to provide a legal backbone to implement a new 
mass transport system. Transport providers 
immediately reacted against the law and the city 
was ground to a halt during two days of protest 
marches and blockades. !e population in La Paz 
withstood the strike and gave their support to the 
Mayor to continue with transport improvement 
projects. In the end, the transport providers toned 
down their pressure tactics. !is undoubtedly 
had a very strong political e%ect, and led to a rise 
in popularity for the Mayor, who is a member 
of an opposition party to the current national 
government, having been its ally previously. 
!e national government saw the need 
to counteract the growth in popularity of their 
political opponent and what better way to achieve 
this than reviving the idea of a cable-car line. On 
11th July 2012 a dra& law was presented to the 
National Congress for the construction of three 
aerial cable-car lines in the city of La Paz and its 
inter-connection with El Alto, with an approximate 
cost of US$234 million to be delivered within 
18 months as a turnkey project by a private 
contractor. Congress approved the dra& Law in 
record time, and President Evo Morales sanctioned 
it onto law on 16th July 2012.
Figura 4: Sistema propuesto de teleféricos La Paz-El Alto
Figure 4: Proposed La Paz-El Alto Aerial Cable-Car System 
Source: http://www.paginasiete.bo/2012-07-12/Sociedad/Destacados/35sco120712-01.aspx 
(accessed 12 July 2012).
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Conclusions
La Paz’s steep topography would seem to suggest 
that aerial cable-cars are a fast, clean and e#cient 
way to transport passengers between the two 
municipalities. !is will always be present in the 
collective imagination. 
!e features and international publicity of 
Medellín’s aerial cable-cars showing that can be built 
quickly and can o%er e#cient transport services 
to low-income populations in faraway zones, 
while contributing to reduce crime and insecurity, 
have turned this project into a politically popular 
reference point in Bolivia, despite high costs when 
compared with other options.  
During Bolivia’s neoliberal period the 
cable-car project hinged on private concessions 
and pro"tability to be sustainable. !e main reason 
why it was not built was perhaps the high initial 
investment involved. Today, the national govern-
ment of Evo Morales, on the back of healthy "scal 
reserves (partly the result of "scal appropriation of 
mineral exports), is more prepared than previous 
governments to tackle projects of great complexity, 
such as a comprehensive national road networks. 
As we understand it, the aerial cable-car lines 
will draw on the same "nancial base, and as such 
will not have to rely on future fare collection as a 
means to repay the initial investment. Moreover, it 
would seem that the future operation of the system 
will be assumed by the state. 
It is worth highlighting two issues arising 
from the aforementioned: i) !is is the "rst time 
that Bolivia decides to spend substantial resources 
on an urban transport project; undoubtedly this 
should give way to investment in future projects, 
not only in La Paz but in other cities too; ii) the 
aerial cable-car project for La Paz-El Alto is more 
a political project than a means of alleviating 
transport problems as suggested by the estimation 
that it will absorb 20% of the public transport 
demand between La Paz and El Alto. If the 
objective were to meet the demand, investments 
should have gone towards funding the BRT mass 
transit system.
At the time of writing in mid-2012 
the great challenge still to be resolved is to link 
the aerial cable-car project (championed by the 
national government) – as it has now become a 
fact – with proposals for the BRT mass transit 
system (championed by local governments) to 
ensure that there is fare integration. !e overall 
aim should be to create a transport system that 
provides citizens with improved mobility and 
better quality of life. 
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The Programme for Accelerated Growth (PAC) launched in 2007 by Brazil’s federal government includes a set of interventions 
in low-income settlements and large investments 
in urban facilities and services and support to 
local inhabitants (BRAZ, 2010). A social and ur-
ban planning intervention in the neighbourhood 
known as Complexo do Alemão (IUCA) was carried 
out as part of this programme. !is was a joint 
implemented by the government of the State of 
Rio de Janeiro and the Mayor’s O#ce of the city of 
Rio de Jainero, aided by transfers from the federal 
government. !e intervention in Complexo do 
Alemão is considered in Latin America to be an 
emblematic case of intervention in an informal 
settlement. !e choice of this area was due to the 
precariousness of its urban infrastructure, lack of 
facilities and poor basic public services, its high levels 
of social vulnerability, and the presence of armed 
gangs which made the area known as the head-
quarters of Comando Vermelho, one of the main 
criminal gangs which control drug tra#cking in the 
informal settlements (favelas) of Rio de Janeiro.
According to the Public Works Enterprise 
of the State of Rio de Janeiro (EMOP), the PAC 
Alemão, which began in 2008 inspired by the 
experience of Medellín, comprised investments 
and integrated actions in diverse "elds such as 
infrastructure, the supply of public facilities, 
improvement of housing and construction of 
Introduction
Context and Potential Impact 
of Complexo de Alemão,  
Vânia Regina Amorim da Silva
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new dwellings, street layouts, risk mitigation, and 
policies for land regularisation and job and income 
generation programmes. !e project has been 
hailed especially for its action for urban mobility, 
such as in the construction of an aerial cable-car 
lines integrating "ve hills of Complexo do Alemão 
with a network of trains that serve Rio de Jainero’s 
Metropolitan Region. 
Social and Planning 
Features of Complexo 
do Alemão
Situated in Rio de Janeiro’s northern zone, 
Complexo do Alemão is a group of "&een 
communes.1 !ese are built on the Sierra de la 
Misericordia, and the majority of these settlements 
were born out of informal occupation of the area, 
and subsequent proliferation of poor quality 
housing units, insecure tenancy and unregulated 
sub-divisions (see Figure 1). 
Based on data from the 2010 population 
census, Instituto Pereira Passos estimates that the 
communities of Complexo do Alemão live in an 
area of 177 hectares, with a population of 60,583 
inhabitants and 18,442 housing units. !e area has 
a high population density when compared with the 
city’s average: in the communes there were 323.2 
1  Vila Matinha, Parque Alvorada, Morro das palmei-
ras, Rua 1 pela Ademas, Rua Armando Sodré, Morro do 
Alemão, Joaquim de Queiróz, Nova Brasília, Mourão 
Filho, Morro da Baiana, Estrada do Itararé, Itararé, Morro 
do Adeus, Morro do Piancó and Relicário.
inhabitants per hectare in 2010 and an average of 
3.29 per housing unit, while city-wide averages were 
110.7 inhabitants per hectare and 2.94 per unit.
Chaotic land occupation coupled with 
high densities and occupation of steep slopes has 
given rise to a road network of tortuously tight 
streets, without space for vehicle circulation and 
o&en without pavements. !is situation makes 
mobility and accessibility very di#cult, and indeed 
made access of essential public services such as, for 
example, solid waste collection and ambulances, 
very di#cult if not impossible. 
!e lack of public transport was replaced 
by informal networks, with the support of 
politicians and drug tra#ckers, as in the case of 
the van cooperatives and motorbike-taxis which 
operate in the Complexo. !ese are more $exible 
than formal transport networks and o%er some 
residents a viable income-earning option. Poor 
presence of state agencies, according to Kleiman 
(2010), led to the creation of alternative networks 
to provide basic services that can be seen not 
only in transport but also in the supply of water, 
sewerage services and electricity. Funk dance 
events, pagodes and forrós o%ered by grassroots 
organisations (Associações de Moradores who 
own sound systems) are virtually the only 
entertainment available to local communities.
!e Complexo do Alemão is an area 
segregated from the rest of the city. !is can be 
seen in the social, infrastructure and public service 
indicators (see Table 1). A study carried out by 
Serasa Experian showed that 37% of young people 
in the communes lack professional quali"cations 
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Figure 1: Communities of the Complexo do Alemão and the Aerial Cable-Car Line
Sources: EMOP, 2012; IPP, 2011.
Area No latrine/toilet inside the house
Inadequate disposal of 
solid waste
Residents aged 15 
years or more who are 
illiterate
Rio de Janeiro 0,1 0,7 2,9
Complexo do Alemão 
Communes 0,2 8,2 7,7
Table 1: Social Indicators in Complexo do Alemão and in Rio de Janeiro (percentages)
Source: IBGE, 2010 Population Census
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and educational incentives, compared to 18% 
for the city in general, another indication of the 
considerable vulnerability of this social group. 
Interventions 
in Complexo do Alemão
According to a study by Nery and Flaeschen 
(2010), the PAC resources from the Caixa 
Econõmica Federal, added to local matching 
funds, amounted to US$405 million2 in invest-
ments in Complexo do Alemão. !e majority of 
the communities of Complexo bene"ted, with the 
exception of the Relicário community.
PAC interventions included infrastructure work in 
water supply, sewerage, drainage, street lighting, 
pavement improvements and slope stabilisation. 
!ere was also supply of education and health 
infrastructure such as the Colégio Estadual 
Jornalista Tim Lopes, the Centro de Educação 
Tecnológica e Pro"ssionalizante (CETEP), Centro 
Integrado de Atuação em Saúde, a 1,540 m2 library 
with areas reserved for the arts, music studio 
rooms, a computer room with 100 computers and 
video library, a sporting facility with a half-length 
Olympic pool, an income generation centre and a 
legal aid centre. 
According to the State government, 
other community facilities were proposed such 
as a shopping centre, a police post, a post o#ce, 
2  !e investment in Brazilian Reais was R$827,721,089.17. 
!e exchange rate between the dollar and the real is based 
on data from the Banco Central do Brasil issued on the 
23rd July 2012. 
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the construction of 2,620 new homes and the 
improvement of close to 5,600 houses. In this 
project they included the total recovery of the 
Parque Municipal Urbano da Serra da Misericórdia. 
!ere was also an aim to regularise land tenure 
of all properties in the Complexo, as well they 
employment and income generation initiatives 
for the community who have bene"ted from the 
broader programme. 
One highly visible project was the aerial 
cable-car line, inaugurated in July 2011, comprising 
six stations: Bonsucesso, Adeus, Baiana, Alemão, 
Itararé/ Alvorada and Palmeiras, on a route of 3.4 
kilometres. According to EMOP information, the 
system is composed of 152 gondolas, with a capacity 
of ten passengers each, with an operational capacity 
of 3,000 passengers/hour. !e journey between 
Palmeiras and Bonsucesso, which previously took 
one hour, was reduced to 17 minutes excluding 
waiting time. !is also has the advantage of being 
integrated into the railway system through transfers 
at Bonsucesso Station. !e intention was to reduce 
the journey time, facilitating access to places of 
employment, leisure time and cultural facilities, 
improving urban mobility, especially in the highest 
points of the hills where access to alternative 
transport is more di#cult. 
According to EMOP, the construction of 
the cable-car line cost US$103 million3. 
3 !e investment in Brazilian Reais was R$ 210,000,000.00. 
!e exchange rate between the dollar and the real is based 
on data from the Banco Central do Brasil for 23rd July 2012.
Construction took three years and 
employed around 3,500 workers, many of whom 
came from the communities. Local young 
people aged between sixteen and twenty-four are 
employed as attendants in the cable-car stations.
According to Ícaro Moreno, president 
of EMOP, the Medellín Metro Company acted as 
consultants to produce a study with the aim of 
modelling the operation, maintenance, emergency 
recovery, proposal for the collection of fares and 
even the pro"les of future workers. !e State 
established that residents from the Complexo had 
the right to two free return trips per day.4 In less 
than a year of operation, it has transported more 
than two million people. Supervia, the company 
administering the cable-car concession, reports 
that they transport ten thousand passengers every 
day (compared with 30,000 on Medellín’s K Line).
!e Secretariat of the Segurança do 
Estado do Rio de Janeiro created four Police 
Paci"cation Units (UPP) that covered all the 
communities. !ese represent a new model of 
public security, which aims to restore and assure 
territorial control through community police, 
stimulating greater links between the community 
and the police.   
4  Each ticket costs R$1.00 and a fare integrated with 
train services costs R$2.90. Working hours are Monday 
to Friday 6 am to 9 pm; Saturday from 8 am to 8 pm; and 
Sunday and holidays from 7 am to 7 pm.
196
Impacts of the Cable-Car 
in Complexo do Alemão
An accessible, e#cient and quality collective 
transport service which guarantees access for 
the population to all the urban space can “(…) 
considerably increase the availability of income 
and time for the poorest, facilitate access to basic 
social services (health, education and leisure) and 
to work opportunities ” (Gomide, 2003, p.8). For 
this reason, the cable car was an important action 
in terms of reducing socio-spatial inequalities and 
the integration of this area with its surrounding 
area. It has also allowed inhabitants to rediscover 
their neighbourhood given that, before the cable-
car line was launched, many of them did not 
walk between the communities due to di#cult 
access and insecurity. Moreover, it has stimulated 
tourist exploration of the zone, and it receives 
visitors from outside, it has generated income 
and contributed to the decline of stereotypes by 
breaking down symbolic boundaries. 
!e cable stations have been transformed 
into new urban nodes, o%ering public and 
private services, such as free basic education and 
professional courses o%ered by SESI and SENAI 
(Sistema FIRJAN- Federação das Indústrias do 
Estado do Rio de Janeiro) in the Itararé Station. 
A Reference Centre for Social Assistance, a post 
o#ce, an INSS attention post – a body of Brazil’s 
Federal Government for social wellbeing, a Youth 
Referral Centre in Alemaõ Station. In the Adeus 
Station an agency of Banco do Brasil was opened, 
with ATM machines from the Caixa Econõmica 
Federal and Banco Bradesco. !e Mayor’s O#ce 
installed a point for urban and social orientation 
in Baiana station. Another positive aspect of the 
planning interventions was the number of social 
actions implemented in the communities, which 
have bene"ted from a number of educational, 
cultural and sporting events. 
Despite visibility, the use of the system 
amongst residents is limited. For example, a news 
programme of Jornal RJTV from the O Globo TV 
network (24th January 2012) pointed out that, 
according to Supervia, only 12% of the inhabitants 
of Complexo do Alemão had used the cable-car. 
!e inhabitants maintain that the cable-car only 
bene"ts residents in the higher parts of the hills. For 
inhabitants in the lower parts access to the stations 
is more di#cult, and they continue to use other 
means of transport. On the Adeus hill, for example, 
it is necessary to climb stairs to reach the station, or 
to walk long distances. Another argument for not 
using the cable-car is fear of being stuck in the air 
due to technical problems. 
!e construction of the cable-car line 
has had much criticism, such as that stressing that 
it took up more than a quarter of the programme 
budget. Some residents argue that decisions regarding 
facilities and interventions were done with no broad 
popular consultation (Migon, 2011). Moreover, there 
is much disquiet on the decision to relocate 2,000 
families (Agencia Brasil, 2010) in order to meet 
deadlines and complete all the construction work 
in the Complexo. According to Freitas (2012), 920 
houses were built within or close to the Complexo 
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to relocate these families. Some families receive rent 
support while their houses are completed. Houses 
were purchased for 654 families who had to be 
relocated due to environmental risks. However, the 
demand for housing in the Alemão zone is large. !e 
PAC has an additional contribution from the Caixa 
Econõmica Federal for the construction of more than 
1,500 houses for these families.
Social participation and community 
mobilisation in the "rst phase of the project and 
during the implementation of works have also 
le& much to be desired. Despite the fact that 
participatory planning is highlighted in the Estatuto 
das Cidades5, researchers from Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econõmica Aplicada (IPEA), the public federal 
foundation linked to the Secretariat for Strategic 
Matters of the Presidency of Brazil, reported 
the need for greater participation of residents in 
5   Law 10.257 de 10/07/2001 regulating urban policy in 
Brazil, and outlines conditions for the transfer of federal 
resources to municipalities. 
decision-making and pointed out that they should 
have been given more detailed information about 
the project (Nery and Flaeschen, 2010).
Final Thoughts
!e PAC Alemão arises from a policy framework 
of integrated planning, where public transport 
is seen as an important urban poverty reduction 
mechanism. Despite these good intentions, the 
social and economic impact of such interventions 
in the ground must be examined once the have 
been completed. In particular, it remains to be seen 
to what extent the aerial cable-car line contributed 
to an improvement in the mobility of communi-
ties in the Complexo and further integration of 
these areas with the rest of the city. More remains 
to be done in terms of complementary actions for 
employment generation and social and cultural af-
"rmation for local residents and workers. 
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Conclusions : 
What Have 
We Learned from 
Medellín and Soacha?
Julio D. Dávila, Peter Brand, Jorge Acevedo and Juan Pablo Bocarejo
The contributions in this book o%er                    a relatively complete panorama of the possible e%ects that a series of technological 
and institutional innovations supported by 
a local government such as the Medellín 
municipality can have on some of the city’s poorest 
populations. And in documenting the Soacha case,  
a neighbouring municipality to Bogotá, we can see 
the enormous di#culties of carrying out a similar 
project where similar conditions to Medellín, 
which is now considered almost iconic, are 
lacking. Despite not yet being documented in the 
same level of detail, the experiences of other cities 
such as Rio de Janeiro and Caracas, where similar 
aerial cable-car systems to those of Medellín have 
been launched, or those of La Paz and Cali, where 
these are being considered, still o%er valuable and 
important lessons.
In this last chapter we re$ect on the most 
important lessons from the research project of 
which this book is a product. In analysing two 
municipalities with a common national legislation 
and institutional framework, we believe that 
contrasting Medellín and Soacha is a particularly 
useful exercise, and without doubt the other 
examples in this book are a valuable complement 
to these re$ections.
!e e%ectiveness of a set of interventions 
such as those documented here for Medellín can 
be gauged with the help of three inter-related 
criteria. !e "rst of these is an increase in mobility. 
!e second is the degree of poverty reduction 
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in the population who lives and works in the 
neighbourhoods a%ected by the intervention, 
which is tied to increased opportunities for self-
development both individually and collectively. 
!e third is the level of urban integration of the 
neighbourhoods that, although this might be seen 
as a result of the previous two, also refers to the 
perception that the rest of the city has of these 
neighbourhoods, along with their physical linkages 
with the rest of the city.   
Before contrasting the di%erences between 
the communes in Medellín and Soacha, it is worth 
brie$y outlining the institutional and legislative 
framework that these two local governments 
share. Colombia adopted a decentralisation 
programme over 20 years ago, and this has given 
its municipalities considerable political autonomy 
(the mayors and local legislative executive 
are democratically elected every four years), 
administrative autonomy (the municipalities 
decide on road infrastructure and public space, 
the management of public transport, public 
utilities, education and health, amongst others) 
and, to a lesser degree, "scal autonomy, given that 
taxation levels are determined through national 
legislation (including local taxes). In compensation, 
a considerable proportion of national revenues 
are distributed amongst the Departmentos 
(provinces) and municipalities to complement the 
resources they have to exercise these functions. 
!is distribution is carried out in accordance with 
formulae designed to help redistribute resources 
from the richest and most developed regions to the 
poorest and most backward ones. 
However, the management of local 
taxes (to property values, to the gross turnover 
of industry and local commerce, along with 
betterment taxes) depends on the adequate 
organisation and e#ciency of local governments, 
and in particular, of updating of property 
values through regular cadastral surveys. As 
such, the more modern and best organised 
municipalities tend to collect substantial local 
revenues to supplement national transfers, 
while the most backward ones depend on these 
central transfers for the bulk of their budget. 
Medellín is an excellent example of the "rst group, 
whereas Soacha is perhaps the country’s largest 
municipality belonging to the second group. !is 
is aggravated by the fact that Soacha’s population is 
mainly poor, many of them are settled on illegally 
occupied sites, and as such their property is of 
low value or impossible to incorporate into the 
property register. 
In the case of Medellín, it is worth 
distinguishing between the nature and the e%ects 
that the two interventions have had, represented 
in the two Metrocable lines. Likewise, it is worth 
pointing out the di%erences between the e%ects of 
the aerial cable-car line and the e%ects of urban, 
social and institutional interventions embodied 
in the Integrated Urban Projects (PUIs) and other 
municipal programmes. !e "rst, without doubt 
the most striking for the visitor, refers to the 
Metrocable K Line (Santo Domingo and Parque 
España), as it is not only the most visible to the 
rest of the city due to its proximity to the city 
centre and the main Metro line, but also due to the 
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Municipality’s deliberate strategy of connecting it 
with the L Line to Arví Park, today o& frequented 
by the Medellín public and tourists from outside 
the city. It also concerns the neighbourhoods 
where the interventions of the Urban Development 
Agency, through the PUIs, have perhaps been 
more e%ective, as was documented earlier in the 
chapters on Medellín. Urban upgrading around 
the J Line appears less visible to a visitor but, at 
the time of completing this research project, it has 
had a signi"cantly lesser impact in terms of our 
three criteria: mobility of local residents, improved 
opportunities, and degree of urban integration 
with the city. We are far from suggesting that the 
second line has failed simply by virtue of the fact 
that it carries a third of passengers in the K Line 
(and similar to the Complexo de Alemão in Rio), 
as the main aim of the line is to unite the distant 
Ciudadela Nuevo Occidente through an integrated 
transport system with the rest of the city. Indeed, 
there is no doubt that the very existence of the line 
and the housing complexes that continue to be 
built are an indication of a palpable institutional 
presence of the local government.  
What, then, are the most obvious 
di%erences between Medellín and Soacha? What 
explains the pessimistic tone of the chapters on 
Soacha in this book in terms of the feasibility of an 
aerial cable and its potential in achieving an urban 
transformation as signi"cant as that seen in whole 
neighbourhoods in Medellín’s Communes 1 and 
2? And, perhaps more importantly, what can we 
learn from the contrast between the two that can 
be useful for other urban contexts? 
!e "rst key lesson refers to making 
urban poverty more visible, thereby ensuring its 
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presence in the city’s political agenda.  Medellín’s 
high population density and its topography of a 
long valley and steep hills means that large parts 
of the city are visible from the train carriages on 
the Metro A Line: the elegant residential towers 
of the exclusive El Poblado neighbourhood, the 
old recycled industrial buildings of the Ciudadela 
del Río, the sculptures by Maestro Botero close 
to the Parque Berrío station, the Orquideorama 
in the Botanical Gardens, and the low-income 
neighbourhoods of Moravia, Popular and Santo 
Domingo. Despite the fact that, for at least one 
generation, these communities were su%ocated 
by violence and exclusion arising from poverty, 
unemployment and the almost total control of 
their territory by illegal armed groups, this poverty 
seemed removed from the daily life of many 
Medellín residents. However, a decade ago, the 
geographical proximity of these neighbourhoods 
to the city centre, and yet their obvious functional 
disconnection from the rest of the city, somehow 
combined to ensure that the interventions described 
in this book had a political echo and were generally 
accepted by the population as part of an important 
urban project that concerned everyone.    
In contrast, Soacha is a municipality 
lying outside of Bogotá’s jurisdiction, physically 
removed from the centres of power and decision-
making, and visible exclusively to the users of the 
road connecting the city with the south west of 
the country. Despite being an important industrial 
centre, in Bogotanos’ imagination it is associated 
with poverty, poor public management, and 
pollution from its manufacturing and mining 
industries. Even further from all this is Commune 
4 and Altos de Cazucá neighbourhood, the 
object of this study, which is not even visible 
from the main road as it is necessary to climb 
a series of steep hills on an abysmal road to get 
there. It is a neighbourhood marked by violence 
and hopelessness, as were Communes 1 and 2 
in Medellín during the 1980s and 1990s, but the 
di%erence lies in the fact that it is not only far 
from the centre of Bogotá but it falls within a 
di%erent local authority. !ere is no doubt that the 
severity of its social problems and the presence 
of national NGOs and even international NGOs 
contribute to increasing its political visibility; this 
certainly weighed in on President Uribe’s proposal 
to build an aerial cable-car line there. But as 
political priorities shi&ed towards the end of his 
presidential term, the lack of physical visibility 
contributed to the project losing political currency. 
As a corollary to this analysis, we could 
point out that an important lesson from this 
project is that, according to our three criteria of 
mobility, poverty reduction and integration, a 
necessary "rst step to make an urban intervention 
e%ective is the need to consistently maintain 
political visibility in the intervention zone and its 
population. In the absence of physical visibility, 
political visibility can be achieved by other 
mechanisms such as public debates and an urban 
and regional vision that transcends administrative 
divisions. Apart from the obvious ethical and 
social justice considerations underpinning an 
intervention of the kind demanded by local 
residents, it must be remembered that the majority 
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of Soacha’s labour force can be classi"ed as low 
socio-economic strata, and that this labour force is 
crucial to Bogotá’s metropolitan economy. 
A second lesson arises clearly from 
a comparison between institutions in the two 
municipalities. In the previous chapters there was 
a clear contrast, on one hand, between Soacha’s 
political chaos, corruption and the lack of human 
and "nancial resources, and the solidity of local 
institutions with strong technical and "nancial 
capacity and a political-institutional structure 
fostering coordination between the planning 
and implementation of projects which Medellín 
enjoyed on the other. It is also clear that it is public 
institutions and businesses that inspired, "nanced 
and managed the Metrocables and complementary 
urban projects. Governance has not been a public-
private project, but rather an openly political 
project in the hands of independent, imaginative 
and progressive local governments.  
In contrast, in Soacha, the most visible 
characteristic of the local government is weakness 
("nancial, institutional, administrative and 
political) and, as a result, the feeling of impotence 
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of this government in facing the problems and 
challenges of an extremely poor population living 
in informal conditions that is growing fast and is 
situated in far-away, hilly, geologically unstable 
risk zones. For such a government, an aerial cable-
car project surpasses its meagre capacities, and 
it is far from the administration’s priorities. Its 
eventual construction and operation will crucially 
depend on decisions and actions from the national 
government and the Bogotá administration.  
Soacha’s disappointing experience 
demonstrates a frequent problem in the 
development of transport projects, and one 
that relates to institutional capacity of those 
responsible for leading them. Although the Cazucá 
cable-car line designed by the Medellín Metro 
Company is technically sound, Soacha’s municipal 
administration lacked the management capacity 
to undertake its construction: no technical team 
was created nor was there any capacity building, 
nor were there strategies for funding or future 
operation of the system.    
A project conceived at national level like 
other transport systems such as the BRT planned 
for Colombia’s main cities, could not, by law, be 
"nanced or developed by a territorial entity other 
than Soacha municipality. !is local authority was 
bequeathed it but was neither able to integrate it 
within the transport system nor to promote it as 
part of an integrated urban development vision. 
In the absence of a metropolitan authority, Bogotá 
has not been interested in the project despite the 
fact that it has the necessary institutional capacity 
to lead the project. 
A third key lesson which arises from the 
interventions in Medellín refers to the enormous 
e%ort ("nancial, institutional and technical) 
required to link and integrate the Metrocables to 
the surrounding neighbourhoods and the city 
more generally. !e aerial cable-car system does 
not guarantee, in and of itself, a “take-o% ” in 
neighbourhood improvement; rather it constitutes 
an axis around which one can patiently build, 
over the course of time, lasting processes for 
improvement and urban growth. !e Metrocables’ 
urban development success resides in the fact that 
it forms part of a coherent ‘city project’ but also 
one in continuous evolution. 
A fourth lesson from the Medellín 
experience refers to the need to work closely with 
communities in the area of in$uence of the aerial 
cable-car lines in all phases of the project. !is 
means not simply passing a line above people’s 
houses, but rather inserting the project in local 
daily life so that it responds to the needs and 
aspirations of communities and contributes to 
raising living standards. !e di%erences between 
the J and K Lines clearly highlight the relevance 
of this issue. !e constant presence of a local 
government capable of deploying a range of 
"nancial resources and highly quali"ed personnel, 
supported by local planning and participatory 
budgeting processes has been crucial to the success 
of these interventions.
Finally, the Medellín case o%ers a range 
of stimulating re$ections, not fully explored 
in this book. !ese relate to the attempt by the 
local government to counteract the enormous 
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Medellín: K Line and España Park-Library 
spatial fragmentation that is a feature of the city 
(along with many other Latin American cities). 
!is is a product of very high levels of economic 
inequality and successive urban development 
plans and management patterns that contributed 
to maintaining, and even increasing, segregation. 
Radical reforms would be needed to eliminate 
the barriers and physical distances separating 
the inhabitants of residential neighbourhoods in 
di%erent socio-economic strata, reforms that far 
exceed the capabilities and the four-year term 
of any given local administration. Attempts to 
homogenise social behaviour through programmes 
such as Medellín’s ‘Metro Culture’ no doubt help 
facilitate the management of the mass transport 
system. But at the same time, and pointing in an 
almost opposite direction, the city has gradually 
begun to create physical spaces to allow the 
interaction of very diverse social groups, and where 
the potential embodied in the social and cultural 
wealth and diversity that constitute the heritage of 
any city can be best appreciated. In Medellín, these 
spaces for social interaction are ever more apparent 
at di%erent scales. !ey represent a crucial step 
towards the recognition and appreciation of cultural 
and individual diversity, which, over the long           
term, can contribute, to greater social inclusion           
and conviviality. 
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